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Under Testing

Nine Iranian Domestic and Foreign Dynamics Post-Raisi's Departure

28 May 2024


No one anticipated President Ibrahim Raisi's plane crashing over East Azerbaijan Province (Northwest Iran), whether domestically or internationally. All signs indicated that Raisi was the regime's candidate for the 2025 presidential elections, with expectations of his tenure extending until 2029, and possibly even ascending to the position of Supreme Leader thereafter. 

However, the crash of Raisi’s aircraft, an American-made Bell 212, near the Iranian border with Azerbaijan, has the potential to upend numerous calculations and equations. This disruption extends not only within the "solid bloc structure" of the Iranian regime, but also affects Iran's relations with Arab countries, the Middle East, and the broader international community.

The future paths of these repercussions can be summarized by nine main expected equations, which are as follows:

1- Competition for the Position of Supreme Leader:

Ebrahim Raisi, widely regarded as the frontrunner to succeed the current Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, who is 85 years old, was seen as the most prominent candidate for this position. However, his sudden absence has reshuffled the cards, affecting not only the future calculations related to the executive authority, now overseen by Vice President Mohammad Mokhber, but also the considerations regarding Khamenei’s potential successor.

One prominent figure who may emerge is Mojtaba Khamenei, one of Ali Khamenei’s sons. Additionally, Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of the first leader of the Iranian revolution, may also become a notable contender.

Raisi's departure might ignite a competition for Khamenei's succession, which is a scenario reminiscent of the intense dispute that occurred in 1989 following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, which ultimately led to the selection of the current leader. In this competitive environment, the death of Raisi could lead to a significant reshuffling of Iranian priorities, both internally and externally. 

2- Restructuring the Current Authority: 

Although the process of electing a new Iranian president in the absence of the current president is determined by Articles 130 and 131 of the Constitution, along with the amendments made in 1989 to compensate former President Hashemi Rafsanjani by granting the position of guide to Ali Khamenei, there remains a state of uncertainty revolving around the readiness of the First Vice President, Mohamed Mokhber, to replace Raisi as President of the Republic in the upcoming elections.

Mokhber is currently subject to American and European sanctions, which makes it difficult to imagine him participating in meetings of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. This situation places a burden on finding a "more acceptable" candidate who can engage effectively with both the Iranian public and neighboring countries, and who can maintain contact with European nations, similar to former President Hassan Rouhani.

Any attempts to rebuild and restructure the current authority may face strong resistance, both from those who benefit from the current situation and others who seek to advance their own interests in the future. This confirms that the period leading up to the early elections on June 28, 2024, and the selection of a new president will pose a unique challenge for the ruling establishment in Iran.

3- A Kiss of Life for Reformists:

According to current calculations, the conservatives and fundamentalists are most likely to win the next presidential elections. However, Raisi’s absence and the preparations for the upcoming elections might provide the reformists with an opportunity to re-emerge and possibly regain the momentum they lost in 2021 when Raisi won the presidency.

The reformists have the potential to present a strong candidate in next month’s elections. Numerous indications suggest that they are adopting a more radical discourse toward the West and the United States, with the aim of "neutralizing the Supreme Leader" and influential institutions such as the Revolutionary Guards and the Supreme Elections Committee in relation to any reformist candidate. This shift in strategy was evident in the fiery statements from figures within the reformist movement. For example, on May 20th, the former Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, held Washington responsible for a tragic incident, claiming that U.S. sanctions on the civil aviation sector led to the disaster. From Zarif’s perspective, these sanctions are the underlying cause of the tragedy.

4- The Extent of the Opposition’s Readiness:

Despite Ebrahim Raisi's victory in the 2021 elections, marked by significantly low voter turnout, the Iranian opposition has yet to carve out a new political stance. This failure becomes more pronounced in the wake of their inability to leverage the protests ignited by the tragic death of Kurdish girl, Mahsa Amini, in September 2022. However, the departure of Raisi, who unified the regime's power factions, might pave the way for the opposition to articulate their dissent in novel ways, distinct from their approach over Raisi's three-year tenure.

For the opposition to seize this moment, a transformation is imperative. They must cultivate a political and media narrative that resonates with the independent sectors, historically disengaged from the political discourse between the government and its adversaries. Over decades, these sectors have remained on the periphery of political engagement, underscoring the urgency for the opposition to adopt a more inclusive and appealing strategy.

Crucially, the opposition must demonstrate unequivocal independence from external forces or nations. The perception of being foreign agents has significantly undermined their credibility, distancing them from substantial segments of society.

5- A “Crisis Diplomacy” Test:

Calamities and disasters have historically served as catalysts for diplomatic rapprochement, impacting not just interpersonal relationships but also international relations. The concept of "crisis diplomacy" has played a pivotal role in bridging gaps between nations with longstanding differences. A prime illustration of this dynamic within the Middle East is the Arab response to the earthquake in Turkey on February 6, 2023. This event significantly contributed to the enhancement of Arab-Turkish relations, leading to a swift recovery and strengthening of bilateral ties. Such instances underscore the potential for leveraging unfortunate events to foster international solidarity and cooperation.

The recent expressions of condolences from Arab countries, including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, following the tragic event involving Raisi and his companions, may serve as an opportunity to foster stronger ties and facilitate collaborative efforts. This presents a new opening to cultivate amicable relations and bolster joint initiatives. It is noteworthy that Arab countries have shown willingness to extend support and aid to Tehran in its search for a missing aircraft, signaling a potential for constructive engagement.

This approach could serve as the foundation for a "new architecture" in Arab-Iranian relations, building upon the momentum gained from the restoration of ties between Riyadh and Tehran in March 2023. Additionally, Iran's transparency in communicating its response to the Israeli assault on its consulate in Syria in April further demonstrates a mutual interest in revisiting and potentially replicating the successful model of improved relations witnessed with Turkey.

6- A Reconciliatory Path with the West:

Raisi left a legacy that underscores the absence of a comprehensive confrontation with the West. Although he was firmly entrenched in the extremist camp, he simultaneously managed to open broader channels with Western nations, yielding significant political and economic benefits for Iran. This was particularly evident when Tehran requested assistance from the United States to locate a missing plane, and the European Union activated its mapping system to aid Iranian search and rescue efforts. These actions were preceded by days of indirect negotiations between Tehran and Washington in the Sultanate of Oman. This collaborative strategy, agreed upon by Iran and the United States, successfully averted a large-scale regional war, despite the ongoing conflict in Gaza, which lasted about eight months.

With the departure of Raisi and his Foreign Minister, Hussein Amir-Abdullahian, this strategy will face a severe test. While Iranian policy is ultimately determined by the Office of the Supreme Leader, Raisi’s influence and his intricate relationships with key power sources within the Iranian regime enabled him to achieve this limited breakthrough with Washington. A critical question now arises regarding the ability of Raisi’s successor, whether within the presidential institution or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to continue this role. The success of a strong, capable personality in the upcoming presidential elections is essential to sustaining this path of openness with the West and the United States. Conversely, the emergence of a new president who seeks to appease the hard-line faction of the Iranian regime could lead to a regression, undoing the progress Raisi achieved.

7- Iran’s Eastern Focus:

During Raisi's presidency, Iran clearly oriented itself towards the East, particularly with Russia and China. It is certain that the new Iranian president will continue this eastward focus. However, there is a challenge in maintaining this trend as effectively as it was under Raisi, who received high praise from both Beijing and Moscow. The success of this approach will depend on the new president's diplomatic ability to balance expanding communication channels with the West while simultaneously strengthening the existing partnerships with Russia and China.

8- “Soft Recruitment” for Allies :

The past three years under Raisi's rule have seen the aggressive deployment of Tehran's allies in the region, particularly its military arms in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon. This strategy embodied a "brinkmanship" policy, not just with Israel, but also with the United States. In response to the targeting of its soldiers at the "Burj 22" military base in northeastern Jordan, the United States conducted military actions.

With Raisi's departure and the development of mutual military responses between Israel and Iran, perhaps the clear objective for Washington, Tehran, and Tel Aviv is to avoid escalating tensions in the region. This transition might signify an opportunity to move from "hard employment" to "soft employment" of allies and agents. In essence, this means leveraging "military prestige" to achieve political gains while minimizing the military use of these forces.

For instance, Iran might accept the Houthis as a political entity within the Yemeni state, under a comprehensive political agreement. This trend is particularly evident in Tehran's adherence to the rules of engagement between Lebanese Hezbollah and Israel since the outbreak of the Gaza War. Here, Iran could gain political benefits without escalating to a broader military conflict.

Additionally, there is talk of reducing Iran's military presence in Syria, with a greater focus on establishing long-term economic and political partnerships with the Syrian government.

9- Doubts about Azerbaijan and Israel:

Perhaps one of the most significant diplomatic achievements for Raisi and Abdullahian was the establishment of an "Azerbaijani pivot" towards Iran. This shift was underscored by a noticeable change in the tone of Iran's political and media discourse towards Baku over the recent two months. However, the tragic incident involving the crash of President Raisi's airplane in an area near the Iran-Azerbaijan border could potentially cast a shadow of doubt over the future of Iranian-Azerbaijani relations. This concern is further compounded by speculations around Israel's possible involvement in the downing of the aircraft—a theory that, while unproven, adds a layer of complexity to the situation.

In conclusion, it is unequivocally evident that the epicenter of decision-making in Iran resides within the Office of the Supreme Leader. However, it is equally apparent that the dynamics of these decisions are invariably influenced by individuals' capacity for adaptability and strategic maneuvering. This suggests that the unfolding events in Tehran will captivate the attention of observers worldwide. Furthermore, the intricate details and repercussions surrounding the incidents involving Raisi, Amir-Abdullahian, and their entourage have also garnered widespread interest.