Iran, as a state and regime, navigates a critical juncture in its history, possibly the most significant since the 1979 revolution. The country faces mounting internal pressure caused by severe economic crises affecting a broad segment of the Iranian population. These challenges are compounded by political and social restrictions imposed by the regime on a people inherently inclined toward freedom and openness. Moreover, Iran confronts the impending transition of leadership as a successor to the current Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, must eventually take his place in the event of his incapacity or death. The prospect of this transition looms heavily over Iran's internal political dynamics and will undoubtedly influence its foreign policies.

External pressures on Iran are no less significant than those within. Tensions between Tehran and Western powers have escalated to unprecedented levels over a range of contentious issues, including the nuclear and missile programs and Iran's support for Russia in its war on Ukraine. The result has been successive waves of severe sanctions, intensifying economic and livelihood challenges domestically. Futhermore, the "shadow war" with Israel has increasingly turned into direct confrontations, as witnessed during the clashes of April 2024. Iran also remains steadfast in its regional ambitions, supporting militias that destabilize the security and stability of neighboring countries.

In light of these circumstances, a pressing question emerges: could these internal and external pressures lead to a transformation in the behavior of the Iranian regime, regardless of the scale, extent, or impact of such a change?

Pressing Factors

Numerous pressures surround and constrain the Iranian regime both internally and externally, potentially driving changes in its conduct and policies. These pressures can be outlined as follows:

1- Generational change:

In recent years, Iran has witnessed the emergence of a new generation of young men and women, particularly those born between the mid-1990s and the end of the first decade of the 2000s. Dubbed "Generation Z" (Gen Z), this cohort is chronologically and ideologically disconnected from the 1979 Iranian Revolution and its values. Unlike their predecessors, they never experienced the leadership of Imam Khomeini or the influence of his speeches broadcast from Paris before the revolution.

Instead, Gen Z is deeply immersed in social and political spaces marked by globalization, modernity, and religious tolerance, placing little emphasis on civilizational and ideological conflicts. Some sources estimate that this generation constitutes approximately 7% of Iran's population, equating to around six million people.[1]

Gen Z has been a driving force behind the protests of recent years in Iran, most notably the demonstrations that erupted in mid-September 2022 following the death of the young Kurdish-Iranian woman Mahsa Amini. These protests were primarily fueled by demands for social and political rights, carrying the slogan "Woman, Life, Freedom."[2]

Unlike previous waves of protests, which often centered on economic grievances, the September 2022 demonstrations were unique. Their demands targeted the very foundations of the ruling system in Iran, particularly regarding social freedoms and the issue of compulsory hijab (veil) for women.

2- Increasing boldness and taboo-breaking:

In recent years, Iran has witnessed a striking decline in reverence for religious and political symbols—a phenomenon that would have been inconceivable during the first two decades of the Islamic Republic. Protests have escalated to include demands as extreme as regime overthrow, accompanied by acts of defiance such as burning and tearing down images of senior officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

The unrest has extended to religious institutions, with seminaries being set ablaze, as seen in the city of Takestan in Qazvin Province during the January 2018 protests. Facilities affiliated with the Basij forces—a volunteer militia under the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—have also faced attacks.[3] Even the legacy of Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, has not been spared; his home was set on fire during the September 2022 protests.[4]

A particularly notable trend in Iran has been the rise of incidents targeting religious clerics, widely reported in the media as the "turban-throwing phenomenon."[5] These acts have escalated from symbolic gestures to physical assaults and, in some cases, fatal attacks. A stark example of this escalation occurred on April 26, 2023, when Ayatollah Abbas Ali Soleimani was assassinated by a bank security guard in Mazandaran Province.[6]

3- Impact of Western sanctions:

Western sanctions continue to exert a profound impact on the Iranian economy, plunging a significant portion of the population into challenging economic conditions. The local currency has plummeted to its lowest value in over a decade, with an exchange rate of 613.55 Iranian rials to the U.S. dollar. Soaring inflation, now exceeding 40%, has contributed to a tripling of poverty rates since 1979, resulting in 52% of the population living below the poverty line. Moreover, the misery index has surpassed 60%, further highlighting the dire economic situation.[7] These economic hardships have fueled widespread public dissatisfaction with the regime's policies, becoming a primary driver of protests against successive Iranian governments, regardless of their conservative or reformist leanings.

4- Public opposition to foreign entanglements:

Growing segments of the public and some political circles—particularly within the moderate and reformist camps—are calling for Iran to avoid involvement in external crises. Slogans raised during recent protests, such as "Neither Gaza nor Lebanon, My Life for Iran," reflect this sentiment.[8] Critics argue that funds Iran spends on regional militias could be redirected to address pressing domestic issues, especially given the country's abundant natural resources. Voices within Iran have also advocated for easing tensions and improving foreign relations to mitigate "Iranophobia," a phenomenon contributing to severed ties between Iran and much of the world. These strained relations have consequently had adverse effects on Iran's economy.

Paths to Change

Considering the factors and motivations previously discussed, Iran's potential for change may manifest through several pathways, each influenced by the intensity of various pressures:

1- Recurrent waves of protests:

Iran has experienced successive waves of protests in recent years. Following the widespread demonstrations of 2009, known as the "Green Movement" protests, other notable waves occurred: the 2017 "Thirst Protests," the 2021 "Inflation Protests," and the 2022 "Mahsa Amini Protests." Iranians possess an inherently revolutionary spirit, with protests and demonstrations forming a significant part of their historical memory, dating back to the Persian Tobacco Protest of 1890.

The Persian Tobacco Protest erupted when the Shah of Qajar, Naser al-Din Shah Qajar, granted a British company exclusive rights to buy and sell tobacco in Iran. In response, the religious authority Mohammad Hassan Shirazi issued his famous fatwa, declaring smoking and the use of tobacco tantamount to waging war against the Imam of Time (the Mahdi, or the twelfth and final Imam in Twelver Shia belief). Demonstrations spread across Iran, ultimately forcing the Shah to reverse the decision.

Subsequently, the Constitutional Revolution of 1905 laid the foundations for constitutional and parliamentary governance in modern Iran. Later, the movement led by Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in the 1950s opposed British occupation, culminating in the 1979 Revolution.[9]

Recent protests have unveiled two significant trends: First, the intervals between protest waves have shortened compared to historical patterns. Second, public participation and demands have intensified, with each successive wave becoming more confrontational than its predecessor. Such patterns reflect escalating public anger and frustration, as each incident serves as a catalyst for further unrest.

2- Constitutional amendments:

Calls for constitutional reform have intensified in recent years, with reformist figures like Mir-Hossein Mousavi (leader of the Green Movement and former prime minister) and Mehdi Karroubi (a reformist leader and former parliamentary speaker) at the forefront. Their demands include limiting the Supreme Leader's extensive powers, abolishing the position entirely or subjecting it to direct popular election, introducing term limits for the role, and reducing the powers of institutions under the Supreme Leader's control. These institutions include the Guardian Council (also called Council of Guardians or Constitutional Council) and the Expediency Discernment Council. Simultaneously, reformists advocate for expanding political and social freedoms.[10]

While the Iranian constitution allows for amendments in critical cases, such changes require approval from the Supreme Leader via the Guardian Council he appoints. Moreover, certain provisions—such as the Islamic nature of the state and the principle of velayat-e faqih (guardianship or governance of the jurist)—are considered "supra-constitutional" and immune to amendment.[11]

Nevertheless, the issue of constitutional amendment holds merit, particularly when considering the 1989 amendments. These changes institutionalized the Supreme Leader's absolute authority by ex+panding the concept of velayat-e faqih and increased the powers of appointed institutions while limiting the authority of the president and other elected bodies. A similar approach could potentially be employed to curtail some of the Supreme Leader's powers and those of institutions under his control, reallocating them to the president and other popularly elected bodies.

However, such a development is unlikely to occur without significant pressure on the regime, whether from domestic sources, external factors, or a combination of both. Alternatively, it might result from a fundamental change in the structure of the ruling system itself.

3- New leadership seeking change:

The selection of new leaders in key positions in Iran is likely to contribute to transformations, ranging from structural to superficial, depending on the extent of changes and the degree to which the deep state permits their implementation. This analysis focuses on two levels of potential change: at the Supreme Leader level and at the level of the president, government, and other institutions.

In the first scenario, the emergence of a new supreme leader—following the death or incapacity of the current leader, Ali Khamenei—could catalyze significant shifts. Such a leader might advocate for limiting the absolute powers of the Supreme Leader, transferring some of these powers to the elected president, or even abolishing the position entirely. Particularly plausible is this possibility if the new leader aligns with the "Montazeri School of Thought," a clerical faction fundamentally rejecting the concept of velayat e-faqih. Viewing it as a novel idea introduced by Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, this group considers it an innovation within the Twelver Ja'fari school of thought. Instead, they argue for a focus on awaiting the return of the Imam of Time (the Mahdi) after the end of his "Major Occultation."[12]

In the second scenario, the election of a president with reformist ambitions could drive some changes. While power in Iran is indeed concentrated in the hands of the Supreme Leader, the president and their government still possess a degree of political maneuverability. Although limited, this potential for change should not be underestimated in the complex political landscape of Iran.

Historically, presidents from the reformist and moderate camps have achieved notable internal and external breakthroughs in Iran. Former President Mohammad Khatami and his reformist movement, which controlled the parliament (Majlis) and municipal councils at the time, attempted to introduce constitutional amendments limiting the Supreme Leader's powers. Although these efforts ultimately failed, they succeeded in bringing a once-taboo issue into public discourse within political and media circles, marking a significant shift in addressing the Supreme Leader's authority.

Iran's foreign policy underwent a substantial transformation during former President Hassan Rouhani's tenure. The landmark nuclear agreement signed with Western powers in 2015 represented a major turning point in the Islamic Republic's history. Through this deal, Iran reconciled with the United States and the West, entities it had long labeled as the "Great Satan." While the agreement required the Supreme Leader's approval, this fact does not diminish the pivotal role played by Rouhani and his then-Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif in the negotiation process.

In light of these precedents, the recent statements by Iran's new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, suggest potential changes on the horizon. Pezeshkian, hailing from the reformist camp, won the second round of presidential elections held on July 5, 2024, securing 55% of the total vote against his conservative rival, Saeed Jalili. Based on his campaign promises, it is possible to anticipate moves to expand political and social freedoms within Iran. Furthermore, Pezeshkian is expected to pursue more open policies toward both the West and the region.

The success of these initiatives, however, will depend on Pezeshkian's ability to implement them without clashing with the regime's deep-rooted institutions, which remain dominated by the hardline conservative faction.[13]

Scenarios of Change

Considering the potential avenues for change in Iran, the outcomes and possible scenarios may manifest in one of the following forms:

1- The regime adheres to the current policies:

Should the regime insist on maintaining its hardline policies regarding both domestic and foreign issues, it is likely that the causes for change may not elicit a response. The regime's reliance on its fundamental pillars (doctrinal, political, and economic) forms the basis for this scenario. Furthermore, support from a segment of the Iranian population that remains loyal to the regime and its ideologies provides a popular base for the regime's authority.

In this scenario, the Iranian regime would continue to restrict social and political freedoms domestically while persisting in closing off the public sphere and preventing popular participation in decision-making. Moreover, the regime would maintain its destabilizing regional behavior, threatening the security and stability of the area. Such actions include supporting allied militias, continuing a brinkmanship policy with the United States and the West, and escalating tensions with Israel. These heightened tensions could lead to direct confrontations, as witnessed in April 2024. Additionally, ongoing escalation in the nuclear and missile dossiers would remain a significant concern under this scenario.

2- A more rational regime:

Several potential paths for change in Iran could lead the regime to adopt more rational and pragmatic policies regarding domestic and foreign issues. The scenario envisioned here is predicated on the regime undergoing internal reforms, influenced by external pressures, as the next generation of second-tier revolution supporters assumes leadership. Such a transition would occur more than four decades after the revolution, in a global, regional, and local context vastly different from the situation in 1979.

Key features of this scenario would involve expanding political and social freedoms within the country and providing citizens with opportunities to participate in the decision-making process. Furthermore, Tehran would adopt less aggressive policies towards the region and work to reduce tensions with the West.

Iran has, at certain stages, implemented some of these features. During the presidency of the late Ibrahim Raisi, for instance, Iran pursued a path of opening up and improving relations with neighboring countries. These efforts culminated in the signing of a landmark reconciliation agreement with Saudi Arabia on March 10, 2023. Moreover, former presidents Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani both sought to open up relations with the West.

3- The “Normal State” model:

The "Normal State" model posits that certain paths of change in Iran could lead to a transformation, resulting in a more harmonious state—one that aligns with its citizens, fosters peace with neighboring countries, and cultivates mutual understanding with the West and the global community. This transformation, however, hinges on a fundamental shift in the regime's policies, necessitating either voluntary or reluctant abandonment of its hardline stance on internal political and social freedoms.

For this model to materialize, the regime would need to create space for genuine popular participation in decision-making processes and ensure a clear delineation between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. Moreover, the phenomenon of "parallel institutions" within the system must be eradicated, with each institution's powers precisely defined to eliminate policy variations between them. These variations have significantly contributed to the hardline policies on both domestic and foreign issues since the Islamic Republic's establishment.

A prime example of this institutional discord is evident in the conflicting stances often adopted by the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Revolutionary Guard on particular issues. Frequently, the IRGC's position has prevailed, leading to tensions within the government. This internal conflict was notably highlighted when former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif criticized this duality, even submitting his resignation in February 2019. Although he withdrew his resignation days later following directives from the Supreme Leader, the incident underscored the deep-rooted challenges within Iran's governance structure.

In parallel with domestic openness, the regime would abandon its principle of exporting the revolution and confine itself to its recognized international borders, eschewing the "forward defense strategy" of extending its reach. The expansive regional agenda, implemented through intervention in other countries' internal affairs and the use of militias, would be discontinued. Moreover, the pursuit of nuclear weapons would cease, replaced by a peaceful nuclear program for civilian purposes. This new program would be characterized by transparency and clarity, subject to international oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

4- A coup staged by the IRGC:

Several factors could precipitate a coup by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). These include overwhelming popular pressure becoming unmanageable for the regime, demands for abolishing the Supreme Leader position, or the current Supreme Leader's death or incapacitation without a successor due to internal discord. Under such circumstances, the Revolutionary Guard might swiftly seize power, positioning itself as the Islamic regime's guardian.

Such a takeover would likely spark open confrontations with the Iranian populace, potentially rejecting these measures. The resulting scenario could devolve into chaos and civil war, reminiscent of events in several Arab countries. In this model, the new regime's internal and external policies would be difficult to predict, likely characterized by chaos and reactionary approaches.

In conclusion, the political system in Iran rests upon two fundamental pillars: the religious "Islamic" element and the popular "republic" component. While the former remains firmly entrenched, the latter has experienced significant erosion in recent years. A substantial portion of the population yearns for freedom and change, aspiring to live in peace and harmony with their neighbors and the global community. The election of President Masoud Pezeshkian, a member of the reformist camp, potentially reflects this desire, standing in stark contrast to a system still operating on ideologies and values from the 1970s and 1980s.

Consequently, a widening chasm has emerged between the regime and its citizens, pointing toward two potential outcomes: either the regime will acquiesce to the people's demands for change, or an internal upheaval will occur. Change in Iran appears inevitable, with the most critical question centering on the nature of the impending transformation and its ramifications for both Iran's domestic situation and its foreign policy.