The evolving situation in Syria raises numerous pressing questions that demand answers. Officials seek to understand how to navigate future dealings with Syria, while ordinary citizens are eager to comprehend the rapid, dramatic developments reshaping the region. These changes, potentially serving as a "political and security pivot," could initiate a chain of repercussions acknowledged to extend beyond Syria, influencing the entire Middle East. Moreover, the unfolding events in Syria might significantly impact broader geopolitical dynamics, further emphasizing the far-reaching consequences of the current situation.
The future conduct of armed factions in Syria remains one of the most crucial questions. Uncertainty lingers over whether members and leaders of these groups will cling to the ideologies of terrorist organizations like ISIS and al-Qaeda, with which they were affiliated for years. Alternatively, we may be witnessing a transformation and maturation in the thinking and behavior of these new groups poised to govern Syria.
Amid concerns over Syria's territorial integrity, a significant question arises regarding the commitment of Ahmad al-Shara'a, better known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, and his comrades in Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) to the Syrian national state project, including its institutions, particularly the Syrian army. After years of fighting to overthrow the Assad regime, the political will and determination of these factions to preserve Syria's territorial unity remain uncertain.
Furthermore, the restoration of Syria's pre-war borders appears increasingly challenging. Israel controls approximately 270 square kilometers in southern Syria, Kurdish forces continue to expand their control, and other actors such as Russian and American forces maintain a presence in the region. These factors collectively raise doubts about the feasibility of restoring Syria's pre-war original territorial boundaries.
Positive Indicators
Despite the complexities, several positive signs have emerged following the armed factions’ takeover of governance in Syria:
1. Unifying discourse and moderate behavior:
In the wake of Bashar Assad's regime collapse, HTS and its leader Ahmad al-Shara'a adopted a unifying and moderate tone. Their rhetoric shifted positively towards the Alawite, Christian, and Druze communities, describing them as partners in the homeland. By rejecting the violent discourse of groups like Jabhat al-Nusra, HTS signaled a political approach that respects minorities and eschews vengeance.
2. Readiness for the new experiment:
In the days following the armed factions' rise to power in Syria, widespread willingness to support and engage positively with the new governance structure has emerged, offering a genuine chance for the new rulers to succeed. A notable example of this support comes from Qardaha, the birthplace of Bashar Assad, where residents, elders, and notables have pledged to cooperate with and support the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and the Free Syrian Army in the coming period. These individuals emphasized the heavy price they have paid during the war, which broke out in March 2011, and expressed hope for a new era free from the funerals of their young men, many of whom were previously killed in battles between the former regime and the opposition.
3. Smooth transition of power:
A recently emerged photograph features Ahmed Al-Sharaa, Mohammed Al-Jalali (the last Prime Minister under Bashar Assad), and Mohammed Al-Bashir (appointed to lead the transitional government). The image asserts the notion that Syrian people are weary of further wars and conflicts. Characterized by a cooperative spirit, the meeting conveyed a message both domestically and internationally that consensus and dialogue could define the overarching theme of Syria's next period.
4. Regional and international support:
Early indications suggest the new rulers will receive regional and international backing. Alongside comprehensive Turkish support, Russia has signaled a willingness to dialogue with the armed factions to safeguard its interests, particularly regarding its military bases in Tartus and Hmeimim. The continuation of these bases is tied to a 2015 agreement signed by Assad, which lasts for 50 years and is renewable for another 25 years. Moreover, the United States has hinted at delisting al-Jolani and his associates from its terrorist lists, representing a stark reversal considering Washington had previously offered a $10 million bounty on al-Jolani. Such a shift could pave the way for broader international acceptance of the new Syrian government led by the armed faction.
5. Decline in security chaos:
Despite incidents of looting and damage to infrastructure, widespread security collapse has not materialized since armed factions assumed control. In Aleppo, for example, these factions handed over the city to the police before moving on to other areas. Damascus experienced a similar transition, with police gradually resuming operations and commercial activities restarting within three days of Assad's departure. The relative stability can be attributed to al-Shara'a's directive, which explicitly prohibited harm to public or private property upon entering key cities.
6. Decline in security lapses:
Despite numerous incidents of theft and vandalism at some institutions, widespread lawlessness has not emerged since armed factions took control of Aleppo, northern Syria. In these instances, the factions would hand over captured cities to the police before advancing to their next target. Police operations in the capital Damascus gradually resumed, with commercial activity reviving on the third day following Bashar al-Assad's departure from power. The relative stability can largely be attributed to Al-Sharaa's directive upon entering Aleppo and Hama, which strictly prohibited any harm to public or private institutions or property.
Challenges and Concerns
Despite these positive developments, significant concerns persist regarding Syria's potential to become a new epicenter of instability in the region. Several key issues contribute to this apprehension:
1. Armed factions’ history:
Advocates of a civil state generally agree that individuals who join extremist ideological groups such as ISIS or al-Qaeda seldom break free from their doctrines and tendencies, regardless of any changes in their outward appearance or the resumption of their original identities. To support this view, they point to a series of behaviors underscoring the difficulty of transforming the ideology or mindset of Syrian armed factions.
A prime example is the recent actions of the leader of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Idlib, who has eliminated rivals through force over the past few months. Moreover, the faction's fighters have exhibited an inclination to kill those who hold differing beliefs.
Given this context, observers argue that it is unlikely for someone like Al-Sharaa, who fought alongside Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, to suddenly transform into a different person after ascending to power and acquiring significant authority. From their perspective, the armed factions may be employing "political taqiyya" (the practice of concealing one's belief) to garner support from national and foreign powers. The concern is that these factions might potentially revert to their known practices of violence and revenge once they achieve their immediate goals.
2. Cross-border connections:
Syrian armed factions and their leadership continue to receive external support, explaining their access to weapons, ammunition, drones, and anti-tank missiles used to breach Syrian army defenses. The prime concern of advocates for a national state in Syria, however, is the congratulatory message sent by al-Qaeda to Al-Sharaa, despite his declared separation and disputes with the organization. Moreover, fundamentalist groups, those with extremist ideologies, and their popular bases were the most jubilant and welcoming of the armed factions' assumption of power in Syria.
3. “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s” monopoly on power:
The Syrian National Coalition for Revolutionary and Opposition Forces expressed dissatisfaction with the selection of Mohammed Al-Bashir as the interim prime minister and the process of forming the current government, citing a lack of consultation with armed factions and the Coalition itself. Such actions are viewed as a "negative precedent," particularly considering the Coalition's significant role in the Syrian opposition since its inception during the early protests against Assad in 2011. As the largest gathering of civil and military forces opposing Assad, the Coalition has been a key player, participating in numerous negotiation rounds with the regime in Geneva, Astana, and Sochi.
By sidelining the Syrian National Coalition, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham seemingly signals its intention to monopolize power, particularly given the Coalition's inclusion of many civil and secular factions. Abd al-Majid Barakat, Deputy Head of the Coalition, emphasized the necessity for a genuine constitution and fair elections, which would allow Syrian voters to choose their president and prime minister. Critics also voiced concerns over the selection of Al-Bashir as interim prime minister, citing his affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood and close ties to Al-Sharaa. These objections suggest the decision was driven by personal considerations rather than a broad consensus or general acceptance.
4. Territorial fragmentation in Syria:
The fragmentation of Syrian territories intensified as Kurdish groups expanded their control over vast swathes of northern and eastern Syria. Their influence stretched from Deir ez-Zor and Qamishli to the Syrian-Iraqi border, encompassing the strategic Al-Bukamal crossing. Concurrently, Israel capitalized on the situation by swiftly annexing additional areas of the Golan Heights, a region it had initially occupied on June 5, 1967.
In the wake of its takeover of the buffer zone, a 75-kilometer stretch from Mount Hermon to the Jordanian border, Israel deepened its incursion by advancing roughly 20 kilometers into southern Syria, bringing them alarmingly close to Damascus. The armed factions in the region have remained conspicuously silent regarding the Israeli incursion. However, their lack of explicit opposition to this development could potentially contribute to heightened instability in southern Syria in the coming period.
5. Israel’s destruction of the Syrian army:
As of December 10, according to Israeli, Syrian, and other estimates, Israel has conducted approximately 300 strikes on military targets in Syria. Israel's systematic destruction of Syria's land, naval, and air military capabilities raises profound concerns about the country's future. The absence of a strong, professional army could exacerbate instability and fuel separatist tendencies. Consequently, an environment ripe for internal conflict among armed factions emerges, especially without a "ruling armed force" capable of mediating and preventing disputes among the various military components.
6. Potential targeting of the Kurds:
Turkey views the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and other Kurdish factions and groups in Syria as a threat to its national security, particularly due to their links with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). As armed factions advanced toward Damascus, simultaneous offensives were launched against the Kurds in the cities of Manbij and Tel Rifaat. The situation has sparked fears that armed factions in Syria could transform into "guns for hire" to be used against the Kurds, further complicating the country's transitional phase.
7. Continued foreign military presence in Syria:
Early indications suggest that Syria will continue to host both Russian and American forces. Washington has announced its intention to maintain approximately 950 troops in eastern Euphrates, while Moscow has stated its engagement with intermediaries to discuss the future presence of its forces in Tartus and Hmeimim on Syria's Mediterranean coast. The ongoing presence of these rival international forces on Syrian soil is likely to serve as a source of tension and instability, potentially impacting the country's internal situation.
Potential Scenarios
Amid the positive indicators and outlooks, as well as the challenges and concerns, several possible scenarios for Syria's future can be envisioned:
1. The Golden scenario:
Widely regarded as the ideal outcome, this scenario envisions the establishment of a modern democratic state that treats all citizens equally, placing the majority and minorities on an equal footing. It begins with the creation of a comprehensive roadmap, outlining clear steps for drafting a new constitution, electing a president and a new parliament, and defining relationships with Arab, regional, and international countries. While potentially the most challenging to achieve, this scenario stands as the only path capable of maintaining Syria's unity and territorial integrity.
2. Federal state:
The federal state scenario proposes granting significant rights to Syria's main groups, including Sunnis, Alawites, Christians, Druze, and others. These rights would extend beyond mere autonomy, aiming to form an all-inclusive federal system similar to those in the United States or Europe. By implementing such a framework, Syria could potentially attract support from Western nations and Israel.
3. Anti-Shia state:
Israel has been developing a model since the outbreak of protests in Syria in 2011, envisioning the establishment of a "Shia-hostile" Syrian state as a means to entirely eliminate Iran's regional influence. In such a scenario, communication between Shia groups in Iraq, Syria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon would be severed. Israel considers this its preferred outcome, as it would effectively isolate and weaken Shia influence across the region.
4. Taliban-style state:
The scenario of a Taliban-style state aligns closely with the vision of armed groups seeking to establish an Islamic Republic of Syria. These groups claim to respect minority rights and avoid infringing on the beliefs of other sects, basing their approach on their interpretation of true Islam. Their discourse bears a striking resemblance to the ideology espoused by the Taliban in Afghanistan. In this scenario, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, along with the Salafi movement, would form the solid core of this proposed Islamic state project.
5. Fragmentation into mini-states:
The partitioning of Syria into mini-states based on "blood borders" and the "re-engineering of the map of the Arab East" represents a scenario discussed by British scholar Bernard Lewis and American strategist Ralph Peters. Considering the regional and international ambitions in Syria, such a fragmentation remains a plausible outcome.
