Hours after the shooting began inside the Crocus City Hall in the northwest of Moscow on March 22, 2024, the Afghan branch of Islamic State (ISIS-K) claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack, which killed at least 115 people and injured 121 more. According to Russian authorities, the number of attackers ranged from three to five, and several individuals directly involved in the operation were apprehended.
Russian security agencies revealed that the suspects had "contacts" in Ukraine but did not file charges against Kyiv. "After committing the terrorist attack, the criminals intended to cross the Russian-Ukrainian border," the Federal Security Service stated, citing TASS. According to Russian media and MP Alexander Khinshtein, some of the arrested individuals are from Tajikistan. Tajik officials responded by stating that they "have not received confirmation from the Russian authorities regarding the information currently circulating about the involvement of Tajik citizens." The international community, including the United States, the European Union, France, and the United Kingdom, strongly condemned the attack.
Four Observations
The Moscow terrorist incident holds key messages and observations, which include:
1. A bloody attack:
Moscow's attack occurred while Russia has been at war with Ukraine for nearly two years. As such, the Kremlin’s state security, military, and information capabilities have been mobilized for the fight in Ukraine. Despite the fact that the country has been in a state of emergency since the beginning of the war, terrorists were able to breach all security barriers and reach Moscow, where they carried out the largest and bloodiest attack since 2002. The Crocus City Hall onslaught calls to mind Russia's decade of brutal terrorist activities from the late 1990s until 2011. On January 24, 2011, the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus carried out a suicide attack at Moscow Domodedovo Airport, killing 36 people. A year prior, on March 29, 2010, two female suicide bombers blew themselves up at the Lubyanka and Parc de la Culture metro stations, killing 41 and injuring 88 others. In October 2002, Chechen militants held over 800 people hostages in a Moscow theater. Two days later, Russian special forces attacked the facility, killing 128 captives and 41 Chechen fighters, the majority of whom suffocated from Russian gas. In September 2004, roughly thirty Chechen militants invaded a school in Beslan in southern Russia, seizing hundreds of captives. The siege claimed the lives of almost 330 people, over half of whom were children.
2. A political message:
The Moscow attack occurred just a few days after President Vladimir Putin was re-elected for another term. Part of President Putin's political appeal emanates from his "strong man" persona, which he acquired through his background as a foreign intelligence officer. His experience in that domain strikes up images of power, control, and security in popular imagination. As a result, the latest attack on Moscow could potentially harm this image as terrorists succeeded in reaching the heart of the country and engendered a significant death toll.
3. The confrontation with ISIS:
The operation, which was claimed by the "ISIS-Khorasan" terrorist organization, appears to be a message to the world that the extremist group is still powerful and capable of attacking its adversaries. That is, despite its recent defeats in Syria, Libya, and Iraq and the dismantlement of its sleeper cells in Europe. It also serves as a reminder to Russia and the Putin regime that the war against it is still being debated as a response to its contribution to ISIS’s defeat in Syria after Russian forces' intervention in September 2015. The same is true for the case of Libya, where the Russians provided military and advisory assistance to the Libyan National Army led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar in the country's east.
4. Reality confirms American security expectations:
On March 7, the US Embassy in Moscow warned of an impending attack by "extremists targeting large gatherings in Moscow, including concerts" and recommended US nationals avoid such venues. US National Security Council spokesperson Adrienne Watson said the US government had gathered information about a planned terrorist attack in Moscow – potentially targeting large gatherings, including concerts. The US government also shared this information with Russian authorities in accordance with its longstanding ‘duty to warn’ policy. In a speech on March 19, Putin blasted the American warnings as “provocative,” saying, “These actions resemble outright blackmail and the intention to intimidate and destabilize our society.” This is despite the fact that Russian authorities stated on March 3 that they had killed six suspected ISIS fighters in an operation conducted in Ingushetia, a small republic in the Caucasus with a Muslim population.
Russian Hypotheses
Since the early hours of the terrorist incident in Moscow, two hypotheses have developed concerning the perpetrator and the stakeholder involved.
1. The first hypothesis relates to ISIS, which explicitly claimed responsibility for the attack:
This is based on the fact that the extremist group planned, implemented, and benefitted from the offensive. Furthermore, ISIS enjoys both real-life as well as political and historical support in its relationship with what it describes as its "Russian enemy." This is especially true since the organization has stated in September 2022 that it was responsible for a deadly suicide bombing at the Russian embassy in Kabul. This hostility may be related to the fact that ISIS is primarily made up of Afghan elements who have a longstanding animosity towards the Russians, referring to them as the "Soviet invaders" who fought their fathers and grandfathers at the end of the 1970s. In a statement released by its Amaq News Agency, the organization claimed to have "attacked a large gathering of Christians in the city of Crocus on the outskirts of the Russian capital, Moscow, killing and wounding hundreds." It is important to note, however, that the organization's announcements have not always been accurate, as some were merely a display of power for the media. Yet, with regards to this specific attack, a US official told CBS News that the US possesses intelligence that confirms ISIS's responsibility for the attack and that there is no reason to question it.
2. The second theory relates to what the Russian side implied. Namely, Ukraine's complicity in the attack, as well as Western countries' support for it:
This premise rests on two levels of involvement. The first is the direct perpetrator of the attack. This might be ISIS or any other Islamic or separatist group operating within the Russian Federation, particularly in the Caucasus: Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia. The second level is the planner, backer, and true stakeholder, and here the Russian side appears to charge Kiev and its Western allies.
Although the Kremlin did not assign blame for the Moscow incident, some Russian lawmakers quickly accused Ukraine of being behind it. First Deputy Chair of the Federation Council's Committee on Defense and Security Viktor Bondarev held "Ukraine responsible for the tragedy that occurred." According to the local Interfax news agency, Bondarev wrote on his Telegram channel that “what transpired at Crocus City Hall was a terrorist and sabotage attack by Ukraine. They must be eliminated immediately." The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry responded, saying, "We consider such charges to be a planned provocation by the Kremlin with the aim of stirring up anti-Ukrainian hysteria in Russian society," while also accusing Russian secret services of being behind the attack.
While it is too early to determine with certainty the identity of the e Moscow attack perpetrators, Russian suspicions about the extent of ISIS's involvement in a conflict where Ukrainian and Western interests intersect may be supported by historical evidence. Indeed, Islamist terrorist groups’ activities have a history of being closely linked to Western recruitment policies for these groups. This began with the Afghan jihad campaign from 1979 to the early 1990s, which targeted the former Soviet Union and the communist Afghan regime that was allied with it. Similarly, in the Yugoslav experience, the goals of Western powers led by the United States collided with Islamic jihadist groups in order to destabilize Slobodan Milosevic's rule and divide the country into ethnic and religious factions. This is especially plausible since Russia's war against Ukraine is hybrid in nature, employing all economic, demographic, and information weapons as well as irregular military units, militias, and ethnic and religious armed groups.
Various Implications
The following are some of the likely effects of the Moscow terrorist assault in the coming period:
1. Reorganizing the Russian security services:
There is little doubt that the consequences of this attack will primarily affect the Russian side. Specifically, the organization of security and intelligence services. The US access to intelligence indicating the possibility of an attack on Russian soil demonstrates American and Western security encroachments against Russia. As a result, President Putin is likely to begin his new term with significant changes in security and intelligence leadership. In addition, the Ukrainian war has dominated the security infrastructure's resources.
2. Revenge against Ukraine:
The consequences for Ukraine will be significant if the Russian leadership makes an official accusation against the former. Within this scenario, it is likely that the Russian response will take the shape of a strong military attack, or series of attacks, to restore the prestige of the Russian services and Putin's image, which may have been tarnished following the Crocus City Hall tragedy.
3. Resuming the Russian war on terrorism internally:
Putin is anticipated to relocate special forces in the Caucasus and along Central Asian borders, and authorities may conduct special security operations beyond the country's borders. This is given that ISIS-Khorasan has strongholds in Central and South Asia, particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This approach has the potential to enhance the Russian-Iranian partnership in defeating the Islamist organization, particularly as Iran faces ongoing threats. Indeed, months ago, on January 3, 2024, two suicide bombers affiliated with the organization blew themselves up during the memorial of slain General Qassem Soleimani in Kerman, killing 84 people and injuring 284 others in the country's bloodiest attack since the Islamic Revolution in 1979.
