The Future for Advanced Research and Studies Center (FARAS) held an extensive workshop to address issues related to the potential scenarios of war expanding in the Middle East. Discussions also touched on the positions of the involved parties and the repercussions on both the regional and international levels. The workshop was attended by several experts from outside the center, including General Mark Kimmitt, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs from Washington; military expert Brigadier General Khalil el-Helou from Beirut; military expert Brigadier General Mahmoud Mohyeddin from Cairo; and military expert Brigadier General Yasser Saleh from Aden.
A number of experts and researchers from FARAS also participated with research papers, including Hussam Ibrahim, the center’s Executive Director; Ahmed Eleiba, Head of the Security Trends unit; Mostafa Rabie, Head of the Data Analytics program; Mohamed Mahmoud el-Sayyed, researcher in Israeli affairs; and Sherif Haridi, researcher in Iranian affairs.
The conversation took place against the backdrop of current developments in the region. Most notably, the assassination of several Hezbollah leaders, including Fuad Shukr, as well as the former head of the Hamas Political Bureau, Ismail Haniyeh. This followed Israel’s unprecedented attack on the port of Hodeidah in Yemen on July 20, 2024, a day after a Houthi drone attack on Tel Aviv.
An examination of the different involved parties’ motivations and considerations led to conclude with the following key points:
1. Netanyahu’s Interests
Israel’s calculations in the Gaza war are primarily based on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s political estimations, including those of his far-right coalition government. Netanyahu does not seem to have a clear vision for the future of this war, or the “day after” in Gaza, beyond prolonging military action. This is due to the current circumstances whereby his political future has become contingent upon the continuation of the conflict. His speech before the U.S. Congress on July 24 confirmed this assessment.
Netanyahu conveyed to the military and the Israeli public the belief that Hamas has become significantly weaker given the concessions the latter has recently made in ceasefire negotiations—concessions it once considered “red lines.” This is also evidenced by Hamas’s unusually weak military response to the assassination of several of its leaders, including Mohammed Deif and Rafa Salama, according to Israeli assertions.
Thus, Netanyahu shows no signs of being in a hurry to reach a ceasefire and hostage release deal. The decision is in his hands, and the military leadership does not seem to oppose him in this regard. War cabinet members, many of whom supported a deal with Hamas, have been excluded from the decision-making process.
At a later unspecified stage, Netanyahu may opt to reduce the intensity of military operations in Gaza, as referred to by the Israeli military as the “third phase” of the war. The Prime Minister may pause the war temporarily if a “military achievement” is realized on the ground, but could then ignite another conflict in Lebanon to maintain his political survival.
2. Tehran’s Calculations
For strategic and ideological reasons, Hezbollah holds a special position in Iran’s calculations. Since the outbreak of the Gaza war, Tehran’s response has been restrained as it witnessed escalation against Palestinian factions, the Houthis, and its proxy groups in Syria and Iraq. Iranian officials have nonetheless issued firm warnings to Israel against launching a large-scale war against Hezbollah, especially given the increasing Israeli threats of such a possibility.
In this context, Tehran is betting on avoiding a broadening of the current war. It does so while also seeking to maintain back-channel communications with the United States reportedly conducted in Oman. The purpose of these indirect negotiations is to control the level of escalation and prevent matters from spiraling out of control, according to Western reports. American officials, however, deny such negotiations are taking place—perhaps due to reasons pertaining to the ongoing domestic elections. Yet, several indicators suggest that indirect communication continues between the U.S. and Iran, which Tehran might use to negotiate a larger, more comprehensive deal with Washington that includes nuclear and regional issues. The results of this process are yet to be seen depending largely on the outcome of the U.S. elections.
3. Washington’s Shifts
The U.S. stance has undergone changes since the October 7 attack. Initially, Washington supported Israel in dismantling Hamas’s military infrastructure. However, as tens of thousands of civilians were killed, the humanitarian situation in Gaza worsened, and tensions escalated on the northern front with Hezbollah, the U.S. administration began proposing initiatives to de-escalate and reduce tensions.
Political developments in the United States, particularly regarding the electoral scene following President Joe Biden’s withdrawal from the presidential race, have also reflected a reduction in the chances of American initiatives. Furthermore, the priority of U.S. military support for Ukraine in its war with Russia, the strengthening of NATO, and the focus on developments in East Asia and tensions with China have all taken precedence over the matter.
4. Hezbollah’s Scenarios
The confrontations between Israel and Hezbollah remain within the framework of the war of attrition that began after Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. These confrontations have seen several stages of developments that have raised the ceiling of mutual escalation, thus making further exacerbation possible.
In terms of military power balance between Israel and Hezbollah, Israel’s Air Force holds an advantage. These include advanced targeting capabilities, the extensive use of artificial intelligence for identifying targets, gathering intelligence, and spying on Hezbollah leaders, fighters, and military sites. However, Israel also contends with weaknesses. In addition to military exhaustion caused by over ten months of confrontation, challenges also encompass in ground maneuvers, the social and economic impacts of the ongoing war, and the reluctance of its allies, particularly the U.S., to expand the war in the region.
Hezbollah, on the other hand, possesses strengths such as its underground tunnel network, which could impede any Israeli ground movement and increase the cost of targeting its forces. It also has experience in guerrilla warfare and traditional warfare skills accumulated through cooperation with regular armies in the Syrian arena. Moreover, its regional alliances under the so-called “Axis of Resistance”, including Iraq, Yemen, and Syria, could provide support within the framework of the so-called “unified fronts.”
Given the latest developments, three scenarios regarding the situation on the Lebanese front are conceivable: limited invasion, expansion of the war (less likely), and continuation of the war of attrition.
5. Houthis’ Influence
Iran is leveraging Yemen’s geopolitical significance in influencing international trade routes and vital global interests in the region. Particularly seeing the Houthi group’s disregard for any consequences or repercussions Yemen might face. Thus, Tehran has tasked the Houthis with targeting international trade.
The Houthis may join forces with Iran under the banner of “unified fronts” in facing any attack or war on Iran. Their involvement in any confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah could be more impactful than the involvement of other Iran-allied groups. This is given Yemen’s geographical significance and the Houthis’ control over the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, which they might close. The fate of Hezbollah seems more critical to them than the events in Gaza.
The Houthi group likely realizes the difficulty Israel faces in waging war in Yemen due to geographic and logistical challenges, along with its allies’ desire to avoid broadening the war’s scope in the region. This has led the U.S.-led Operation Prosperity Guardian coalition, announced in December 2023, to adopt a strategy of defensive operations, avoiding preemptive strikes or direct confrontation with the Houthis.
