Will the Somalia-Ethiopia Agreement Brokered by Turkey Endure?

On December 11, 2024, Ankara hosted a significant diplomatic gathering, bringing together Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. During the meeting, a groundbreaking announcement revealed that Somalia and Ethiopia had reached a Turkey-brokered agreement to resolve the acute disputes that had escalated significantly throughout the current year.

Given the complex regional and international environment, assessing the opportunities and challenges for the agreement's success becomes crucial. Moreover, anticipating the future implications of this accord for both parties and the Horn of Africa as a whole emerges as a vital consideration.

Context of the Agreement

At the beginning of 2024, the Ethiopian federal government announced a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the government of Somaliland. The agreement granted Ethiopia access to Somaliland's coast, allowing establishment of commercial ports and naval bases. In exchange, Ethiopia agreed to initiate the process of recognizing Somaliland's independence, starting with upgrading diplomatic representation between the two sides to the ambassadorial level.

Since its issuance last January, the MoU has sparked exceptional tensions between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa, many of which persist into the current year. The resulting strains have reached a critical point, threatening security arrangements in place since 2007. The Somali government, exploiting the end of the African mission's mandate, has officially announced its refusal to receive any Ethiopian forces within the mission. Furthermore, Mogadishu now considers any form of Ethiopian military presence in Somalia as occupation by foreign forces, effective from the beginning of 2025.

The announcement of this agreement resulted from Turkish diplomatic efforts led by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan since last July to mediate between the two countries, with which Ankara has close relations. The agreement, however, did not include any reference to settling the contentious issues between Somalia and Ethiopia. These matters were left to a technical negotiation track to be launched by February 2025, lasting four months before reaching a final agreement that includes settling the various points of dispute between the two parties.

Evidently, the agreement is limited to exchanging understandings between the two countries regarding the principles governing their bilateral relationship. The official statement issued by the Turkish side affirmed Ethiopia's commitment to the principle of Somalia's unity and sovereignty, in return for Somalia's recognition of Ethiopia's right to access the Somali coast for economic benefit. Additionally, Somalia acknowledged the sacrifices made by Ethiopian soldiers throughout the years of their military involvement in Somalia.

Catalysts for Success

The agreement brokered by Turkey between Somalia and Ethiopia, while sidestepping detailed contentious issues, maintains genuine prospects for success. Several catalysts contribute to its potential effectiveness, including:

1. The need for both Somalia and Ethiopia to ease tensions to address acute domestic problems:

In Somalia, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud faces growing opposition due to his plan to end reliance on clan-based quotas as a mechanism for assigning legislative and executive powers at the federal level. His proposal aims to abolish indirect elections and transition to direct elections on a one-person, one-vote basis. Additionally, disputes have arisen between the Somali president and several state presidents stemming from his attempts to affirm the federal government's sovereignty, challenging the traditionally broad powers enjoyed by state governments.

Meanwhile, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed grapples with significant challenges. Armed confrontations have erupted in the Amhara and Oromia regions, with potential for renewed tensions in the northern Tigray region. Furthermore, Ahmed's political project to reshape Ethiopian politics beyond the ethnic federal system has encountered obstacles. Efforts to reunite the parties that formed and supported the "Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front" under the banner of the "Prosperity Party" since late 2019 have faced numerous problems, reflecting the difficulties in implementing this vision.

2. Implications of political change in Somaliland:

The Ethiopian plan primarily relied on the position of former Somaliland president Musa Bihi Abdi, who signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Ethiopia in January 2024. Abdi was among the most enthusiastic supporters of leveraging Ethiopia to neutralize pressure from the Somali federal government in Mogadishu. However, the November 2024 elections in Somaliland led to Abd al-Rahman Muhammad Abdullah's rise to power. Abdullah had previously expressed his intention to re-evaluate all agreements signed with external parties, ensuring they enhance Somaliland's long-term interests.

Confirmation of this stance came from the spokesman for Somaliland's ruling party, who announced the new government's study of the MoU with Ethiopia. The announcement, made just days after the Somali-Ethiopian agreement in Ankara, aimed to decide whether to proceed with the MoU's implementation or suspend it. Consequently, the change in Somaliland's ruling authority may motivate Ethiopia to realign its priorities with Mogadishu. Such realignment could lead to more comprehensive and sustainable settlements, potentially reducing the likelihood of regional tensions.

3. Shared Turkish interests in Somalia and Ethiopia:

Shared Turkish interests in Somalia and Ethiopia formed the main motivation for Turkish mediation. Ankara has maintained a strong presence in Somalia since 2011, extending from humanitarian efforts to economic investments and military involvement, particularly in training the Somali armed forces. Turkey also plays a significant role as a major trade partner and investor in the Ethiopian economy, complemented by long-standing political relations between Ankara and Addis Ababa. Turkish interests drive Ankara's continued sponsorship of negotiations between Somalia and Ethiopia, aiming to settle various contentious issues. The resulting agreements provide qualitative opportunities to enhance Turkey's military, security, and economic presence in the Horn of Africa.

Challenges to the Agreement's Sustainability

Despite the many catalysts for the success of the agreement brokered by Turkey between Somalia and Ethiopia, several challenges could threaten its sustainability, including:

1. Security challenges hindering compliance:

Ensuring the security of a long land route from the Somali coast deep into Ethiopia, reaching the economic center in the capital Addis Ababa, presents a formidable challenge, even with Turkish military and security support motivated by potential economic benefits for Ankara. Among the most prominent obstacles are the presence of terrorist organizations. Al-Shabaab poses a significant threat if reliance is placed on central and southern Somali ports like Mogadishu, Marka, and Kismayo. Conversely, ISIS, which has been expanding its activities during the current year, threatens the northern ports in Puntland such as Bosaso.

Moreover, the negative experience of the Tigray conflict deserves particular attention. Resulting side conflicts between Somalis and Afars within Ethiopia led to the severing of the railway line connecting the port of Djibouti with the Ethiopian capital in 2021. The gravity of this situation is further underscored by the recent escalation of clashes between Somalis and Oromos in central and southern parts of the country.

2. Implications of Middle East turmoil:

The Horn of Africa's connection to the Middle East through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait renders the region susceptible to direct influence from changing circumstances. Growing pressure to contain Iranian expansion in several countries, including Yemen—geographically the closest Middle Eastern point to the Horn of Africa—contributes to these shifting dynamics. Consequently, developments in the Middle East may necessitate the transformation of coastal areas in the Horn of Africa into support points or a confrontation arena. Such changes could invoke a more active foreign military presence, potentially reshaping regional balances and reducing the effectiveness of the recent Somali-Ethiopian agreement.

3. Growing international polarization:

The Horn of Africa faces increasing exposure to heightened competition, potentially disrupting the region's fragile stability. African coasts overlooking the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and their southern extensions are now perceived as forming the western sieve of the Indian and Pacific Oceans region. Intense competition among major and middle powers, including the United States, China, Russia, India, and France, already characterizes this area. Hence, bilateral relations between Horn of Africa countries remain subject to the ongoing influence of international interest balances in the region. These balances typically tend to perpetuate polarization, especially considering the significant variable represented by Donald Trump's return to the US presidency starting in January 2025.

Three Future Trends

Considering the catalysts and challenges surrounding the Somali-Ethiopian agreement, three future trends can be anticipated regarding its implications for the Horn of Africa:

1. Temporary easing of tensions:

The agreement is anticipated to result in a temporary reduction of tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia, which have endured for about a year. Turkey's approach of meticulously addressing the complex contentious issues between the two parties will likely extend the de-escalation period until mid-2025. Throughout this timeframe, stakeholders concerned with developments in the Horn of Africa may await the delineation of the new US policy in the region.

2. Consolidation of the role of external mediation:

Turkish mediation's success in reaching this agreement will strengthen the position of external mediations in addressing Horn of Africa issues, potentially overshadowing regional mechanisms like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union. The declining influence of these organizations in tackling African continent crises has become increasingly apparent over the past decade, reflecting a broader shift in conflict resolution approaches.

3. Opening the door to new tensions:

The Somali-Ethiopian agreement addresses one aspect of Ethiopian expansion towards the coast, yet leaves unresolved issues with other countries such as Djibouti and Eritrea. Consequently, new regional tensions may emerge as a result of these unaddressed concerns.

Drivers and Challenges

Will the Somalia-Ethiopia Agreement Brokered by Turkey Endure?

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