The attack in the city of Ahvaz which targeted the military parade organized by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and the Iranian army on September 22, 2018, on the occasion of the so-called “Sacred Defense Week”, indicates that Iran is set to experience tough times on more than one front. This is the case given the fact that the attack coincides with the continued internal protests over deteriorating living conditions, due to the government’s failure to contain the various economic woes, and the growing pressure of the US sanctions, as the strongest batch, on November 4, looms large on the horizon.
The attack may introduce a new variable that will have an impact on Iran’s interactions with major regional and international powers during the coming period, as the Iranian officials are keen to link it to the pressures their country are facing due to its persistent meddling in the internal affairs of regional countries, impeding efforts to resolve the current crises, and supporting terrorist organizations.
Two Important Implications
The attack, the strongest and deadliest since long time, has two major implications:
1- A security deficiency: The way in which the attack was carried out reveals a significant security deficiency, given the particular importance the Iranian institutions attach to such celebrations, which mark the anniversary of the outbreak of the 1980 – 1988 Iranian war with Iraq, contrary to the claims propagated by Iran as it is “the most stable state in the region, which has political stability and security”. This may prompt the Iranian authorities to review their security measures, both by the Ministry of Interior and the IRGC, which was the main target of the attack, due to its internal and external roles, which have made it an enemy to many sides at home and abroad.
2- Political significance: Remarkably, the attack took place in the city of Ahvaz, home to the Arab ethnic community. This, of course, amplifies the multiple problems in the city, which although it has vast natural resources of oil and gas, it suffers discrimination and marginalization by the regime, at various levels, a policy the latter pursues in other provinces of non-Persian ethnicities, such as the Kurds, Baluchis, and Azeris.
Direct Repercussions
The attack, which the Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahwaz (ASMLA) and ISIS have claimed responsibility of it, without providing evidence, will have direct repercussions at home and abroad, the most prominent of which are the following:
1- Stepping up armed confrontations: The attack is set to push the IRGC for a new phase of armed confrontations with ethnic groups in Iran, using force to handle the measures taken by the authorities in the areas they inhabit. Noticeably, the latest attack came a few days after the IRGC launched missile attacks on Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) positions in northern Iraq on September 9.
Accordingly, the Iranian authorities will be keen to link these potential confrontations with the recent protests in many cities and provinces, in a bid to downplay the importance of these protests and portray them as demonstrations fueled by internal actors acting on behalf of foreign forces.
2- Launching a diplomatic offensive: Iran may exploit the recent attack in the diplomatic offensive it is expected to lead during UN General Assembly meetings in New York, in which President Hassan Rouhani participates, as part of its attempts to confront US pressures. The administration of US President Donald Trump, in turn, seeks to rally support of the largest number of international powers for its policy on Iran, considering the latter threatens regional stability, because of its nuclear program, its ongoing interference in the internal affairs of regional countries and supporting terrorism.
President Rouhani began his diplomatic offensive on Washington even before leaving Iran for New York, saying that it does not respect international treaties and acts to destabilize security and stir unrest in Iran, a rhetoric that Iranian officials seem to adopt in New York, during meetings that bring together the foreign ministers of Iran and the remaining P4+1 parties to the nuclear deal or the meetings in which President Rouhani himself will participate.
3- Mounting pressure: Iran may take advantage of recent attack to exert further pressure on European countries, which are currently making efforts to enhance the viability of the nuclear deal. Iran tries to push those countries to take security measures against Iranian opposition groups as part of the “incentive package”, which could result in keeping Iran in the nuclear agreement and not resuming its nuclear program
That may help explain why the Iranian Foreign Ministry has summoned the ambassadors of the Netherlands, Denmark and the British charge d’affaires on the same day of the attack. The ambassadors of the first two states were “informed of Iran’s strong protests over their respective countries’ hosting of some members of the terrorist group” which carried out the attack in Ahvaz, while the British Charge d'affaires was told it was unacceptable “that the spokesman for the Al-Ahvazi terrorist group was allowed to claim responsibility of the attack through a London-based TV network”, according to the Foreign Ministry Spokesman Bahram Qasemi.
In other words, Iran may add the classifying of these groups as terrorist organizations and expelling their members and cadres from European countries to the conditions that have already declared in order to continue to adhere to the nuclear agreement and abide by its various provisions. This may constitute a new bone of contention with the European countries which are eager to host some opposition groups that have succeeded in attracting international attention to human rights violations committed by the Iranian regime against different ethnicities and political activists.
4- Launching retaliatory attacks: The IRGC may orchestrate retaliatory attacks against the interests of the countries that it believes are behind this attack, as it did in the past when it took part in operations against those accused of involvement in the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists. This is evident in the statement of the Chief of General Staff of Iranian Armed Forces Major General Mohammad Bagheri, in which he said: “It will spare no effort in chasing and punishing terrorists in the region and beyond”.
This may also serve Iran’s attempts to justify its military presence in Syria, as part of its forward defence strategy. It claims that its presence there aims at combating terrorist organizations before they reach Tehran, a matter runs contrary to realities on the ground, which show that the Iranian role in the region is one of the major causes for the increasing activity of these organizations.
In sum, Iran is currently facing tough tests, given the interconnected pressures due to the internal protests, security tensions, and US sanctions, which are set to have considerable domestic repercussions, possibly the toughest for the current regime.
