A recent US intelligence report revealed an Iranian-Russian motive to infiltrate Eastern Syria with the aim of undermining the US presence and Washington’s allies, particularly the SDF militia, and supporting armed attacks against the forces in this region. The report considers that Iran, Russia and Hezbollah are attempting to secure their permanent military and economic presence in the region, and that there is this assumption that Iran has entered into a competition with Russia. Iran is seeking to secure economic opportunities and long-term influence within Syria, referring to manifestations of Iranian military reinforcements at the Syrian base of Aleppo to besiege the SDF.
In the last week of this May, an American convoy accompanied by members of the SDF was attacked on the administrative borders between the provinces of Hasaka and Deir Ez-zor in Northeastern Syria. The official Syrian news agency ‘SANA’ - which revealed the details of the operation - indicated that the attack was carried out by unidentified persons, using machine guns and RPGs. About 10 days earlier, the SDF militia at the Tabqa military airport, West of the Euphrates, was attacked by ISIS with the use of silenced weapons, which led to the killing of two airport guards. This was concurrent with another attack by unidentified people with an RPG missile on the SDF headquarters in Al-Busaira in Deir Ez-zor, incurring material damage without any human casualties.
In general, these attacks demonstrate the level of security challenges faced by forces outside the areas of influence of the Syrian regime and its allies. According to reports of deployment maps, the regime controls about 63% of the country, while the SDF militia controls 26%. However, in the Northern areas towards the West, the regime intersects with the Syrian opposition forces which control approximately 11% of those areas.
Iranian tactics:
Iranian recent movements at the Iraqi-Syrian joint borders revealed Tehran's endeavors to expand widely along the borders towards the North in Eastern Syria to secure the passage of weapons and militias through the Bukamal crossing. The Iranian convoys were intercepted by the SDF militia and were exposed to a US strike on February 26. On May 22, Tehran inaugurated a new consulate in Aleppo, which is widely believed to aim at establishing networks of penetration towards areas controlled by the Syrian opposition forces and the SDF, since it failed to extend beyond that area. Meanwhile, the regime forces seek to prevent any supplies from reaching the SDF areas in order to besiege them, while the opposition forces rely on Turkish supplies.
The role of the tribes:
While the Arab forces East of the Euphrates complain of the growing Kurdish influence, there is a race amidst Turkey, Russia and Iran to co-opt these tribes. However, it seems that the map of the relations of these tribes with the various parties in those areas varies. There is a contrast in the relations of the tribes that spread widely in the Jazirah region and the Euphrates Basin. Their population is about 4 million people, which comprises more than 85% of the population in those regions. The tribal alliances are also fluid and unsustainable according to developments on the ground, in addition to the fact that there is a split in attitudes within the large tribes. However, the tendencies of some tribes reflect a relative rapprochement with the Syrian regime, considering their unified position towards the Kurds. This comes in addition to the existence of relations with Turkey, which occasionally invites tribal leaders to conferences, as well as the US. However, the relationship of the tribes with Iran seems weak, if at all existent.
Interests are perceived to be one of the motives on which alliances are built. For example, Syrian observers point out that the regime is seeking to exploit the position of tribes and clans in Hasaka and in Deir ez-Zor, after their formation of a military wing opposing the SDF and the US presence. This is particularly after the agreement between the Kurds and Washington to sell oil as one of the streams of the Kurdish economy, which irritated the Arab tribes as oil is extracted from their regions. Turkey also became involved in this controversy, as it criticized the conclusion of a contract between the US company Delta Crescent Energy and the Kurds, considering it a step to enhance the separation within Syria, noting that this action comes at the expense of the resources of the Syrian people. Despite the confirmation of local reports and the issuance of several statements about that, the US administration denied the matter this week. On July 30, 2020, the US Senator Lindsey Graham announced the signing of an agreement between the SDF and a US oil company to modernize the wells that were damaged due to the war against ISIS.
A Russian-US race:
The race to penetrate those areas is clearly between Russia and the US. Frictions often occurred between the military forces on both sides. In fact, Russia levelled strong criticism against the US developing military bases in Northern Syria. Additionally, according to field indicators, the process of the US withdrawal, announced by former President Donald Trump in December 2018, has practically turned into a redeployment process. In 2021, the US forces established two new bases, one in the Al-Malikiyah area, Northeast of Hasaka, and the other in the Tal Alo area in Al Yarubiyah, in the Eastern countryside of Hasaka, Months before that, Russia established a new military base for helicopters in the Qamishli region in Northeastern Syria, in addition to reinforcing its main bases in Humaymim by adding new runways for landing military aircraft, especially transport aircraft.
During the NATO summit held this week, President Joe Biden referred to a direction for joint cooperation in Syria. Perhaps the aim was to send proactive messages from Washington to Moscow ahead of the Geneva summit that included Biden and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin on June 16.
Finally, it may be concluded that the equation of clashes between external forces over the Syrian arena is witnessing an acceleration in the race on the map of deployment. This map is variable and highly complex, considering the nature of the governing relations as well as the political goals of the various parties. These relations will not witness a change towards cooperation but rather in the penetration and expansion operations. The ruling factor has become the interests that each party seeks to reap, in light of the decline in the intensity of conflicts within Syria and the escalation of competition to engineer the post-conflict phase.
