The Sahel region, extending from Sudan in the east to Mali in the west, is increasingly recognized as one of the most volatile areas in the world. Its conflicts are deeply interconnected, driven by a combination of historical grievances, ethnic tensions, weak governance, and external interventions. Ripple effects from these conflicts have profound implications for neighboring regions, including the Horn of Africa and North Africa. The following analysis delves into the dynamics of these entangled conflicts, explores their impact on neighboring regions, and assesses the role of organized crime in perpetuating instability.

The Sahel’s Conflict Dynamics: A Regional Overview

1. The roots of instability:

The instability in the Sahel stems from a complex interplay of factors, including colonial legacies, economic marginalization, and ethnic fragmentation. Arbitrary borders drawn during the colonial era left many ethnic groups divided across several countries, sowing seeds for future conflicts[1]. As a prime example, the Tuareg people, spread across Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Algeria, have been at the center of repeated rebellions, particularly in Mali, where their demands for autonomy frequently clash with the central government.

The conflicts in the Sahel are characterized by their transnational nature, involving a multitude of actors including jihadist groups, ethnic militias, and state forces. Key conflict zones include Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, where jihadist insurgencies linked to groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and Boko Haram have destabilized vast areas[2]. Porous borders, inadequate state presence, and local grievances have facilitated the expansion of these jihadist groups. These grievances often stem from historical marginalization, economic underdevelopment, and resource competition, further exacerbated by the impacts of climate change[3].

In Mali, the conflict escalated following the 2012 Tuareg rebellion and subsequent coup, creating a power vacuum that allowed jihadist groups to gain significant territory. The conflict has since evolved into a complex war involving international forces, local militias, and Islamist factions[4]. Meanwhile, Burkina Faso has seen a sharp increase in violence since 2015, with attacks spreading from the north and east towards more densely populated southern regions, affecting the borders of neighboring Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo[5]. Simultaneously, Niger faces a dual threat: Boko Haram in the southeast and jihadist groups in the west, both of which continue to challenge state authority and spill over into Nigeria and other neighboring states[6].

2. The role of external actors:

External interventions have further complicated the situation in the Sahel region[7]. France's military involvement in Mali, initially under Operation Serval and later Operation Barkhane, aimed to counter the jihadist threat but has faced criticism for its heavy-handed approach and failure to address underlying issues. Compounding these challenges, the G5 Sahel Joint Force, established by Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, has grappled with insufficient funding and coordination problems. Additionally, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has been hampered by its limited mandate and resources, raising questions about its effectiveness in stabilizing the region.

Economic and Security Spill-over Effects

The spill-over effects from the Sahel’s conflicts are multifaceted, encompassing both economic disruptions and security threats that affect the broader West African region.

1. Economic spill-over effects:

The conflicts in the Sahel have disrupted regional trade networks, which are crucial for the economies of neighboring countries. In Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, insecurity has led to the closure of critical trade routes and markets, affecting trade flows across West Africa. In April 2023, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Senegal, and Togo have experienced significant economic impacts, with losses through lower exports and reduced foreign direct investment (FDI) flows equivalent to 1.3% of GDP in Ghana and nearly 5% of GDP in Senegal[8].

Investment climates in the affected regions have deteriorated due to heightened security risks, with FDI inflows particularly sensitive to instability as investors shy away from areas with high perceived risk. According to the report, countries embroiled in conflict experience, on average, 40% less in FDI flows compared to countries at peace[9]. While the displacement of investments from conflict-affected areas to relatively stable neighbors like Côte d'Ivoire serves as a potential mitigating factor, its impact remains limited as the overall regional attractiveness diminishes due to interconnected security threats.

Addressing these increased security threats has led to higher military spending among Sahel countries and their neighbors, consequently diverting funds away from critical social services such as health and education. For instance, Ghana and Togo have exhibited patterns where spikes in military expenditure correlate with stagnant or reduced spending on social sectors, posing long-term risks to human capital development[10].

2. Security spill-over effects:

The spread of jihadist activities from the Sahel to coastal West African countries illustrates the porous nature of the region’s security landscape. Extremist groups have taken advantage of local grievances, porous borders, and the absence of effective state control to expand their reach. For instance, Côte d’Ivoire and Togo have reported direct jihadist attacks, leading to fatalities and increasing fears of further infiltration[11]. In Ghana, although no direct attacks have been reported, the government acknowledges a growing threat, particularly in the northern regions bordering Burkina Faso, where local disputes could be exploited by jihadists[12].

The Sahel conflicts have generated significant displacement, with millions of people forced to flee their homes. The UNHCR reports that between 2021 and 2022 alone, about 50,000 Burkinabés fled to neighboring countries such as Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo due to escalating violence[13]. This mass displacement not only creates humanitarian crises but also places additional strain on host communities, often leading to tensions and competition over limited resources. Refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) strain local resources and services in host countries, exacerbating existing social and economic challenges.

Impact on Neighboring Regions

1. The Horn of Africa: A region on the brink:

The Horn of Africa, already beset by its own challenges, is increasingly vulnerable to the spill-over effects of the Sahel’s instability. The porous borders between Sudan and its neighbors, including South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, facilitate the flow of arms, refugees, and militant groups. Sudan’s internal conflicts, particularly in Darfur and the Blue Nile region, have had a destabilizing impact on the Horn[14]. For example, the influx of refugees and arms into South Sudan has exacerbated its ongoing civil conflict, while the spread of jihadist ideologies from the Sahel to Somalia poses a significant threat.

Al-Shabaab, the jihadist group based in Somalia, has established connections with organizations like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). Through these links, the groups have facilitated the exchange of resources, training, and tactics, thereby enhancing the capabilities of jihadist organizations in both regions.[15] Meanwhile, the ongoing conflict in Ethiopia's Tigray region, exacerbated by instability in Sudan, threatens to spark a broader regional crisis. This volatile situation has the potential to draw in neighboring countries, further destabilizing the Horn of Africa.

2. North Africa: A region under siege:

North Africa is also profoundly affected by the Sahel’s instability, with Libya and Algeria playing key roles in the region's security dynamics. The 2011 Libyan revolution, which led to the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi, has had far-reaching consequences for the Sahel. The collapse of state institutions in Libya created a power vacuum that has been exploited by various armed groups, including jihadists and criminal networks. Libya has become a major hub for arms trafficking, with weapons from Gaddafi’s vast arsenals flooding into the Sahel, fueling conflicts in Mali, Niger, and beyond[16].

Algeria, which experienced a brutal civil war in the 1990s against Islamist insurgents, has also been deeply affected by the Sahel’s instability. The country’s vast desert borders with Mali and Niger are difficult to secure, making it vulnerable to the infiltration of militants and smugglers[17]. Algeria has responded by ramping up its military presence along the border and conducting joint operations with its neighbors. However, the threat of spill-over remains high, particularly as jihadist groups in the Sahel seek to expand their influence into North Africa.

Organized Crime: The Fuel of Instability

Organized crime in the Sahel is both a driver and a consequence of the region’s instability. The vast, ungoverned spaces of the Sahel provide ideal conditions for criminal networks to operate, facilitating the trafficking of drugs, arms, people, and illicit goods. These networks are often closely linked to insurgent groups, creating a symbiotic relationship where crime fuels conflict, and conflict enables crime.

Drug trafficking, particularly of cocaine from South America, has become a significant source of revenue for criminal networks in the Sahel[18]. The region serves as a major transit route for cocaine en route to Europe, with traffickers exploiting the weak state presence and porous borders. In return, these networks provide financial and logistical support to insurgent groups, further entrenching the cycle of violence. The profits from drug trafficking are used to purchase weapons, recruit fighters, and bribe officials, undermining state authority and perpetuating instability.

Human trafficking and smuggling are also rampant in the Sahel, driven by the region’s poverty and instability[19]. Migrants from West Africa, fleeing violence and economic hardship, often pass through the Sahel en route to Europe. Along the way, they are vulnerable to exploitation by smugglers and traffickers, who subject them to extortion, forced labor, and sexual violence. The human smuggling networks are highly organized, with connections across the region and beyond, making them difficult to dismantle.

The revenues from human trafficking and smuggling are often used to fund insurgent activities, creating a vicious cycle where instability drives migration, and migration fuels further instability. The involvement of criminal networks in human trafficking has also led to a rise in slavery and human rights abuses in the region, further exacerbating the humanitarian crisis.

The proliferation of arms in the Sahel stands as another major factor driving the region's instability. Following the collapse of Libya in 2011, a flood of weapons was unleashed into the Sahel, subsequently used by various armed groups to fuel conflicts across the region. Significantly increasing the lethality of conflicts, these weapons—including small arms, light weapons, and heavy artillery—have led to higher casualties and more protracted violence. Highly sophisticated arms trafficking networks in the Sahel, often involving a mix of local and international actors,[20] exploit the region's porous borders and weak state controls. As a result, weapons move across vast distances, from the Maghreb to West Africa. These networks exploit the region’s porous borders and weak state controls to move weapons across vast distances, from the Maghreb to West Africa.

Regional Security Architecture: ECOWAS in Crisis

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has traditionally been at the forefront of efforts to manage regional security in West Africa. However, the organization has faced significant challenges in responding to the escalating crises in the Sahel. The recent coups in Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso have exposed the limitations of ECOWAS’s approach, raising concerns about its capacity to enforce democratic norms and maintain stability.

ECOWAS’s response to these coups has been widely criticized[21]. In Mali, the organization imposed sanctions and suspended the country’s membership, but these measures have had limited impact. The Malian junta has remained defiant, forging closer ties with Russia and further isolating itself from the West[22]. In Guinea, ECOWAS’s response was similarly ineffective, as the military government ignored calls for a return to civilian rule. These failures have eroded ECOWAS’s credibility and raised questions about its ability to manage future crises.

The crisis within ECOWAS is also a crisis of legitimacy. The organization’s reliance on economic sanctions as a punitive measure has been increasingly questioned, as these sanctions often hurt civilian populations more than the ruling elites[23]. Moreover, ECOWAS’s inconsistent responses to political crises have undermined its authority. For instance, the organization was quick to condemn the coup in Mali but was slower to react to the constitutional crises in Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire, where incumbents manipulated electoral processes to extend their rule[24]. The perception of bias and ineffectiveness has weakened ECOWAS’s standing, both within the region and internationally. As a result, member states are increasingly looking for alternative security arrangements, which could further undermine the organization’s influence.

The Way Forward

The spill-over effects of the conflicts in the Sahel are reshaping the security landscape of Africa. From Sudan to Mali, the entangled conflicts are creating a web of instability that threatens to engulf neighboring regions, including the Horn of Africa and North Africa. The involvement of organized crime, which both fuels and is fueled by instability, adds an additional layer of complexity to the region’s challenges. The recent developments within ECOWAS highlight the difficulties and potential in addressing these threats. However, any sustainable solution must go beyond military responses and address the root causes of instability, including poverty, governance deficits, and ethnic tensions. The future of the Sahel, and by extension the broader region, hinges on the ability of regional and international actors to adopt a comprehensive approach that prioritizes peacebuilding, development, and inclusive governance.