Field Marshal and commander of the Libyan national army Khalifa Haftar’s discussions with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu during his visit to Russia on August 14 raised several questions about the motives of his visit. This visit comes less than a month after Haftar met with Fayez al-Sarraj, the prime minister of the Government of National Accord, in Paris on July 25. Following his meeting with Sarraj, they issued a joint statement consisting of 10 points to push forward a political settlement to resolve the Libyan crisis. The discussions in Russia, however, made indirect criticism to France’s mediation in the crisis.
The goals of the visit
Haftar’s recent visit to Russia was not the first of its kind as last year (in 2016) he made two visits, one in June and one in November. During these visits, he met with the Russian foreign and defense ministers. In January 2017, he visited the Russian air-craft carrier in the Mediterranean Sea Admiral Kuznetsov and held a video conference with the Russian defense minister from one of the ship’s wardrooms.
During his recent talks with the Russian foreign and defense ministers, Haftar focused on the means to resume coordination with Moscow on several levels and activating the Russian role to reach a political settlement in Libya. He also tackled Russia’s military support to the Libyan army to assist in its battle against terrorism and on the role it can play to cancel the resolution prohibiting arms exports to Libya.
The field marshal exploited his presence in Russia to make statements that violated the joint statement made after his meeting with Sarraj in France and which stipulated a ceasefire and working on new parliamentary and presidential elections. Haftar had stated that “90% of Libyan territories were liberated from terrorists and work will go on until all Libyan territories are liberated.” This is an indirect hint to the possibility of carrying out his threats to storm the capital Tripoli. He also criticized Sarraj and accused him of violating many of the principles they had agreed on in Paris.
Meanwhile, during his meeting with Haftar, Russia’s foreign minister voiced the importance of activating the political settlement process in Libya and said Moscow is willing to contribute to this aim. He also made indirect criticism regarding the French mediation in the crisis and said it was important for “the UN to supervise all mediation efforts,” adding that “there’s no alternative to Libyans’ reaching a solution on their own without foreign influence.” He confirmed that the threat of terrorism and extremism is still present in Libya.
Russian motives
Russia recently received Haftar to achieve a series of goals which are:
1. The desire to secure its interests and enhance its influence in Libya by playing a pivotal role in the political settlement for the Libyan crisis and providing support to Haftar who now controls most eastern and southern areas in Libya. This will prevent ignoring it in new arrangements for the crisis. This also aims not to repeat the February 2011 mistake when it let NATO interfere to topple Colonel Moammar Qaddafi and manage the situation on its own in Libya thus harming its interests and influence there.
2. Exploiting the appointment of Ghassan Salameh as a new UN envoy in Libya and his efforts to communicate with different international parties involved in the Libyan crisis to crystallize a new vision about a solution for the crisis. This will guarantee involving it in a settlement and will help it look after its interests considering it is a key player there as Lavrov said during his meeting with Haftar that he expects Salameh to visit Russia soon. This will eventually prevent European countries from solely controlling the initiatives and visions of the new UN envoy.
3. Competing with the rising European and American military and political influence in Libya by providing all forms of support to Haftar. France has influence in the east by providing political and military support to Haftar and by recently spearheading the mediation efforts in Libya. Britain, Italy and the US have influence in the eastern region by providing military and political to the Government of National Accord and to the forces which have been affiliated with it ever since launching its operations against ISIS in Sirte in the end of last year. In addition, Rome has, since the beginning of August, begun to deploy warships in Libyan territorial waters.
4. Seeking to exploit the Libyan file and its sensitivity on European national security in order to pressure European countries to make concessions, such as in matters related to the Ukrainian crisis and to the western sanctions imposed on it. Libya is important for European national security considering the influx of illegal immigrants from Libyan coasts towards European countries and the terrorist organizations’ exploitation of chaos in Libya as they’ve established training camps to carry out terrorist operations in the West.
Haftar’s motives
Meanwhile, Haftar’s aims of his recent visit to Russia are:
1. Seeking Russia’s help to balance any possible pressures, by France in particular and European powers in general, to commit to the 10 points listed in the joint statement issued followed his meeting with Sarraj in Paris on July 25, especially that he said that what is listed in the joint statement cannot be achieved.
2. Providing more Russian military support to the Libyan army, whether in the form of arms, military training or intelligence cooperation. Haftar is worried that France may exploit the military support it provides him with to pressure him to make concessions to his rivals and to prevent him from carrying out his threats to storm the capital Tripoli in order for its mediation efforts in the Libyan crisis to succeed. Within this context, Haftar said during his visit to Moscow that he will not stop fighting until he seizes control of all Libyan territories.
3. Resuming his efforts to get an international recognition of the legitimacy of his military activity in Libya and a recognition of his recent victories against the extremist organizations in east and south Libya.
4. Securing Russia’s veto in the UN Security Council to prevent issuing any resolutions against the Libyan national army especially if he carries out his threat to storm Tripoli. Haftar also wants to foil attempts that aim to prevent Libya from partially lifting off the arms embargo by allowing the Government of National Accord and security forces affiliated with it, primarily the Presidential Guard, from getting arms from foreign countries.
Future moves
It’s likely that Russia will take a series of measures towards Libya during the upcoming phase. The most prominent measures are:
1. Increasing its military and political support to Haftar considering he is its major ally in Libya in the confrontation against terrorist groups and the main tool to balance American and European influence in Tripoli.
2. Strengthening communication channels with powers in West Libya and which are represented by the Government of National Accord. Russia began doing so by receiving this government’s head Sarraj in March 2017. This aimed to pave way towards playing a bigger future role in the Libyan settlement – a role that balances the European one especially after it previously let western powers solely manage the political settlement.
3. Competing with European military presence in the Mediterranean Sea as represented in the European naval operation Sophia off the Libyan coast and which was recently extended on July 25 until the end of 2018. This European military presence was strengthened after Italy deployed warships in Libyan territorial waters.
In the end, Russia’s recent moves towards the Libyan crisis aim to help Russia enhance its influence in Libya in particular and in the Mediterranean Sea in general so it becomes a key player in Libya and in North Africa. Field Marshal Haftar aims to exploit this and employ it to get more Russian political and military help to confront his rivals that consist of armed groups in western Libya and to confront regional and international pressures that seek to force him to make concessions such as recognizing the legitimacy of the Government of National Accord and committing to the implementation of the political agreement signed in the Moroccan city of Skhirat on December 17, 2015 to push a political settlement forward.
