What Awaits Venezuela's Maduro in his Third Term?

On January 10, 2025, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro was sworn in for a third six-year term. The opposition condemned this event as a "coup," accusing Maduro of election fraud in connection with the presidential elections held on July 28, 2024. In response, the government organized a rally in support of Maduro in the capital. Meanwhile, the opposition staged a protest led by Maria Corina Machado, who made her first public appearance since August 2024.

Internal Challenges

Maduro faces a number of internal challenges in the coming period, which can be outlined as follows:

1- Escalating social unrest

Indicators suggest a high likelihood of continued and increasing social and political unrest due to ongoing protests and demonstrations led by the opposition, which reject the election results. This unrest is likely to contribute to a growing sense of insecurity among the population. Furthermore, the number of Venezuelans suffering from food insecurity has risen significantly, from 2 million in January 2024 to 3.5 million in July 2024. The government's ineffective response to these challenges, along with its failure to provide basic social services, has exacerbated the crisis. Additionally, Venezuela's gas crisis has forced citizens to revert to traditional cooking methods, utilizing charcoal, firewood, and even plastic waste. Such practices pose a clear threat to household safety and public health across the country, as the production of propane gas—the primary cooking fuel in Venezuela—remains insufficient.

2- Rising rates of organized crime

Some analysts predict that Venezuela may experience a rise in smuggling activities as drug trafficking groups attempt to counteract economic difficulties through illicit revenues. To add, illegal mining, another highly profitable and illicit endeavor, is expected to expand, posing a significant threat to the stability of Maduro’s regime. The increasing concentration of illicit wealth could exacerbate internal conflicts in Venezuela, as these illegal revenues may be utilized to fund arms purchases, recruit individuals, and support coups or uprisings, thereby heightening the risk of government collapse.

3- Deteriorating economic conditions

Maduro’s first and second terms were characterized by economic collapse, with the GDP shrinking by 70% and 7.7 million Venezuelans fleeing the country in search of jobs. The economic blockade has further exacerbated Venezuela’s economic troubles, leading to significant losses in the oil sector and hindering the government’s efforts to allocate income toward local community development. The blockade has also restricted the country from entering into contracts with numerous companies worldwide, resulting in challenges in importing essential technologies and goods, as well as attracting vital investments for the oil and industrial sectors. Over the past decade, these factors have contributed to rising inflation and pushed more than half of the population below the poverty line. For this reason, Maduro fears sanctions more than any other measure; his regime even passed a law last year imposing 25-year prison sentences, asset confiscation, and lifetime political bans on any Venezuelan who advocates for such sanctions.

4- Threats to the cohesion of the security apparatus

There are numerous indicators that Maduro is allocating valuable resources to suppress dissent within his regime and target those deemed insufficiently loyal. In August 2024, when opposition leader Machado called for nationwide protests, five army generals were dismissed for disloyalty and their unwillingness to engage in repression. Furthermore, reports emerged of several judges facing retaliation for refusing to pursue fabricated charges against protesters. These developments raise concerns about the potential fragmentation of the regime’s security forces, which poses a significant threat to Maduro’s future.

External Challenges

Maduro’s regime is expected to face a number of external pressures, both from neighboring Latin American countries and the broader international community, as outlined below:

1- Loss of support from traditional allies

Maduro faces the risk of shifting stances from his leftist allies—Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico—potentially leading to a loss of economic, trade, and diplomatic support from these nations. Initially, these three countries aimed to mediate the crisis, neither recognizing Maduro’s victory nor explicitly labeling the elections as fraudulent. They also issued a series of joint statements demanding more comprehensive reports on Venezuela’s election results. On August 15, 2024, Brazil and Colombia called for a re-election, a proposal rejected by both Maduro and the opposition. Such a perspective is further reinforced by statements from Brazilian President Lula da Silva, a historical ally of Maduro in the region, who described Venezuela as living under “a very unpleasant regime” with an “authoritarian slant.”

2- Increased risk of international isolation

Maduro’s regime is likely to face further international isolation in the coming period. In December 2024, the European Union decided to expand sanctions against the Venezuelan government. Additionally, Italy officially recognized Edmundo Gonzalez, the opposition candidate who ran against Maduro, as the legitimate president. Tensions between Venezuela and Spain heightened after the Spanish Congress recognized Gonzalez as the elected president of Venezuela.

Gonzalez arrived in Spain on September 8, 2024, seeking asylum after spending a month in hiding in his home country, where he was wanted by the authorities. In response, Venezuela recalled its ambassador in Madrid for consultations and summoned the Spanish ambassador in Caracas to protest comments made by Spanish Defence Minister Margarita Robles regarding Maduro’s re-election.

At the start of 2025, the Venezuelan government severed diplomatic relations with Paraguay after its president, Santiago Pena, unequivocally expressed support for opposition leader Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia, which Maduro described as "ignorance of the law."

Finally, some assessments suggest that geopolitical factors may increasingly work against Maduro’s regime. External patrons of Venezuela, particularly China, have grown frustrated with the country’s poor economic performance and irregular debt repayments. Such frustration is unlikely to subside anytime soon, given Venezuela’s lack of economic diversification and low productivity. Moreover, the war in Ukraine and the open confrontation with Israel have diverted the attention of Russia and Iran away from Latin America, potentially weakening their support for Maduro.

3- Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency

As U.S. President-elect Donald Trump prepares to officially assume office on January 20, 2025, a critical question arises: What impact will the new U.S. administration have on relations with Venezuela? Most opinions on this matter can be summarized into two scenarios:

Scenario One: Practical Coexistence

In this scenario, the U.S. shifts from sanctions and pressure to re-establish diplomatic relations with Venezuela. Trump would aim to negotiate directly with Maduro, potentially seeking to reduce migration from Venezuela by offering concessions in oil sector negotiations. Renewed dialogue could lead to eased sanctions and a revitalization of Venezuela’s oil sector. Such recovery would diminish the Venezuelan government’s reliance on black-market oil sales, attract foreign investment, improve oil infrastructure, and boost state revenues.

Several indicators support this view, including Maduro’s congratulatory message to Donald Trump following his election victory, in which he described the Republican Party’s second term as a "new beginning." At the same time, Maduro ordered the release of hundreds of detained protesters and the review of cases involving dozens of others. Many interpreted these actions as signs of his willingness to make concessions to Trump, leaving the door open for a more pragmatic approach from the Trump administration.

Conversely, some attribute Trump’s potential inclination toward coexistence to the failure of the "maximum pressure" strategy adopted during his first term. This approach not only failed to remove Maduro but also contributed to the influx of nearly 700,000 Venezuelans into the United States. Consequently, Trump’s policies toward Maduro are likely to be influenced by his focus on reducing migration, potentially fostering dialogue between the two countries.

Additionally, Trump faces pressure from energy lobby groups to resume diplomatic relations with Venezuela. According to The Wall Street Journal, executives from U.S. oil companies and bond investors have urged Trump to abandon the "maximum pressure" policy, calling for an agreement to increase oil supplies in exchange for reducing the flow of migrants. Prominent figures like Harry Sargent III, a billionaire and major Republican donor, are also trying to convince the Trump administration of the potential benefits of negotiating with Maduro rather than attempting to oust him.

Scenario Two: Increased Pressure

Some analysts warn that relationsbetween Washington and Caracas could significantly deteriorate during Trump's second term if he pursues a strategy of "increased pressure." Such an approach would involve tightening international sanctions on Venezuela and implementing new measures targeting senior officials and key sectors of the Venezuelan economy, particularly the oil industry. Such a strategy would likely be influenced by figures like Republican Senator and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a vocal critic of the Venezuelan government, and National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, who advocates for sanctions against Maduro’s regime.

Furthermore, the possibility of coexistence and improved relations between Maduro and Trump seems impractical for several reasons. Opposition from the more conservative wing of the Republican Party, pressure from influential Cuban-American leaders close to Trump, and the risk of alienating Latino voters all pose significant challenges. Additionally, Latin American leaders such as Argentina's President Javier Milei, El Salvador's President Nayib Bukele, and Brazil's President Jair Bolsonaro are actively combating powerful leftist forces in their own countries.

ّIn conclusion, Maduro is expected to strengthen his control over the streets and undermine opposition efforts, drawing on the backing of military and security forces. His strong ties with China, Russia, and other allies will further bolster the resilience of his regime, particularly as the U.S. and Western nations remain focused on ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. Given these dynamics, the likelihood of Edmundo Gonzalez making a significant impact on Maduro’s political future appears slim.

Uncertainty in Caracas

What Awaits Venezuela's Maduro in his Third Term?

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