Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri resigned in early November from Riyadh, and things are no longer the same in Lebanon. The fact that this resignation was announced in Saudi Arabia added a significant regional dimension to the Lebanese political scene. Although it is still unclear how this resignation is going to impact the developments internally or regionally, one thing is certain: Lebanon is today part of the regional conflict, and any escalation against Hezbollah and Iran will include Lebanon.
For Hezbollah, this is certainly not good news, at least on the short term. Not only did they lose the government cover, but they have also lost a significant Sunni partner in the government. Even if they manage to replace Hariri with a new PM, any new government will be perceived as a completely Hezbollah-controlled one, and it will expose them further to international and local pressure.
Whether they chose to replace Hariri or deal with the void until the parliamentary elections – due in May 2018 – Hezbollah will face an additional challenge to the accumulating ones it has been facing since its involvement in the Syrian war.
As Lebanon enters the void again, Hezbollah is exposed to more regional and international pressures. American and Gulf sanctions are on the horizon, and the Party of God does not have a legitimate government cover to deal with the financial repercussions of sanctions. Hezbollah will have to choose one of two scenarios: replace Hariri and have a Hezbollah government, or keep the void in the institutions until elections. In both scenarios, the situation will not be ideal, especially that they are still stretched thin in Syria and in the rest of the region.
The War Challenge
Syria has given Hezbollah a new regional role that helped it in expanding its influence in the Middle East. There is no doubt that Hezbollah has more precision weapons, and an arsenal that is estimated to have grown from 33,000 rockets and missiles, before 2006, to 150,000. These are more advanced weapons that would cause serious damage in the next war.
Under the command of Iran's Quds Force, Hezbollah is today leading tens of thousands of Shi'ite fighters from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen. Earlier this summer, Hassan Nasrallah warned that any future Israeli war against Syria or Lebanon would draw thousands of fighters from these militias, currently fighting in support of the Syrian regime. In other words, a conflict with Hezbollah could very well be a conflict with all the Shi'ite militias in the region, and therefore a conflict with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps' Quds Force.
However, Hezbollah will be hurt the most from such a war. All the achievements Iran has secured in Syria via Hezbollah will probably be challenged in the next war, and Hezbollah can’t afford to lose it. These achievements entails the ability of Iranian-backed militias to secure Assad's regime and sustain his presidency for the time being, pushing international community to focus on ISIS, which allowed Iran and Hezbollah to expand their influence across Syria and Iraq. This influence caused demographical changes in all the territories around Damascus and along the “Useful Syria” that stretches from the Alawite Coast via Homs to the Lebanese borders, and almost completed the land-bridge that will connect Tehran to Beirut via the Syrian-Iraqi border around the Euphrates River and Bou Kamal in Syria.
These achievements are still vulnerable and Iran will not jeopardize them through any conflict with Israel. That is why Hezbollah has never retaliated to any Israeli strike against its weapons depots and factories in Syria. Yet, the more powerful Iran will be in Syria, and the more consolidated its control over the regime and the land-bridge, the more imminent the war will be.
Internal Dispute
The problem with this war rhetoric is that it exposes Hezbollah’s real objective. Ignoring the Israeli strikes one after the other sends a bad message to its own support base, one that weakens its image as a resistance groups that was only found to fight Israel. Despite its multiple statements about how “the road to Jerusalem passes through Damascus,” the Lebanese, and the Shia community per se, are aware of the real mission of Hezbollah; that is to assist Iran in its plan for regional hegemony. Although some Shia do not object a “Shia empire” that will unify the Shia under a stronger Iran, many fear the isolation that it will result in.
Hezbollah has always told the Shia in Lebanon that it is the liberator (resistance), the protector, and the provider. Today, Hezbollah can pass as a protector (against takfirist groups, not Israel), but it is no longer the liberator, and certainly not the provider.
With the Syrian war and its growing regional role, Hezbollah’s priorities have changed. While the funding coming from Iran and other sources has increased, it is now allocated to military operations in the region. Everything else is kept on hold, including the social services that used to cater for the Shia community in Lebanon to ensure their support. Before the Syrian civil war, most of the Shia community used to benefit from these social services, such as hospitalization, education, shopping discounts etc… After Hezbollah's interference in Syria, social services shrank and started to cater for Hezbollah’s community. Currently, it seems that only the fighters’ community is benefiting from some social services.
War has dictated a new lifestyle for the Lebanese Shia, where they are asked to give their men for war, and be patient, all without perceiving a victory in the horizon. This has created serious class divisions among the Shia, where the rich are benefiting from the war economy, and the poor are providing “the martyrs.”
Earlier in October, an incident inside Hay el-Sellom – a poor neighborhood in Hezbollah’s Beirut suburbs – stirred public opinion in Lebanon, because for the first time, they heard Shia in Dahiyeh blaming and cursing Hezbollah and its leader Hassan Nasrallah. Lebanese police raided unlicensed street vendors in Dahiya, causing a small riot. Dozens of citizens poured into the streets burning tires and blocking roads. One woman addressed Nasrallah after she found her shop -- her only source of income – flattened: "We all provided martyrs for you in Syria. I have three injured sons. And this is how you are treating us?" Another man yelled at the camera, "Syria can go to hell, along with Hassan Nasrallah!"
Hezbollah has dragged the Shia community into wars with Israel many times in the past, but these conflicts were relatively short, and the Shia were usually rewarded by ample of money and services afterward. However, the Syrian war is different. It has been dragging on for years, taking the lives of many young men in the process. Once the group became consumed by events in Syria, it could no longer keep a lid on drug cartels, petty criminals, and illegal construction back home. Shia street clashes increased in Dahiya and complaints grew louder, showing that livelihood and basic services are much more significant to locals than Hezbollah's prestigious new regional role. Families who could afford it began to leave the district, heading south or to other areas of Beirut. That is why Hezbollah allowed the security forces to interfere.
For the residents of Dahiyeh, Hezbollah is still the authority. It is not enough to be the protector. Hezbollah has to maintain its role as the provider; otherwise it will lose its grip over the community. This was perceived in Hay el-Sellom. Those who badmouthed Hezbollah were forced to apologize, in a very humiliating scene where they had to repeat words they did not believe in. For Hezbollah, the story was over, but for those who were forced to apologize, and to their families and communities – the story is far from over.
Confronting Hezbollah
Hezbollah will have to deal with all these challenges. As regional and international pressures mount, these issues will become more complicated. In Lebanon, Hariri’s resignation is the beginning of a complicated phase for Lebanon, where Hezbollah will fight to maintain its grip. It is vital for everyone to stand with independent forces in Lebanon at this stage, within a comprehensive plan.
In Syria, the land-bridge is almost complete, but it is vulnerable, and maintaining it will be a headache for Iran and its backed Shia militias.
Within the Shia community, discontent will probably grow, and more Shia will be looking for an alternative voice or provider. The lack of an alternative among the Shia is keeping Hezbollah in power. That is why working with an alternative (political and economic) could provide the Shia community with options, and help them pull away from Hezbollah.
None of these options are easy or guaranteed. Yet, without a strategy to contain Hezbollah in Lebanon, Syria and beyond, Hezbollah will keep growing, and all the discounts and resignations in the world will not change anything.
*Hanin Ghaddar is the inaugural Friedmann Visiting Fellow at The Washington Institute.
