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The Post-Rouhani Era

The future of US-Iranian relations under Raisi

20 June 2021


After the announcement of the victory of Ebrahim Raisi, Iran's hard-line judiciary chief, various analysts raised questions about the future of US-Iranian relations, particularly in light of major determinants. The most prominent of which is Ebrahim Raisi himself, who is subject to US sanctions, and his term, which may coincide with reaching a new nuclear agreement between Washington and Tehran, as well as the current debate in Washington’s political circles regarding the situation in Iran. 

Washington's stance 

Washington always pays particular attention to the Iranian presidential elections. The official political circles represented by the White House and Congress, and the unofficial ones represented by think tanks and the media, are closely monitoring the elections and were focusing on their results and repercussions with cautious anticipation. In this respect, the following can be noted: 

1- The White House: US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan has played down the impact of Raisi’s elections. Sullivan stated in an interview with ABC that: “Whether the president is person A or person B is less relevant than whether their entire system is prepared to make verifiable commitments to constrain their nuclear programme,” In general, the announcement of the electoral victory of Ebrahim Raisi, who is associated with the hard-line movement, will strongly impose itself on the White House agenda, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Security Council during the coming period. Raisi is subject to US sanctions imposed by the US Treasury Department on November 4, 2019, for his involvement in the regime's brutal repression against the ‘Iranian Green Movement protests’ following the 2009 elections, and for his participation as the deputy attorney general in Tehran in the so-called ‘death commission’ that ordered the execution of thousands of political prisoners extrajudicially in 1988.

2- Congress: Until the election day, no statements were issued by Congress regarding the elections, particularly by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or its counterpart in the House, although some statements were issued by some individual members of Congress, criticizing the elections and asserting their being fraudulent.

Regardless of official statements being released or not, the key issue in the position of Congress is relevant to the stance of the Republicans, who object restoring the nuclear deal with Iran. They will view the election results and the appointment of a hard-line president as a confirmation of their stance against returning to the agreement and enabling Iran to benefit from it.   

3- Non-official circles: The general trend in the unofficial circles, whether think tanks or the media, considers the Iranian presidential elections to be pre-engineered in order to be won by Ebrahim Raisi, who is close to Khamenei, so that the hard-liners would seize control of the government, and that there would be harmony amidst the ruling institutions under the hegemony of a single current. There is a general agreement among academia in the US that the decline in political participation in the 2021 elections is a strong indicator of the regime’s deteriorating legitimacy, which implies that Iran is on the verge of further repression and extremism.

Persistent tensions

Raisi’s election is expected to maintain the current course of cycles of tensioned relations between Washington and Tehran varying between maintaining the current stiffy relations, or escalating friction despite the possibility of sealing a second nuclear agreement in 2021. In this respect, some indicators of the relationship between Washington and Tehran under the rule of Ebrahim Raisi might be as follows : 

1- The growing need to seal a second nuclear agreement: Raisi’s victory increased the pressure to reach a new nuclear agreement. This is evident in the statements, according to  "Axios " website on Friday, June 18 by a US official that the Biden administration wants to finalize an agreement with Iran to revive the 2015 nuclear deal within six weeks, implying that the administration wants to reach an agreement before Ebrahim Raisi assume power. 

2- Difficulties of subsequent negotiations following the second nuclear agreement: The assumption in Washington indicate that the second nuclear agreement in 2021 will include terms regarding subsequent negotiations addressing Iran’s ballistic missile program and its destabilizing activities in the region. Although it would be hasty to expect the outcomes of those negotiations, Biden will face a major challenge represented in Tehran's severe intransigence under the Raisi’s reign to discuss such issues or to offer any compromises.  

3- The dilemma of confronting the Republicans: Assuming a second nuclear agreement is reached before Raisi assumes his presidency, the implications of this agreement after lifting sanctions on Iran, particularly those related to its nuclear program, will enhance the position of his regime domestically due to an expected economic recovery. This result means that the Biden administration will face severe internal criticism, especially from the Republicans, which will consider the administration to be in support of the hard-line wing in Iran. This will force the administration to adopt an active public relations strategy to defend its stance in concluding the agreement.

4- Escalating tensions: Although the general direction of the Biden administration is focusing on calming tensions with Iran, Raisi's continuation of Iran's policies to destabilize the Middle East, including entrenching its influence in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen are likely to escalate  the hostility  between the Washington and Tehran. This tension may intensify, if the administration, under domestic pressure, may be forced to impose further sanctions on the new Iranian President, or doesn’t the lift the sanctions currently in place. While this possibility seems relatively remote, its fulfilment may lead to a crisis between Washington and Tehran, given that the president is the second person in the regime's structure, albeit formally. 

5- Washington’s options: US think tanks indicate that the Biden administration does not have a clear strategy in dealing with Iran. However, it has one main goal, which is to return to the nuclear agreement to restrict Iran's nuclear program, and preventing it from acquiring a nuclear weapon, which may lead to a regional nuclear arms race. However, achieving such goal does not mean a change in Iran's behavior in other aspects, whether its regional policy or its rapprochement with China, which has become the prominent threat according to US national security. 

Hence, Raisi’s victory, even with a new nuclear agreement, means that the rest of the contentious issues between Washington and Tehran will continue. The complexities of such issues will put the Biden administration in a real predicament. In light of the administration’s desire to de-escalate conflicts in the Middle East and to focus on confronting China, Iran’s position under the control of the hard-liners will obstruct any chances of Washington’s success in bringing about an appeasing regional change. Thus, the US factor will be less influential. 

In conclusion, although the results of the Iranian elections will have major internal repercussions, particularly the decline of the reformist trend, the most significant repercussions of the results of those elections may be seen in the file of US-Iranian relations, which is likely to witness intensified tensions. This is also likely to lead to a crisis in relations, if Washington imposes new sanctions on Ebrahim Raisi. Finally, Raisi's rise to power will confirm Washington's limited ability to calm regional issues relevant to Iran in light of the hard-liners' domination of Tehran.