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Calculating the Risk

Why Israel and Iran disfavor an all-out war?

29 June 2022


Despite non-traditional showdowns between Israel and Iran over recent years, an all-out war may not be likely in the foreseen future i.e. at least in the next two years. The turning of such showdowns- which involve proxy war, threatening commercial shipping, cyber-attacks, assassination of scientists and politicians- to turn into an all-out-war, in which both states would use their full military and strategic capabilities, hinges on other calculations that involve not only the positions the two states take on each other, but also the positions of great powers, especially the United States and Russia, on an Israeli-Iranian conflict.

 

Theories on international conflicts do not hold that the turning of non-traditional showdowns into all-out wars is inevitable. Such showdowns can lead to negotiations or a de-escalation of a non-traditional conflict by either party to prevent the crises they made from becoming a comprehensive war.

 

Although negotiations between Israel and Iran are unlikely to be held for well-known reasons, both states are careful not to slide into an all-out war. Moreover, the now-suspended Vienna talks about resurrecting the Iran nuclear deal between Washington and Tehran after the US under the Donald Trump Administration pulled out of it in 2018, can be seen as indirect negotiations between Israel and Iran brokered by the P5+1 i.e. the UN Security Council's five permanent members plus Germany. The outcome of the Vienna talks, if and when they are resumed and deemed successful, will determine the trajectory of the showdowns between Israel and Iran, as well as the circumstances for an unlikely all-out war between the two countries.

 

Israel’s Assessments

Israel feels that it is caught in between two equally hard scenarios, with the first being failure of the nuclear talks in Vienna which would remove any restrictions on Iran’s nuclear activities and allow it to move closer to, and even beyond the nuclear threshold. In fact, Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz, in statements on May 17, said Iran has already reached the threshold and is just a “few weeks” from accumulating sufficient fissile material for a bomb. In the other scenario, Washington would meet requirements laid down by Iran and return to the nuclear deal without amendments to its text.

Because of this, Israel called on the United States to impose the following conditions on Iran:

 

1.     Extending the duration of the nuclear deal beyond 2030:

Under the deal, Iran permitted to enrich uranium up to 3.67% purity up to 2034, while Iran demands that the four years period since Washington pulled out of the deal i.e. from 2018, be considered as part of an agreement on returning to the original nuclear deal i.e. restrictions on Iran’s uranium enrichments will expire in 2030.

 

2.     Keeping Iran’s IRGC on Washington’s list of terrorist organizations and keeping sanctions against Iran in place:

Israel wants that Iran to abide by other commitments before the sanctions imposed by the United States or the Security Council are lifted, that sanctions are imposed only on Iran’s nuclear program activities and do not include sanctions waivers related to Iran’s policies that pose threats to stability of the Middle East.

 

3.     Iran’s agreement to stop developing nuclear-capable ballistic missiles:

Israel believes that not addressing this issue in a clear way is one of the failures of the 2015 nuclear deal.

 

4.     The IAEA should tighten monitoring of Iran’s nuclear activities:

The aim is to ensure Tehran’s compliance and commitment to fulfilling obligations.

 

5.     Iran should stop backing militias posing threats to Israel’s security:

The objective is to stop Hezbollah, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad Movement.

 

Israel became aware that Washington’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018 did not prompt Iran to give up its quest for possessing nuclear weapons, and, likewise, that its major operations against Tehran did not deter it from halting its nuclear program.

 

Since the Vienna talks were launched in November last year, Tel Aviv was certain that Washington will not put pressure on Iran to fulfil the five Israeli demands, especially because the administration of President Joe Biden was determined on returning to, and reviving the nuclear deal although it was certain that Iran will not agree to Israel’s conditions. Moreover, Israel is now concerned that the United States’ return to the original nuclear deal of 2015, with slight or no amendments to its text, would lead to Washington pledging to restrict Israel’s non-traditional activities against Iran.

 

In other words, Israel now finds itself in a difficult position. That is, failure of the Vienna talks would mean a major challenge as serious as Washington’s return to the old nuclear deal after introducing slight and non-essential amendments. That is why, it makes sense that Tel Aviv is trying to cling to a balanced position albeit temporarily. This was clearly expressed by Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett during a meeting with Rafael Grossi, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency on June 3.  A statement from Bennett’s office said that Bennett made it clear that while Israel prefers diplomacy in order to deny Iran the possibility of developing nuclear weapons, it reserves the right to self-defense and to take action against Iran in order to block its nuclear program should the international community not succeed in the relevant timeframe.

 

Iran’s Calculations

Unlike Israel, Iran believes that Washington’s agreement to enter into talks over its return to the nuclear deal was a good opportunity. On the one hand, the Biden Administration’s decision to return to the nuclear deal and to listen to Tehran’s conditions for compliance with commitments stated in the 2015 deal represents the United States’ admission that its sanctions policy failed. Moreover, it would show that Iran proved that it can achieve its goals of developing its nuclear capabilities despite the sanctions. On the other hand, the US initiative offered the Iranians an opportunity to mend faults regarding sanctions in the original nuclear deal. That is, for Tehran, there was an issue with the unclear provisions for lifting the sanctions, especially after the Trump and the Obama Administrations said that the provisions are strictly regarding sanctions over Iran’s nuclear program. But the Iranian government told its people, after the deal was signed, that restrictions on Iran’s right to uranium enrichment for a limited period of time were offset by American and international pledges that all sanctions over the nuclear program, human rights violations and Iran’s interference in the internal affairs of regions countries would be removed altogether.

 

Iran entered into the talks in Vienna to try to ease the severe economic crisis which was caused by the sanctions imposed by the Obama Administration and which became more serious after the Trump Administration pulled out of the nuclear deal in 2018.

 

Up to March, when the Vienna talks were suspected, Iran was very close to striking a better deal had it not been for Israel’s pressures on Washington and the outbreak of the war between Russia and Ukraine in February. The Biden Administration was asked by Congress members not to give any concessions to Iran, especially regarding sanctions and the removal of the IRGC from the US terrorist list. Additionally, Russia worked to take advantage of the Iranian nuclear issue to ease the issue of sanctions imposed by the US and allies backing Ukraine in return for allowing Washington’s return to the nuclear deal. These developments led to the failure of Iran’s efforts to win a good deal with Washington. This was expressed by Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov, in May, in statements he made during a visit to Bahrain. Lavrov said that the Washington not only tried to impose more conditions in the nuclear talks, but also aims to cause confusion about the original nuclear deal although it was approved by the UN Security Council. In response to Washington’s announcement of new conditions for its return to the nuclear deal, Lavrov noted that Moscow insists on the need to reach a comprehensive nuclear deal. These include Iran’s giving up demands that the IRGC be removed from the terror list, Iran’s suspension of oil exports to China as well as halting its ballistic missiles program.

 

Expectations

Although the suspension of Vienna talks was not officially announced, Israel’s and Iran’s positions, as well as development in the showdown between Russia and its allies, on the one hand, and the US and western allies, on the other, may lead to the death of the talks or to the suspension of these talks indefinitely. The legitimate question begging itself is: What would Tehran, which was looking forward to a deal with Washington that would end all or most of the sanctions that caused a severe economic and social crisis posing threats to the stability of the ruling regime? In the same context, how would Israel address Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons that pose threats to its security since US sanctions and Israel’s major operations against Israel?

 

In this context, Israel is likely to escalate its cyber- attacks against Iran and assassinate more Iranian scientists and even politicians. However, Israel would not wage an all-out war against Iran even if and when failure of the Vienna talks is officially declared. Israel would maintain the same position at least during the term of the Biden Administration, which will not back any Israeli military attacks on Iran’s nuclear program because of concerns that such attacks would potentially damage US interests in the Middle East. Moreover, Washington does not want another major crisis while it is busy with its own standoff with Russia and China over the ongoing war in Ukraine.

The same holds true for Iran, which does not have any interest in going to an all-out war with Israel because it would cause more destruction in Tehran than in Tel Aviv which is backed by the US and western allies. That is why Iran is likely to firmly hold to its approach of being reactive to Israel’s military operations against it. Reactions would mean Iran’s continued support to armed groups and militia organizations that pose threats to Israel’s security, while conducting retaliatory attacks against Israeli commercial ships and working on improving its capability of waging cyber attacks against Tel Aviv.