On Saturday, July 6, 2024, Iran's Ministry of Interior's election committee announced that the reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian won the second round of the presidential elections. Pezeshkian secured 16,384,403 votes, surpassing his conservative rival Saeed Jalili, who garnered 13,538,179 votes. Consequently, Pezeshkian became the new president of Iran, succeeding hardliner Ebrahim Raisi, who died in a Helicopter crash in May.
The voter turnout for the second round was approximately 50%, with nearly 30.5 million voters casting their ballots, according to the Ministry of Interior. About 61 million voters were invited to participate across 58,638 polling stations throughout Iran.
While the ultimate power in Iran is vested in the supreme leader, currently Ali Khamenei, as stipulated by the constitution enacted in 1979 and amended in 1989, the president is the second-highest official in the country. Despite the president's limited scope, he still holds a degree of influence, potentially affecting certain domestic and foreign policy decisions.
Rise of the Reformists
Several significant indicators emerged from the results of the second round of the Iranian presidential elections:
1. Return of the Reformists to Power
In a noteworthy turn of events, amid the declining chances of reformists participating in power over recent years and the dominance of conservatives, the reformist-backed and moderate candidate Masoud Pezeshkian secured the presidency. This victory mirrors the 1997 election when the first reformist president, Mohammad Khatami, took office, defeating the conservative Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri, then the speaker of the Consultative Assembly (parliament).
Reformists managed to attract voters from the so-called "gray bloc," estimated at around 36 million who did not participate in the first round. This support added approximately six million new votes to Pezeshkian's initial ten million, resulting in a final tally of about 55% of the total votes.
The unprecedented backing Pezeshkian received from prominent reformist and moderate figures played a crucial role in his victory. Early endorsements from Mohammad Khatami and former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif were pivotal. Additional support came from former President Hassan Rouhani, former parliament speaker Mehdi Karroubi, and others.
Furthermore, Pezeshkian's lead in the first round reinvigorated hopes for change among many Iranians, prompting higher participation in the second round. The lower turnout in the first round was likely due to the mistaken belief that the conservative candidate, Saeed Jalili, would win, leading to a perceived lack of incentive for change.
Notably, Pezeshkian is the only reformist who did not win outright in the first round of the Iranian presidential elections. His predecessors, Khatami in 1997 and Rouhani in his two terms, all secured significant victories in their first rounds. Iran has only seen a second round of presidential elections once before, in 2005, when former President Hashemi Rafsanjani faced Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who ultimately won.
2. Increased Voter Turnout
The second round of the presidential election saw a turnout increase of about ten percentage points compared to the first round, which had a 40% turnout. This figure is also slightly higher than the 2021 presidential election turnout, which stood at 48.8% when the late President Ebrahim Raisi won the race.
Additionally, the current presidential elections were held separately from the municipal elections, initially scheduled for 2025. The sudden death of Raisi led to an early presidential election, making the 50% turnout reasonable given these circumstances.
The Iranian regime aimed to use the election turnout, regardless of the winning candidate, as a measure of its legitimacy and popularity, which has waned in recent years. Rising public dissatisfaction with the regime and its policies has been evident in recurring protests and lower electoral participation.
The Guardian Council's decision to approve Pezeshkian's candidacy might have been a strategic move to boost voter turnout, given the low participation in the March 2024 Consultative Assembly and Assembly of Experts elections.
A viral video on social media purportedly shows Supreme Leader Khamenei voting for Pezeshkian in the second round, contrary to expectations that he would support Jalili. This could be an attempt to quell public anger, considering Jalili's hardline views during televised debates, which could have posed a challenge for the regime already facing numerous crises.
3. Dominance of the Hardline Faction within the Conservative Camp:
Despite the conservatives' defeat in the recent presidential elections, the results indicated that the so-called Jebhe Paydari, or Front of Islamic Revolution Stability, representing the hardline faction within the conservative camp, will have dominance in the near future. The candidate leading in the first round was Saeed Jalili, who belongs to this front, whereas the candidate who lost in the first round, the parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, is part of the pragmatic wing of the conservative camp. This outcome contradicted some opinion polls, which had predicted Ghalibaf as the frontrunner in the first round.
4. Decline of Clerics
An evaluation of the results of the recent Iranian elections reveals that the Iranian public has lost confidence in clerics. The losing presidential candidate, Mostafa Pourmohammadi, the only cleric who ran in the current presidential elections, received only about 200,000 votes out of the 24 million voters who participated in the first round. In contrast, the leading candidates, whether from political or military backgrounds or a combination of both, included Ghalibaf, Jalili, Pezeshkian, Alireza Zakani, and Ghazizadeh Hashemi. This is a departure from the past when clerics like Hashemi Rafsanjani and Raisi were elected as presidents of Iran.
Internal Implications
Based on the statements made by Pezeshkian and his campaign leaders, several potential domestic policies and consequences of his victory can be anticipated:
1. Adherence to the Iranian Regime's Principles and Values
Pezeshkian chose to make his first speech at the shrine of the late Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic. During his speech, he described the supreme leader Khamenei as a "wise leader" and ensured Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of Khomeini, was by his side. These gestures signal that Pezeshkian, a reformist president, aligns with the regime and does not oppose it, unlike some Iranian opposition factions, especially those abroad, such as supporters of the "People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran" and monarchists who reject the revolution and the current regime.
These actions indicate Pezeshkian's desire to avoid a confrontation with the regime from the outset, which could hinder his ability to fulfill his campaign promises, especially if conservatives use it to label him as opposed to the revolution and the regime. In his speech, Pezeshkian, speaking simply without reading from the prepared text, expressed his need for support from the supreme leader, the parliament, and the public to overcome Iran's crises.
In his first message to Pezeshkian, Khamenei emphasized the need to adhere to the path initiated by the late President Ebrahim Raisi, hinting at the direction Pezeshkian should take. Despite Pezeshkian's criticism of some of Raisi's policies, Khamenei's message suggests that while the regime allowed a reformist president to run and win for various reasons, including the desire to contain growing public anger and the lack of time to engineer the elections to enable a fundamentalist candidate to win the presidency, as was the case in 2021, it will not tolerate Pezeshkian straying from the revolution and the regime.
2. Forming a Technocratic Government
In his first speech, President-elect Pezeshkian extended a hand of friendship to all for the country's benefit, acknowledging that "the path is difficult" and that difficulties can only be overcome through collective effort. His meeting with the losing conservative candidate, Jalili, symbolized this sentiment.
Pezeshkian is likely to form a technocratic government, not representing specific political factions, based on his statement that "experts should be appointed to the government." He criticized his opponent, Jalili, because conservatives exclude experts from important positions. The new government's focus will likely be on economic issues, foreign policy, and national security.
It is unclear if Javad Zarif will become Foreign Minister in the new government, given his popularity following his support for Pezeshkian. However, Khamenei's warning on June 25 for the new president not to appoint "pro-American" figures could be an obstacle for Zarif, who is seen as supportive of relations with Washington. Other potential candidates for the foreign ministry include Abbas Araghchi, head of the nuclear negotiation team during Rouhani's tenure, who might be the leading candidate for the position, and Ali Akbar Salehi, a former foreign minister under Ahmadinejad, among others.
The economic team will be a crucial part of Pezeshkian's anticipated government, covering ministries such as energy, economy, finance, transportation, roads, and agriculture, as well as the Central Bank. Notable potential candidates include Bijan Zangeneh, the seasoned oil minister during Rouhani's era, Hossein Abdo Tabrizi, one of Pezeshkian's economic advisors, and Pirouz Hanachi, the former mayor of Tehran, who is a potential candidate for the transportation and roads ministry. Potential candidates for the Intelligence and Security Ministry include Mahmoud Alavi, who was the intelligence minister in Rouhani's government. Ali Younesi, the intelligence minister in Khatami's government, and Mostafa Pourmohammadi, the losing presidential candidate and interior minister in Ahmadinejad's government.
3. Allowing More Freedoms
During the televised debates, Pezeshkian emphasized the need for a permanent solution to the compulsory hijab issue, criticizing the "oppressive" practices of the morality police against women. He also criticized the government's crackdown on protesters during the 2009 "Green Movement" protests. The new president pledged to prevent censorship and internet restrictions and to ensure broader government representation for women and ethnic and religious minorities, especially Kurds and Baluchis. It should be noted that Pezeshkian himself is of Azeri and Kurdish descent through his father and mother, respectively.
4. Conflict of Dual Power
It remains unclear whether Pezeshkian's victory will revive the dual power conflict that prevailed during Rouhani's tenure. Most decision-making institutions in Iran are dominated by conservatives, including the Consultative Assembly (Parliament), the Assembly of Experts (responsible for selecting the supreme leader), the Guardian Council (responsible for candidate eligibility), the Expediency Discernment Council (which participates in determining internal and external policies), the Supreme National Security Council, and the Revolutionary Guard Corps and security and intelligence agencies. Consequently, decision-making may face a clear duality, especially in foreign policy, with potential conflicts between military and diplomatic priorities, as occurred during Rouhani's administration with his foreign minister, Zarif.
Accordingly, Pezeshkian's policies might encounter resistance from these institutions, leading to potential obstructions. This situation would present Pezeshkian with two choices: confront these institutions to implement his electoral promises or comply with them, risking losing public support and bearing the consequences of each choice.
5. The Issue of Khamenie's Succession
The election of Pezeshkian, a reformist president, brings the issue of the supreme leader's succession to the forefront once again. Raisi's death deprived Iran of two positions simultaneously: the actual role of the president and the potential role of the supreme leader, considering Khamenei's advanced age and health conditions. Raisi was among the prominent candidates for the succession. While the regime succeeded in filling the presidential vacancy, selecting the next supreme leader remains a complex issue, potentially leading to scenarios involving either a smooth selection of the third supreme leader, internal factional conflicts, or the Revolutionary Guard taking control if the selection process fails.
External Implications
The future of Pezeshkian's foreign policy can be anticipated based on his campaign statements:
1. Attempt to Open Up to the West
During his televised debates, Pezeshkian advocated for opening up to the West and defended the 2015 nuclear deal signed between Iran and the P5+1 group of world powers, viewing it as beneficial for Tehran. Pezeshkian believes in negotiating with the West to lift sanctions, which he believes is causing significant losses for Iran. He also calls for joining the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), arguing that failure to do so has excluded Tehran from the global banking system. Moreover, Zarif, the architect of the nuclear deal, was involved in Pezeshkian's campaign, which reflects Pezeshkian's likely approach towards relations with the West, particularly regarding the nuclear agreement.
However, challenges complicate this approach, such as the fact that the decision to return to the nuclear deal is not solely Pezeshkian's but requires approval from the supreme leadership and influential institutions. Additionally, a law passed by the Iranian parliament in 2020 mandates the continuation of the nuclear program's escalation as long as sanctions persist, implying that the program's development cannot be halted, especially as it nears weapons-grade levels, according to evaluations by Washington and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Another challenge is the potential return of former U.S. President Donald Trump to the White House in the November 2024 elections.
Conversely, Tehran's disclosure, two days before Raisi's death, of rounds of indirect talks between Iranian and American officials in Oman suggests a desire for progress on this issue, which Pezeshkian's victory might enhance.
2. Continuing the "Look East" Policy
Pezeshkian believes in strengthening Iran's relations with Russia and China, considering this would give Tehran a strong position in nuclear negotiations with the U.S. The Iranian regime views the "look east" policy, which primarily means solidifying ties with non-Western powers like Russia, China, and other emerging powers in Asia and beyond, as a strategic alternative to reliance on foreign relations with the West, given the complex issues with the western bloc.
The signing of a significant gas exchange agreement with Russia by the Iranian interim government, headed by Acting President Mohammad Mokhber, on June 26, along with discussions of a new comprehensive cooperation agreement between the two countries, indicates Tehran's commitment to continuing its cooperation with Russia. The same applies to China, which has a 25-year comprehensive agreement with Iran, and India, which signed an agreement with Iran on May 13 to continue investment in the Iranian port of Chabahar.
3. Continuing to Improve Relations with Regional Countries
The trend of improving relations between Iran and regional countries, which gained momentum during Raisi's presidency with the signing of a landmark agreement to restore relations with Saudi Arabia on March 10, 2023, is likely to continue. This encompasses efforts to improve relations with Arab Gulf countries and other Arab states, as well as Turkey and Pakistan. This strategic direction appears to be a consistent policy that is not influenced by the changing of presidents or governments but rather stems from Iran's supreme leadership. Pezeshkian, during his electoral debates, called for better relations with regional countries, viewing it as a solution to domestic issues. Pezeshkian received congratulatory messages from leaders and heads of most regional countries upon his election, reflecting their interest in cooperating with him.
4. Persistence of Iran's Regional Role
Regional influence is a fundamental pillar for Iran and one of the "red lines" that is unlikely to change with different presidents or governments. Decisions in this area primarily fall to the supreme leader, the Revolutionary Guard, and influential institutions. Thus, Iran's regional role, including the continued support of the Revolutionary Guard for Iran's proxies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, is expected to persist. Pezeshkian expressed support for the Revolutionary Guard Corps, describing them as "different from the past," and condemned the U.S.'s designation of them as a "terrorist organization," blaming Washington for regional tensions.
Moreover, it is also improbable that Iran will abandon its policy towards Israel, which it considers a sworn enemy, meaning the tension between the two countries will persist. The intensity of this tension depends on developments in the ongoing conflicts since the Israeli war on Gaza and subsequent clashes on other fronts in Lebanon and Yemen.
In conclusion, Pezeshkian's victory might represent a case of role-switching within the Iranian regime, which has once again demonstrated its flexibility and capacity for renewal to bridge the growing gap with the public. However, Pezeshkian's election does not signify a departure from Iran's established approach to domestic and foreign issues, which are all subject to the directions set by the supreme leader and affiliated institutions within the framework of Iran's consistent policies. Nonetheless, the newly elected president may have some leeway to address these issues within the variable aspects of Iranian politics, allowing him to leave a distinct mark and enact "permitted" changes domestically regarding political, social, and economic rights and freedoms, as well as managing foreign relations.
