Reciprocal Pressures

Are Israel-Lebanon maritime border talks doomed to fail?

29 September 2022


The future of talks between Israel and Lebanon on delineating a shared maritime border, mediated by US Special Envoy and Coordinator for International Energy Affairs, Amos Hochstein remains uncertain following an exchange of escalatory statements from Israel and Lebanon’s Hezbollah about the disputed Karish natural gas field. Both sides suggested that the tensions can escalate into an all-out war unless their conditions are met. However, Lebanese officials including President Michel Aoun stated that the negotiations to demarcate the border are in the final stages.

Signs of escalation

In recent days, there were several signs of escalation between Israel and Hezbollah over the maritime border delineation. Although some of these signs are not new and include warnings by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah that exploration work at the Karish field is a red line, the fact that these signs resurfaced in recent days makes it worthwhile to outline them as follows: 

1- Linking the Karish Field to Israel’s pipeline system: 

On September 16, Israeli energy minister Karine Elharrar announced that preparations are underway to link the Karish gas field with Israel’s pipeline system and start extraction from the field within a few days since this stage is part of plans for gas extraction. She explained that in the coming days, drilling equipment and pumping systems will be tested on the offshore rig to initiate connection with the pipeline system. 

The statements came as an Israeli preemptive step aimed at imposing a fait accompli at the disputed field even though, to date, the border talks brokered by the US special envoy Hochstein between Israel and Lebanon have not reached an agreement. This is largely related to Israel’s attempt to establish a reality in the area by using the Energean Power floating gas rig at the disputed field on June 5, a development that is likely to lead to renewed escalation of tensions over the area. 

2- Exchange of threats between Israel and Hezbollah: 

The recent statements by Israeli energy minister were met by direct threats from Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in statements made on September 17 at the so-called Arbaeen commemoration. He said: “We give negotiations a chance, but our eyes and our missiles are on Karish.”

The statements cannot be viewed separately from steps made by Hezbollah since the dispute over the Karish field renewed in June. These include threats from the militia leaders, as well as deployment of drones over the Karish field to send a message that although the militia is closely monitoring the situation although it is not taking part in the negotiations and left it up to the Lebanese state, represented by its three institutions i.e. the presidency, the parliament and the cabinet, which, following a long period of confusion and disagreement between them, managed to reach consensus and came up to one consistent position that was conveyed to US mediator. 

On its part, Israel, which wants to speed up gas extraction, issued counter threats to reiterate that it will not hesitate to respond to any escalation by Hezbollah. Israeli Minister of Defense Benny Gantz, in statements on September 15, said that Lebanon will suffer dire consequences if Hezbollah disrupts the talks with Lebanon. He said that if Nasrallah wants to disrupt the ongoing talks, he’s welcome to do so, but the price will be Lebanon.”

Reports from Lebanon and Israel talk about political and military preparation being underway by the two sides in anticipation of a potential war that can break out any time. 

Existing complications

Signs of recent escalation between Israel and Lebanon are related to developments in the indirect talks mediated by the US special envoy during his tour to the region during which he visited both Tel Aviv and Beirut in the first week of September. They are also related to internal developments in both Israel and Lebanon including complications blocking an agreement between the two countries. These can be outlined as follows: 

1- The safe zone: 

US Special Envoy Amos Hocshtein, during his recent visit to Beirut, presented Lebanese officials with a new Israeli proposal for delineating the maritime border. The proposal would be a reconciliation between Line 23, officially approved by Lebanon for demarcating the border, and Line 1 claimed by Israel. The proposal would give Lebanon all of Qana field in return for approving a 6-km safety zone between the two lines. Israel would acknowledge Lebanon’s sovereignty in this area but demands it be under the control of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, or UNIFIL, for security reasons. 

The new proposal pushed, once again, technicalities to the front of negotiations after Lebanon gave up Line 29. The proposal combines delineation of the land border and delineation of the maritime border. 

That is, Israel demands that Line 29 should run from the so-called B1 at Ras Naqoura. B1 is among the points that Lebanon claimed through the United Nations following withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon in 2000. Israel continues to dodge the issue keeping the Ras Naquora tunnels blocked since 2000. The new delineation of the maritime border may impose essential changes on the demarcation of the land border designated back in 1923 and 1949. The escalation of disagreement between the two countries on this issue would send negotiations back to square one. 

2- Lebanon’s conditions: 

In his statement on September 17, Hezbollah leader laid out what can be described as Lebanon’s prior conditions about the Karish field and generally the delineation of the maritime border.  He said that Israel's extraction of gas from the Karish gas field before Lebanon obtained its rights is a "red line”, meaning that the militia would not allow the extraction of gas from the field until an agreement is reached. It also implies a prerequisite for eliminating all impediments to Lebanon’s extraction of gas from its own fields as per agreements signed with France's Total before Israel can do the same at its fields. 

3- Domestic contexts: 

The domestic situation in Lebanon and Israel represents a significant variable impacting the negotiations. In Israel, the early legislative elections scheduled for November would place pressure on Israeli decision makers about signing an agreement. The current government led by Yair Lapid appears to be caught between two fires. Firstly, the economic situation in Israel, coupled with the global energy crisis, makes extraction of gas from the Karish field absolutely necessary, especially after agreements were signed with Energean, which already sent its Energean Power rig to the disputed field on June 5, where extraction was set to begin in mid-September. This will undoubtedly enhance Lapid’s standing in the coming elections, especially because of fierce competition from his rival Benjamin Netanyahu.  

Secondly, signing an agreement with Lebanon, which implies giving up the Qana field, will reduce Lapid’s electoral credibility because he will be smeared by the opposition as someone who is compromising and giving up Israeli rights. 

In Lebanon, the ongoing political crisis and the impasse over forming a government is further complicating consultations between Najib Mikati prime minister-designate and President Michel Aoun, as well as the presidential elections. As a result, the country is likely to undergo presidential void by the end of October. Altogether, these factors are set to make an agreement with Israel, and more specifically the signing of such an agreement, a more complicated issue. That is because the current government led by Mikati is a caretaker that is not eligible for signing the agreement. Coupled with a likely presidential void, the impasse is set to impact the future of negotiations. 

The conclusion therefore would be that despite the several signs that serious points of disagreement have taken shape between the involved sides, and although both countries seek to capitalize on the issue of maritime border delineation to address the internal situation, it became clear now that both sides are keen on reaching an agreement and preventing their disagreement from sliding into a military conflict, given the economic benefits of the potential signing of the agreement and the launch of gas extraction. 

Despite existing obstacles to resolve the negotiations, the surrounding circumstances indicate a desire to de-escalate tensions at the current stage. This is evidenced by Israel’s giving up plans to link the Karish field to its pipeline system following threats from Hezbollah and claiming that the decision was made based on technical issues. Moreover, Israel postponed the launch of production from the field to mid-October to deprive Hezbollah of excuses to ignite a fresh conflict.