Prospects of Iran’s Nuclear Deal in 2023 amid Absence of Trust and Alternatives

06 January 2023


The year 2023 marks three decades since the international community learned about Iran’s nuclear programme. In 1993, The US Agency for International Development uncovered a deal between Tehran’s reactor facility and Argentine’s Applied Research Institute, whereby Iran received roughly 115 kilograms of enriched fuel at 20%. Since then, Tehran’s ambitions to acquire nuclear capabilities have been marred by a lack of international trust, skepticism, and prolonged economic sanctions.

In 2002, Iranian opposition groups leaked information about the existence of nuclear facilities regions of Natanz and Arak, where the Iranian regime had launched its very first nuclear programme with military ambitions. Soon after, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors issued a statement demanding that Iran cease all its nuclear activities at once and allow agency inspectors to take samples from areas surrounding the facilities. After much European pressure, Tehran had to accept IAEA’s demands to avoid escalation to UN Security Council. 

Violation of International Frameworks

Iran did not comply for long. It wasn’t long before the IAEA’s Board reported Iran to the UN Security Council in 2006. Pressured, Iran accepted the Protocol to the Additional Safeguards Agreement, which complements the initial inspection agreements, and offers the IAEA further access to data and information within ratifying countries. The Protocol also lets the agency track stockpiles, trade, and any other activities related to a country’s nuclear programme, as well as sending scientists to suspected sites for thorough inspection and reporting. 

When Iran announced uranium enrichment at 3.5 percent for the first time, the international community, led by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany (G5+1), offered Tehran an incentive package in return for shutting down its nuclear programme. The Security Council passed resolution 1696 demanding Iran cease all nuclear enrichment activities. But Iran did not comply. A package of economic sanctions followed under the 1737 resolution, which targeted Iranian individuals and institutions and banned countries from transporting any nuclear technologies or missiles into Iran.  

Yet despite international intervention, Iran has since 2007 managed to grow its programme. According to US intelligence reports, Iran steadily increased its design and armament activities and its uranium enrichment capability. Iran pushed ahead with its nuclear enrichment activities regardless of numerous international incentives.  

In 2009, Iran launched its first domestically produced satellite, which deepened the international community’s concerns over its capabilities to carry nuclear heads. 

Barack Obama was the first US president to propose direct negotiations with Iran outside the G5+1 framework. The US approach shifted. Washington promised to ease international sanctions if Iran agreed to reduce its uranium enrichment from 20 percent to 3.5 percent, which would be sufficient for energy and scientific research. But months later, investigations revealed new nuclear facilities near Qom, which Iran denied. More sanctions were instated, and US and EU decided to boycott negotiations with Tehran. 

Maintaining the Military Option

Iran has always kept its sight on transforming its nuclear capabilities for military purposes. At the same time, the international community demands more transparency from Iran. Yet Iran has rejected what it describes as an intervention in its sovereign right to develop nuclear energy. It is quite unclear whether Iran intends to develop nuclear weapons. But evidently, the Iranian regime had kept its options since 2012, when it installed 2800 new centrifuges to accelerate its uranium enrichment by 20%.  

Given this, a series of intense negotiations took place between G5+1 and Iran to reach an agreement that guarantees more transparency, which could lead to the lifting of some of the economic sanctions on Tehran. In 2013, G5+1 negotiator, Catherine Ashton, met with Jawad Zarif and reached a preliminary agreement, which stipulated the following: 

1. Stopping the Iranian uranium enrichment programme.

2. Reducing enriched uranium stockpile by 20%.

3. Granting IAEA access to nuclear sites for inspection and reporting.

4. Lifting international sanctions on Iran during the period of the agreement.

Both sides agreed to establish a committee to oversee the agreement and liaise with the IAEA. The committee then confirmed Iran’s compliance with the joint framework and recommended US and EU ease sanctions. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was signed soon after in 2015 by the G5+1 and Iran. 

Yet a media leak in 2016 revealed that Iran had continued its research & development of centrifuges, contrary to what had been agreed on. The US and EU were quick to reinstate harsher sanctions on Tehran to prevent the latter from building nuclear-capable missiles. 

In 2017, Senator Bob Corker proposed a new sanctions bill targeting Iran’s nuclear capabilities. But former deputy foreign minister Anthony Blinken, alongside other senators, rejected the bill, claiming it would impede the 2015 Agreement. The bill was passed, however, with a 98-votes majority and two oppositions. 

The Futility of the 2015 Agreement

The agreement wasn’t enough at best, for it hadn’t curbed Iran’s threats to the national security of other regional countries. And while according to the IAEA, Iran complied with quantities stipulated in the agreement, it continues to develop its military capability, which may enable Tehran to integrate its nuclear technology. Tehran continues to invest in R&D budgets in missiles capable of carrying nuclear heads and other communications technologies supporting its military project. 

The international community, on many occasions, has warned against Iran’s ballistic missile ambitions. And the fact that Iran continues to support militias across the region that fuel proxy war has deepened US concerns over Tehran’s real intentions. Such issues have been discussed domestically in the US and abroad. Simply, Iran’s growing military activity does not align with its promises to comply with the nuclear agreement, from which Tehran keeps threatening to walk away. 

Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal was yet another indication that the deal hadn’t achieved its primary goals. Since then, the US has implemented additional sanctions, which in turn set Iran to walk away from negotiations and increase its nuclear activity to unprecedented levels. 

Currently, Democrats and Biden’s Administration are still hoping to mend the 2015 agreement with a handshake. But since 2018, a series of intelligence pieces of information have revealed that Iran has never complied with the agreement. Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu has told the UN Security Council that Iran has had secret warehouses where it stores nuclear stockpiles; the IAEA has confirmed these reports and asked Iran to allow inspectors to visit the sites, though Iran rejected its requests. Thus, the agreement with Iran has deteriorated, and the prospects of a viable deal are very slim. 

In conclusion, the main barrier in the way of building a viable agreement is the ability of both sides to restore trust. While Iran demands the US a legal pledge that any future administration won’t quite the deal, the current Democrat administration seems incapable of getting past partisan division over recent Iranian transgressions.

The risk lies in the lack of any other alternatives. In addition to Iran’s threat to the region, the absence of a viable agreement risks the security and stability of the entire region, which remains subject to menace by Iran-backed militias and armed groups. Iran’s military programmes, especially its ballistic missile development, remain the region’s most significant threat to date.