The current situation in the Libya crisis raises the questions about the ability of the Government of National Unity to remove obstacles and overcome challenges that may hinder the completion of the political roadmap and whether it will be able to hold the presidential and parliamentary elections at the end of this year.
Despite the catalyzing and supportive endeavors to end the transitional period and push the roadmap forward, the Islamists, including the Brotherhood, stand in the way of the ‘correct’ political path, which calls for identifying the reasons for the intransigence of these currents and the motives behind their prolonging the Libyan conflict, as well as for examining the tools they employ to achieve this purpose and the possible scenarios in this respect.
Numerous Clarifications
Streams of political Islam in Libya, including the Muslim Brotherhood, are seeking to impose a state of ambiguity and confusion, to move the Libyan crisis away from the path supported by the international community, and to prevent access to the presidential elections that are relied upon to calm the situation in Libya. These Brotherhood endeavors may be explained in light of the following:
1- The decline of the grass-root base:
The Brotherhood realizes that it currently lacks the popular incubator and the sufficient support from the Libyans. Despite its rapid rise following the events of 2011 and its relentless endeavors to acquire the tools of influence, extending its power over all executive and legislative institutions in Libya, these attempts did not bear fruit. The Brotherhood experienced heavy losses in the 2014 legislative elections, and did not succeed in obtaining the majority that qualified them for the role they were seeking. Additionally, the Brotherhood was connected to the violence and chaos that the country witnessed and the resulting sharp division between West and East Libya, which negatively impacted it at the political and popular levels, leading to the erosion of its legitimacy.
Furthermore, there is a lack of public confidence in these groups, which was evident in the Brotherhood’s loss of the municipal elections in January 2021 in several regions in Western Libya, which were supposedly secured areas in terms of the group’s influence. Thus, its insistence on obstructing the upcoming elections can be understood.
2- The desire to gain power:
The Brotherhood in Libya suffers from weak organizational and intellectual structure, given the widening gap amidst its leaders, in addition to the divergence of interests within the group. Evidence of disintegration and internal division emerged in the surge of resignations that hit the group, especially within its main strongholds. Brotherhood members in the city of Zawiya dissolved the organization’s branch and submitted a collective resignation in August 2020, which was also repeated about two months later by members of the group in the city of Misrata. Those resignations were a major hit to the Brotherhood due to the significance of these two cities and their strategic position for the group.
In an attempt to control matters and avoid the specter of a rapid fall, the Brotherhood announced in May 2021 its transformation into an association by the name of ‘The Renaissance and Renewal’. This shift is part of the group's usual tactics of evasion in times of pressing crises, with the aim of overcoming any ordeal and working to remobilize its strength.
Therefore, the attempts to disrupt the political path in Libya may be understood in light of the Brotherhood’s desire to reposition itself differently within the Libyan community. However, these attempts may not be effective. Changing its slogan and transforming itself into a preaching association does not mean a change in the doctrinal basis, but rather refers to the group’s multiplicity of tools and a temporary change of its strategy with the aim of penetrating the Libyan society once more.
3- Escape the regional ripple-effect:
The Brotherhood and its elements in Libya are also mindful of the organization’s fall in the neighboring countries, and therefore, they intensify their efforts to escape the expected fate during the upcoming presidential and legislative elections. The regional experience indicates the decline of the Brotherhood’s capabilities, its lack of influence, and its rapid exposure in the societies that witnessed its rise. This was evident in the fall of the Brotherhood in Egypt following the 2013 revolution, the decline in the influence of the Ennahda movement in Tunisia amid public discontent of its practice, in addition to the resounding loss suffered by the Justice and Development Party in Morocco after winning 13 seats in the legislative elections last week, compared to 125 seats in the 2016 elections.
Accordingly, the Libyan Brotherhood seeks to obstruct the elections scheduled for December 24, 2021 for fear of this fate, and in the hope of preserving the last chance for the organization in the region. Holding the elections on time amid this state of internal division and public rejection may signify the final exit of the Brotherhood from any future arrangements within Libya.
Obstructive Methods
In light of the aforementioned motives, the Brotherhood in Libya is working to employ a number of tactics in order to keep the status quo and to move the roadmap away from its specified path, which can be illustrated as follows:
1- Provoking constitutional controversy:
The Libyan Brotherhood is working on targeting the constitutional path by raising further controversy over the constitutional rule regulating elections. The organization promotes the importance of organizing a constitutional referendum first, and then holding elections, which would delay the upcoming elections. The organization also raised a similar dispute over the mechanism of electing the country’s President, as it supports his election through the Parliament without resorting to direct voting. This can be understood within the course of the Libyan Brotherhood's desire to exclude the public option, which is difficult to control or attract in favor of the Brotherhood, compared to the indirect election through the Parliament. In that respect, several members of the Political Dialogue Forum expressed their dissatisfaction with the Brotherhood's attempts to obstruct the constitutional process by calling for the intervention of the UN envoy, Jan Kubis, to stop the Brotherhood's tampering with the constitutional process.
Meanwhile, the Libyan Brotherhood and its affiliates are quick to reject any measures and question all practices aimed at reaching the presidential and parliamentary elections. This was evident in the rejection of the presidential election law approved by the House of Representatives on September 9, where the Justice and Construction Party (the political arm of Brotherhood), as well as Brotherhood Leader, Khaled Al-Mishri, Chairman of the High Council of State, expressed their opposition to and absolute rejection of the law.
2- Targeting the electoral institutions:
The Libyan Brotherhood, through its electronic committees, launched a campaign to undermine the High National Election Commission as well as questioning the integrity and independence of the commission's President, Imad al Sayeh, as part of the group's mechanism to distort the electoral process. According to the UNHCR statement in July 2021, this campaign is similar in its severity to the terrorist attack carried out by ISIS against UNHCR in May 2018, which caused the injury and death of about 20 people. The Brotherhood’s campaign against the Election Commission can be understood as an attempt to abort the elections, and in case the group fails to postpone the elections, this campaign may be a preemptive step to overthrow and reject the election results, thus questioning the legitimacy of the elected institutions in the future.
3- Wreaking havoc:
The Brotherhood is trying to invest in chaos and create a turbulent security environment in Libya, which may complicate holding the upcoming elections in this atmosphere. Since the ceasefire was announced in Libya in October 2020, escalation and militarization that controlled the crisis before the truce have declined significantly. However, the past months have witnessed a return to combats between the militias in Western Libya, which could be due to the desire of Islamic streams including the Brotherhood, to confuse the scene and spread chaos in order to prevent elections from being held on time.
Two Possible Scenarios:
In light of these measures, it seems that the Brotherhood and currents of political Islam in Libya are seeking to prolong the current crisis, setting the obstruction of elections and the political process as a priority. This scheme may take two tracks governed by a number of considerations, as follows:
Track one (the completion of the political roadmap):
This path assumes the inability of the Brotherhood and currents of political Islam in Libya to implement a plan to abort the political path and obstruct the roadmap. This scenario is based on several considerations, including the desire of the international community and the actors in the Libyan crisis to hold the elections on their scheduled date on December 24, 2021, which was expressed in the output of the “Berlin 2” conference and all conferences concerned with the crisis. This is in addition to the convergent viewpoints of neighboring countries regarding the political settlement in Libya, which is expressed in the outcomes of the latest Algeria meeting, recognizing the necessity of activating the mechanism of neighboring countries to contribute to putting an end to the confusion in Libya. Additionally, some Libyan parties seek to get out of the current impasse and work to support and enhance stability in Libya, as well as easing the conflict, which can be found through the “Libya Stability Initiative" adopted by the Government of National Unity.
Track two (the obstruction of elections):
This scenario assumes the success of the Libyan Brotherhood in the scheme to disrupt the political path and obstruct the elections. It is based on several considerations, including the Brotherhood’s possession of weapons, and the persistence of foreign mercenaries in the Libyan arena, which implies the possibility of using this to destabilize the country and disrupt the roadmap. This is in addition to the possibility of the group exploiting and recharging disputes between the parties to enhance the internal crisis. Turkey's declared support for these armed organizations in Libya remains a motivator for these organizations to move forward with their scheme.
Finally, despite the challenges posed by external and internal interactions on the Libyan scene, there still is some chance of holding the presidential and parliamentary elections in Libya on schedule by the end of this year. Disrupting these elections will remain a major priority set by the Brotherhood and currents of political Islam during the coming stage. Yet, holding the elections on time may not necessarily mean a way out of the current stalemate in Libya, particularly in the event that the Brotherhood and its affiliates fail to obtain seats and achieve their desired gains. This is confirmed by historical experience over the past years, because as soon as those currents have lost the elections in 2014, they resorted to spreading chaos, fueling conflict and imposing a state of division between the Libyan East and West. This is a likely scenario, especially after the threats of Prime Minister Khaled Al-Mishri last June, where he stressed that, if the presidential elections are held by direct vote of the people, a serious conflict may result. These messages imply the intention of escalation in the event of the group's failure in the upcoming elections.
