State Voting

Implications of the 2014 Egyptian Elections

06 April 2014


Field Marshal Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi has become the seventh president of Egypt since 1952 Revolution, based on the results of the Egyptian presidential election for the year 2014, announced yesterday by the High Elections Commission. Al-Sisi won almost 24 million votes, making a sweep victory of 96.91%.

Anyway, Al-Sisi’s victory came as no surprise, yet the percentage he got remains remarkable, especially when compared to the shockingly low percentage gained by his opponent, Hamaden Sabahy, that is only 3.9%. The result is more surprising when we take into account the close similarity between the positions declared by both candidates towards internals issues that constituted the center of attention, particularly their position towards the Muslim Brotherhood, terrorism, restoring security, social justice and gaining back veneration of the state.

Election Fallacies

With a closer look at election campaigns and final results, we can deduce that Al-Sisi’s winning does not represent a personal victory or an indication of his personal popularity or his role in the 30th of June Revolution. In fact, it is voting on the nature of the Egyptian state itself. More than three years after the 25th of January 2011 Revolution, Egyptians felt the need to restore veneration of the state, especially with the current terrorist wave strives to undermine the state itself.

In turn, this conclusion reveals a fallacy dominated the Egyptian presidential election, both in 2012 and 2014, that is 2012 election represented the January Revolution, while 2014 election represent the 30th of June Revolution. In fact, such a fallacy makes unjustified connection between elections and revolutions. The disconnection between the two is evident in the fact that the second round between Muhammad Morsy and Ahmad Shafeeq during the 2012 election did not represent “revolutionary” election, simply because it faced Egyptians with two bitter choices. Later the MB, during its rule, showed indifference towards goals of the revolution, and the Egyptian state itself.  

The same goes for the 2014 election. Although Sabahy presented himself as the candidate of the two revolutions, Egyptians opted for the state and the candidate able to achieve the goals of both revolutions, or at least represents a state of established powers, and is more able to restore stability.

A second fallacy is related to the view that the election led Al-Sisi to the presidential office, was guarded by the army, which might be seen as interference on the part of the state in favor of the former defense minster. Those promoting such a view ignore the fact that six elections since the January Revolutions, were guarded by the army, including the presidential election of 2012 that brought Morsy to the presidency, and the parliamentarian elections that gave the “Islamists” a parliamentarian majority.

Voting Implications

An initial analysis leads us to some significant conclusions:

  1. Many common negatives are absent from the 2014 presidential election, for the first time since the January Revolution, such as bribes and vote-buying. Also, there were no religious propaganda or political exploitation, meaning that neither Al-Sisi nor Sabahy enjoyed the support of a reliable political camp or party. Thus, it is safe to say that public voting this time is not a result of propaganda campaign. Public voting depended on what is already known about both candidates, and was influenced by common fear from MB and other terrorist groups’ attempts to undermine election.
  2. Supervisory reports, both national and international, acknowledge the election transparency. No gross offences nor collective forgery have been detected by the 15.000 supervisors, among them 500 international supervisor, including nearly 150 from EU.
  3. The election process demonstrates the controlling ability of the egyptian state, in particular the protection of citizens during crucial moments. On the other side, the election revealed the weakness of groups seeking to undermine pillars of the state. Evidently, allegations of MB and their allies were politically ineffective. Moreover, terrorist threats failed to discourage Egyptians from participating in the political process.
  4. According to released statistics, 47.45% of Egyptians eligible to vote took part in the 2014 election, with a decisive result in the first round. Whereas, voters’ participation percentage in the first round during the 2012 election, was 46.85%, as shown below. The relevant percentage never exceeded 50% in all referendums and elections, except for the second round between Morsy and Shafeeq, with participation percentage of 51.85%, a round marked with fervent political conflict and popular mobilization on the part of Islamists and supporters of the pre-January Revolution regime. Egyptians’ electoral participation exceeds relevant participation in other established democracies, such as US and EU countries, where participation percentage varies between 30% and 40%, and hardly reaches 50% during US presidential election.
  5. When comparing number of votes gained by Al-Sisi with those of gained by Morsy and Shafeeq in 2012, huge disparity among the three candidates becomes apparent. Neither Morsy nor Shafeeq gained 6 million votes during the first round. During the second round, Morsy won nearly 13 million votes, while Shafeeq gained 12.300.000 votes. These numbers reveal a big gap between Al-Sisi and all former presidential candidates. Reasons behind Al-Sisi’s popularity are well-known; his responding to people’s will by ending the MB’s rule, beside being the most able person to lead Egypt through the current turbulent time. Yet, the most significant implication of Egyptian voting remains that citizens voted for the preservation and protection of the state, and they have become able to differentiate between a candidate or group alleges to be “revolutionary” in order to win votes, and a candidate truly able to achieve some of the “revolutionary” goals.
  6. Results of the Egyptian presidential election carry a strong message to the outside world, that implies that Egyptians can not be influenced by the positions taken by parties supported the January Revolutions then opposed the 30th June Revolution. The Egyptians control their own fate and that of their presidents, and they are able to raise up or overthrow whoever they want.

Finally, it has become evident that since the 25th of January 2011, the Egyptian presidency is no longer a luxurious job. Instead, it is now a heavy burden and a huge responsibility. As for Al-Sisi, he is facing grave challenges, on top of them restoration of security, resuming the implementation of the agreed Future Map through organizing parliamentary elections. He should seek to assert what he already declared in his inauguration speech about that votes he won represent sacrifices Egyptians made during the two revolutions of January 2011 and June 2013, in order to achieve proper living, freedom and dignity.