Partial or complete disarmament of violent sub-state actors in border areas is a prerequisite for achieving domestic and regional stability. This applies to the Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas in the Palestinian territories, the Houthi group in Yemen, Shi’ite and Kurdish militias in Syria, the al-Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces) in Iraq, tens of area-based armed groups in militias in Libya and tribal militias such as the Rapid Support Forces and the Janjaweed militia in Sudan. All these represent roving armies crossing soft borders.
Tunisian President Beji Caid Essebsi, on November 8, 2017, said that Libya is no longer a state after it was divided into “sects and creeds” and that this division has created hotbeds of tension in neighboring countries. A conflict in a state will spread into other states, especially because of diverse warring factions, conflicting agendas and interests. Conflicts will further exacerbate through attempts by each one of these factions to hold a maximum share of power during any interim arrangements, while failing to reach a point where the conflict can be settled.
However, there are several issues facing governments and regular armies involved in disarming sub-state actors in the Middle East. These can be presented as follows:
Legitimacy of Arms
1- Representation in existing power structure. Some states tend to integrate militias into quasi-power” structures, especially after they have already penetrated the state military and security institutions as is the case in Libya, Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq. Perhaps this can explain why Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi defended the Popular Mobilization Forces (Hashd al-Shaabi) by asserting that the militia is an integral part of the armed forces under his command. This came at a time when differences surfaced over the militia’s participation in the conflict in Syria and the United States’ pressure to prevent it from transforming into a political party.
The same holds true for Lebanon’s Hezbollah, which has become an influential actor dominating the political decision-making process and imposed a fait accompli by force of arms. Not content with its domestic role only, this militia even plays a regional role supporting the regime of Bashar Assad in Syria and Tehran’s agenda. Hezbollah eventually created serious conflicts with Lebanon’s neighbors that eventually led to the resignation of Prime Minister Saad Hariri.
This prompted Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir to state, on November 9, that Hezbollah has “hijacked the Lebanese system” and put roadblocks in front of every initiative made by Prime Minister Saad Hariri. Hezbollah, al-Jubeir added, also continues to maintain its militia outside the scope of government institutions, even though it should hand over its weapons. There can be no militia outside the scope of government institutions. “Hezbollah has been the instrument that Iran uses to dominate Lebanon.” Al-Jubair also said that Hezbollah is “the instrument that Iran uses to interfere in Syria with Hamas and with the Houthis. And so we see Hezbollah's mischief all over the region. Hezbollah has been responsible for smuggling weapons into Bahrain.”
Saudi State Minister for Gulf Affairs Thamer al-Sabhan, on November 7, said that the Lebanese government will be treated as “declaring war” on Saudi Arabia because of Hezbollah’s “aggression” against the kingdom and its influence on all decisions made by the Lebanese government. Accordingly, disarming Hezbollah is not only a domestic, but also a regional and international demand.
Sectarian Armies
2- Spread of sectarian militias. Alawite, Druze and Christian militias were established in Syria to protect minority groups from ISIS and al-Nusra Front. These militias do not take part in military operations alongside the forces of the regime of Bashar Assad’s forces against the opposition factions and remain within the borders of their areas. Yet, due to their sectarian affiliation, this can increase the risk of infighting between the components of the Syrian society.
Other sectarian militias operating in Syria are Shi’ites and they are affiliated with, and controlled by Iran that provides them with political support and funds. These militias even encroach on the powers of the Assad regime’s forces and have become a strike force against the armed opposition factions. The main mission of these militias is to entrench Iran’s influence in Syria, which will raise the fears of the Syrian regime in the post-conflict era. However, the Russian presence in Syria may make the process of disarming and disbanding of the Syrian Shi’ite militias an easier task.
Hence, some of the Shi’ite militants may be integrated into the regular army, and none of these Shi’ite militias, and Hezbollah in particular, will be prevented from maintaining any presence on Syrian territory. The aim is not to weaken Iran’s influence in Syria in favor of Russia’s influence, but to protect the security of Israel, which will not accept any Iranian presence on its border with Syria. That is why one of the crucial points in understandings between Russia and the United States is to keep Iranian-aligned militias away from Jordan’s border.
Repercussions of Chaos
3- Prevention of escalation of regional tensions. Amid mounting international pressure to counter its threats, a prevalent view now that is demanding Hezbollah to disarm may impact regional stability. Disarming Hezbollah is too difficult for the Lebanese to carry out alone, which raises concerns of several parties over potential escalation between rival regional powers.
In May, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres called on the Lebanese government and army to take measures to prevent Hezbollah and other Lebanese armed groups from acquiring weapons and build paramilitary capabilities away from the control of the Lebanese state. He also called states in the region that have close ties with Hezbollah to encourage the militia to disarm and transform into a political party.
On July 20, 2017, US Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley expressed his concerns over the buildup of weapons by Hezbollah, and emphasized the need for the international community to “apply more pressure on Hezbollah to disarm and cease its destabilizing behavior, especially toward Israel.” Her statement came on the eve of a UN Security Council meeting about United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) deployed to southern Lebanon.
One Army
4- Complications of rendering national reconciliations successful. The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) insists that Hamas should disarm to make Palestinian reconciliation possible. On November 7, 2017 Hazem Atallah, the head of the Palestinian police, emphasized that reconciliation must lead to single government with one law and one army. He called for Hamas to disarm to allow the unity deal to succeed, and said, “How can we do security work in the presence of these guns and rockets? This is not possible, it is impossible.” However, there is no sign that Hamas would dismantle its military wing, the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades.
Although Hamas did not comment on Atallah’s statement, Yahya Sinwar, the head of Hamas' political bureau in Gaza Strip, previously said, “Disarming us is like Satan dreaming of heaven. No one can take away our weapons. We will continue to possess power to protect our people.” The United States and Israel demanded Hamas recognize Israel and disarm, which Hamas rejected.
Repercussions
5- Terrorist counter-attacks. Although terrorist organizations received strong blows in 2017, after they seized key areas in some crisis-hit countries such as Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen, there are still enclaves and active support cells, which justifies a need for a role for militias such as the Kurdish Peshmerga.
On the other hand, Syrian and Russian insistence on disarming factions in southern Syria, especially those from the Free Syrian Army, is not endorsed by neighboring countries and Jordan in particular. According to several views, Jordan is concerned that disarming these factions would push their members to join terrorist organizations, especially because the ISIS-affiliated Khalid ibn al-Walid Army has a strong presence on its border with Syria.
Client Networks
6- Using field forces to control economic resources. Infighting between rival Shi’ite tribes raged in August and September 2017 in Basra, Iraq, over agricultural lands and government construction contracts especially in Iraq’s main oil-rich area in the south. Ali Shaddad, head of the oil and gas committee in Basra’s provincial council, on September 11, 2017 stated that tribal feuds have been exacerbating recently and such a rifts could threaten the operations of the foreign energy companies.
Double Standards
7- Tribes’ fear of losing traditional sources of power. This can explain why Sudanese vice-president Hasabo Abdelrahman’s call for disarming and handing over all arms to the armed forces has received no response in al-Fashir, Nyala, Zalingei, al-Dha'ein and al-Jenaina.
According to several views, arms in Darfur are the only way to protect tribes, and any tribe without arms will be eliminated. The Sudanese reluctance to disarm the Rapid Support Forces, which are part of a tribal militia, sends out the message that disarming certain groups would drive other groups and individuals to stockpile arms in various places and even send them to remote towns and villages in challenge of the government’s decision.
Loose Borders
8- Uncontrolled common borders. South Sudan’s president Salva Kiir, at November 2 joint press conference with Sudan’s President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, accused Sudan as being a source of arms smuggled to South Sudan. The accusations came during Kiir’s visit to Khartoum in a bid to settle issues between the two states, which remain unresolved since South Sudan’s independence in 2011. Although an agreement to create a demilitarized border zone was signed, border areas remained evidently militarized triggering a civil war in South Sudan.
Settlement of border disputes, establishing a buffer zone and exchanging accusations of supporting rebels in both states all represent pending issues. Sudan accuses South Sudan of helping rebels in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile, while the latter accuses Khartoum of supporting Kiir’s rival, his former vice-president Riek Machar since the civil war broke out in South Sudan in late 2013.
However, Sudanese Defense Minister Awad Ibn Ouf recently emphasized that the exchange of accusations of supporting rebels was over and that the two states agreed to reactivate joint committees, install control points on their common border and initiate direct contacts to serve their common interests in finding a radical solution to pending issues.
Complex Process
It can possibly be concluded that disarming and reintegrating sub state actors into security and military institutions, such as armies, police, intelligence services and border guard forces, in post-conflict states hinges on the ability to overcome difficulties arising in transitional stages. This involves the criminalization, and designation of some parties as terrorist organizations, imposing financial sanctions on them and on their collaborators and even continued strikes against some of their elements. This will make the process a complicated one involving political, military, social and economic dimensions. Accordingly, no long-term regional stability can be achieved without responsible and carefully-planned programs to handle arms in cooperation with international agencies, regional experts, and domestic powers that support this track as part of national reconstruction.
