When examining the behavior and conduct of radical groups, it is important to focus on two basic notions. The first is that radical political movements seize power whenever they have an opportunity, whether through irregular or undemocratic means. They usually do not claim power through traditional ways such as elections or popular vote. The second fact is that radical organizations are the outcome of political movements that embrace a radical extremist ideology, claiming that they are in possession of the ultimate truth and the definitive and final answer to all existential questions in all areas of life. The political behavior of these organizations is often exclusionary and divides society into two parts: those who are in favor and those who are against with no in-between. That is why these organizations, by nature, do not enter into political coalitions, nor do they cooperate with other organizations, even if they all share some components of their ideology, because they believe that they possess the ultimate truth that others do not.
Two Contradictory Directions
The historic lessons derived from the outcome of radical movements’ engagement in politics takes two opposite directions:
1- Radical movements preserve their principles and their own ideology and do their best to implement it, regardless of the price that societies under their control might have to pay. This was the case with Nazism in Germany, Fascism in Italy and Communism in the former Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin.
2- Radical movements prioritize their political interests, social and economic gains and embrace political pragmatism. They gradually transform into an ordinary political movement using slogans to solicit sympathy and support from the public, but in practice they pursue pragmatic policies that earn them temporary political gains, engage in negotiations and enter into alliances with political opponents. This is the path that most ideologically-driven movements in the Third World pursued after gaining independence from the Western Colonization. Marxist movements too followed this same approach in Europe.
A close look at radical movements in Arab and Muslim countries reveals that they followed in the steps of radical Marxist and nationalist movements on the same historic paths. In the 1990s, the Taliban movement adhered to the same ideology which lead them to power and thus to intellectual isolation from the political realities both at home and abroad. As a consequence, the US invasion to Afghanistan has befallen following the 9-11 attacks in 2001, before it rose to power again to bring Afghanistan back under its control once again on August 15, 2021.
In the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings, the Mulism Brotherhood took both paths. With its headquarters in Egypt, and its arm in Libya, the Brotherhood was doomed to isolation, where it attempted to impose its ideology on society by force and ignored all political partners. Consequently, the organization was brought to a very swift end. On the side, the Ennahda Movement, the Brotherhood’s arm in Tunisia, took a rational and pragmatic approach that enabled it to outlive the main organization in Egypt for ten years. But in all these cases, the duration of survival was proportional to the level of flexibility and pragmatism pursued in political practice.
Determinants of Behavior
In order to explain this inevitable fate of radical movements, four variables stand out clarifying the behavior of these movements after they seize power in Muslim countries.
1- Radical movements’ ideology and collision with international standards agreed on by the international community:
These include women’s rights, respect of religious and ethnic minorities’ identities, respect for public freedoms such as freedom of opinion, freedom of expression etc. The more intense and larger in scale this collision with international standards, the more likely these radical movements are to fail to stay in power for long periods of time, and the more likely their international isolation will continue and the swifter the end of their rule.
2- Incubator for radical movements in society under their rule:
This is measured both quantitatively and qualitatively. It includes the percentage of population making up the incubator, as well as its social and economic weight in the structure of the state. The incubator can be an ethnic or religious group or a certain region, or a religious group that is geographically dispersed and is intertwined with sectarian, ethnic, linguistic and regional lines. The larger in numbers, the more influential, the higher its percentage in society, the weightier economically, politically and culturally, then the more likely these radical movements to succeed in enduring and maintaining power, and vice versa. Incubators play a temporary role and can relatively continue to support the movements until their faults are exposed and their failures build up. That is when incubators turn against the movements. A good example is Iraq’s society and the Dawa Party and its allies.
3- Regional allies:
This is a highly critical factor in empowering radical movements to seize power, on the one hand, and to remain in power for longer periods, on the other. The more regional allies in neighboring countries or beyond- those who believe that radical movement’s rise to power plays into their hands- the more likely the rule of these movements will endure and become stable. The Taliban in the 1990s, Pakistan’s support for them, and Iran’s tacit approval of their rise to power, all represent the dynamics of this type of regional influence that empowers radical movements to seize and remain in power.
4- Outcome of the political process run by radical movements:
This is among the most important variables impacting the empowerment of radical movements to rise to, and hold power. If, therefore, they succeed to fulfill a minimum of the demands of the public, and later present public economic and social policies in areas such as employment, education, healthcare and infrastructure, then they successfully utilize one of the most critical factors for continuing in power, while also the other three factors (variables) happen to be in their interest.
The Taliban’s Case
Projecting this theoretical conceptualization on the current situation in Afghanistan, after the Taliban took over the country in mid-August, shows that the movement attempted to utilize the aforesaid four variables to serve its interests. That is, immediately after it seized power in Afghanistan, the Taliban movement expressed desire to adapt to stable international norms and traditions. It showed signs of attempting to reassure the world that is has changed and that is not the same Taliban of the 1990s, that it believes in the principle of national state, that it will respect the sovereignty of all other states, that it will not allow the soil of Afghanistan to be used to pose threats to any state, and also that it will respect public freedoms.
This rhetoric remains, however, a publicity stunt aimed at sending reassurances to the world in a moment of weakness right before it seizes control of the state and stabilizes its grip on the process of administration. On the other side, this conciliatory tone came from leaders who engaged in negotiations with the US officials in Qatar, and who knew and interacted with the outside world. Hence, the question begs itself: Does the rhetoric represent the movement’s youth and popular base? Did not the movement attract and recruit the youth by its extremist and violent anti-western rhetoric that rejects all international norms, especially women’s rights, public freedoms?
This same rhetoric may prompt a coup within the movement to bring in a more hardline and extremist generation, which means confrontation with the outside world will be fiercer and bring a swift end of the Taliban’s control of Afghanistan.
On the other hand, the incubator, made up of the Pashtuns tribes, cannot be counted as a positive factor for empowering the movement to rule Afghanistan, due to the tribal and sectarian plurality across the country’s regions. This can pose a threat to the cohesion and integrity of society and the state, because each ethnic or sectarian group takes up a whole region for itself. This situation can lead to civil wars whenever there are two elements of social divisions, such as the existence of an ethnic or sectarian group controlling a whole region, which is the case across Afghanistan. That is why this variable served the Taliban when they seized power, but will not be in the movement’s favor while it attempts to make their grip on power sustainable.
From yet a third perspective, the Taliban’s regional allies are not reliable. They are either beleaguered by internal and external issues, as is the case in Pakistan and Iran, or potential enemies, as is the case with Central Asian countries, if the rights of ethnic groups in northern Afghanistan are violated, or have economic and pragmatic political interests, as is the case with Qatar and Turkey.
The outcome of Taliban’s rule is not expected to gain social approval that can enable them to remain in power, because the movement inherited a system that remained riddled with all kinds of failure for fifty years, and will not be able to address inherited crises to establish its legitimacy unless a Marshall Plan descends on it and brings in huge funds from the outside world, which is unlikely to happen.
The conclusion is that the radical movement’s seizure of power often leads to their destruction or disintegration or blocks their development and progress. Overall, this remains a loss for peoples, societies as well as states. The Taliban is no exception and is not expected to continue in power in Afghanistan for a long time, unless it gives up its political ideology and transformed into an ordinary ruling class that has a moderate national agenda.
