The Libyan capital Tripoli, on Friday, August 27, was rocked by violent clashes between militias loyal to Abdulhamid al-Dbeibah, head of the Government of National Unity (GNU) based in Tripoli, and armed groups allied with a rival government headed by parliament-appointed Prime Minister Fathi Bashagha. Although the infighting was anticipated amid the current status quo in the western Libya, the latest round of clashes revealed a group of developments that are making efforts to find a settlement of the Libyan crisis a much harder task. The current situation gives rise to highly-complicated scenarios for the Libyan state exhausted by a protracted conflict that broke out in 2011.
Implications of recent clashes
The recent upsurge of infighting in Tripoli indicates that a number of determinants of the way parties to the crisis deal with each other have taken shape and that these determinants have contributed towards the emergence of a new pattern of military escalation. The outstanding implications of the latest clashes can be outlined as follows:
1. Upsurge in the conflict over the executive power:
Rivalry between the two governments headed by al-Dbeibah and Bashagha has now climaxed revealing that each party continues to hold on to the executive power and insists on completely removing rivals without showing any flexibility that might produce the “parallel governments” model, which Libya previously adopted. In the ongoing stand-off between the two governments, Bashagha continues his attempts to enter the capital through either understandings or confrontations, Bashagha seeks to weaken and remove armed groups and influential figures loyal to his rival from Tripoli. Moreover, the two sides exchange accusations over the causes and consequences of the ongoing political stalemate and field mobilization of forces.
2. Lack of balancing point between armed groups:
Armed groups operating in the west realize that they will be ousted. After they implicitly or publicly sides with one of the parties fighting for leadership of the government, these armed groups realized that they are sliding into a “zero confrontation”, meaning that they either have to double their gains or go out of the scene empty-handed. This involves the possibility of having a prime minister whom they do not back, as well as the potential consequences of military progress that goes against their agendas, especially if it means that their militants will have to be either de-mobilized or re-integrated into a national army as a prelude to unify the Libyan military establishment. This was evidenced in the recent clashes where the fighting broke out along multiple axes and the use of heavy casualties and destruction caused by the use of heavy weapons for the first time in several years.
3. Ongoing foreign influence on Libya:
The recent clashes in Tripoli showed that foreign powers continue to have significant influence on the situation in Libya. While some parties sensed that international restrictions on the use of power to resolve the conflict have been eased, militias took the opportunity to change the rules of engagement. al-Dbeibah deployed military forces south of the capital after Bashagha threatened to attempt to enter the city again. Less than 48 hours later, the violent clashes broke out. According to local news channel Libya 24, Turkish troops helped repel the attack launched against the forces loyal to the al-Dbeibah government. It added that Turkish drones carried out surveillance and reconnaissance missions over the outskirts of Tripoli. This shows that foreign influence continues to be a critical factor in the developments in Libya.
4. Using armed confrontations to resolve negotiations:
The recent clashes in Tripoli showed that military confrontations are being employed to shape understandings that guarantee the establishment of contact lines between factions operating in western Libya. When they realized that the conflict is far from over, coordination was initiated to halt the fighting and pave the way for talks between warring factions. According to some reports, lengthy negotiations were held between Osama al-Juwaili and commanders of factions allied with al-Dbeibah seeking to halt the advance of al-Juwaili troops to Tripoli and allow their withdrawal from positions in the west and south of the capital. This is now a main characteristic of Libyan actors’ war-management approach where the limits of their engagement are tied to the space granted to them by internal and foreign influential powers to develop their military operations, as well as to the broad ideological, social and pragmatic diversity of involved groups, as well as persistent concerns over shifting allegiances that would tip the balance of power between warring parties overnight.
5. Neutrality of the Libyan National Army:
The national army is seeking to distance itself from the ongoing tensions in western Libya. The LNA’s General Command announced that it does not side with either one of the parties involved in the clashes, despite signs the army supports bids by Bashagha’s parliament-backed government to take over the state. A possible explanation is that the LNA, since the ceasefire went into effect in October 2020, has been adopting an approach to strengthen its control and role in the southern and eastern regions and back efforts by the 5+5 Joint Military Commission to unify the army. Although Bashaga’s rise to power has been the most favorite option, should not be backed by a military action in which troops loyal to him take part. This means the process should be managed by Bashaga himself, either through rallying international support or internal tools that he can use. Moreover, it should be noted that despite their strained relationship, al-Dbeibah’s continued control of power allowed the LNA to manage its interests and realizing its vision in various ways without being involved in a war between the eastern and western parts of the country.
Serious consequences
The clashes in Tripoli produced several consequences that may further worsen the crisis in Libya, because of the power struggle between the two governments and the humanitarian situation in the areas of clashes, the international community’s approach to addressing the crisis, as well as the various tracks of efforts to reach a settlement. These can be outlined as follows:
1. Political stalemate:
Further complication of the political track is among the first direct consequences of the clashes in Tripoli. Polarization and division are highly likely to worsen, eliminating prospects for reaching an acceptable solution. Consequently, the inevitable outcome will be a persistent vicious circle of incomplete transition and reluctance to hold elections if rivalry continues between parties to the crisis.
2. Deterioration of the humanitarian situation:
The recent armed confrontations have worsened the humanitarian crisis across Libya, and in areas of fighting in particular. Relief and medical aid commissions reported that civilians are stuck in these areas and are unable to leave their houses because they fear renewed clashes in which at least 32 people were killed and 159 others were injured. Moreover, a large number of civilians escaped these areas while public and private properties were damaged.
3. Further complication of international rivalry over Libya:
The fighting between armed factions in the capital city of Tripoli, and the related failure of the international commission on Libya, will further fuel rivalry between international powers involved in the crisis. This is what makes the appointment of a new international envoy to Libya a new arena for a lengthy Russian-Western conflict that would undermine the efforts of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, and the country’s loss of an opportunity that could have been used to establish long-lost stability in the country.
4. Potential breakdown of the constitutional track:
The consequences of the recent clashes in Tripoli are likely to have ripples in the constitutional track, especially after the constitutional circuit was reinstalled by the supreme court. This means there is risk in potential use of on-field influence to force the issuance of targeted rulings, thus eliminating the incomplete agreement between those involved in the process of writing the constitution which has been faltering for seven years, as well as push Libya to square one and consequently trigger fresh armed confrontations.
5. Risks of blocking efforts by the 5+5 Joint Military Commission:
Efforts by this commission have become more vulnerable because of the clashes. That is, some forces gained more influence in al-Dbeibah’s government, which may result in restricting or blocking the movement of representatives of western Libya seeking to make progress in their tasks. This emerged when a meeting of the commission was put off in Benghazi. Other developments would reveal issues riddling the commission and undermine its outcome or prevent implementation even after they are approved by involved parties.
Potential scenarios
The clashes in Tripoli may produce one of the following three scenarios.
1. Renewed armed clashes:
In this scenario, the current de-escalation on the ground would be exploited by both rivals to mobilize their forces in preparation for an all-out war. Moreover, armed actors in western Libya may enter into a longer conflict where a military faction would make gains while weakening its rivals. Accordingly, one side would win the conflict, or a temporary truce would be reached to take a break from the fight and rearrange cards before engaging in fiercer confrontations.
2. Temporary understandings:
This hinges upon the warring parties’ desire and capability to maintain the current situation for as long as possible, where neither party would push the other to large-scale fighting. Such a scenario would lead to either a better chance for calm, de-escalation and advancing the level of understanding between the armed actors in particular. This means they would develop a sustainable form of de-escalation (the third scenario) or consider the need for preempting certain arrangements or respond to counter-measures, which eventually would lead to renewed clashes, or maybe an all-out armed conflict would break out (the first scenario).
3. Shaping a framework for sustainable de-escalation:
In this scenario, the presumption is that the recent clashes in Tripoli have laid the foundation for a new pattern of political and military interaction between rivals and that the current situation of calm and the consequences of clashes would push them to avoid betting on entering “zero confrontations”. Accordingly, the development of initial understandings that led to ending the clashes would be prioritized by warring parties in the coming period. This would in turn improve the chances for sustaining the current situation, while using it in an effective way may enable a breakthrough in any of the faltering tracks seeking a settlement.
Overall, it can be said that the recent clashes in Tripoli may represent a mini version of an all-out war which involved parties threatened to fight if they sense any attempts to undermine their gains. If no changes occur in the current situation, i.e. the conflict continues between the governments and the armed factions, Libya is likely to experience renewed armed confrontations following a period of relative calm. While the second scenario might well be the most likely one, it will be determined by the limits of “a necessary war” depending on the views of warring parties.
