By Muhammad Alaraby
Sean McFate is a professor of strategy at the National Defense University and Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, one of the largest think tanks in Washington. McFate also works as a consultant for the Pentagon, Hollywood, and other entities concerned with the future of war. An author and novelist, McFate is best known for his studies of new mercenaries and private security companies, some of which he previously worked for. In 2020, The Economist named his “New Rules of War” book of the year.
"Trending Events" met with McFate to discuss the West’s “strategic atrophy” as well as the role of technology and artificial intelligence in “new revolutions in military affairs”, and mercenaries, as well as military strategies in the Gaza and Ukraine wars.
Let us begin by considering the state of
I believe the world is gradually shifting toward what we might call 'durable disorder.' This concept describes a global landscape where strong state governance is diminishing, unlike the mid-20th century when great powers dominated, and everything was 'sub-state.'
The retreat of state power has been ongoing for decades, but it does not leave a governance vacuum. Instead, we are seeing an overlapping of sovereignties. Take Somalia, Syria, or Afghanistan, for example. As strong central authority withdraws, it's being replaced by something akin to feudal sovereignty. To a Western political scientist, this might look like chaos, but for people on the ground, it's a form of governance – albeit one that often breeds more local conflict and instability. Cases like Ukraine, Afghanistan, Libya, and Venezuela demonstrate this encroachment of durable disorder. I predict that by mid-century, more regions will resemble this model of governance.
Speaking of Ukraine, it is often said that despite receiving considerable military intelligence and financial support, Kiev is losing the war and Russia is winning. Do you concur, or are we are going to see some kind of unexpected reversal of events?
That was highly expected. In 2022, Putin launched what he thought was a 'classic' blitzkrieg into Ukraine, expecting to capture Kyiv in just three days. Many Western experts shared this expectation, but they were all mistaken. Ukraine countered with unconventional warfare, deploying guerrillas armed with anti-tank missiles. After four weeks, Russia shifted gears, resorting to their own brand of unconventional war—massacring civilians and leveling cities. We've seen this playbook before in Aleppo, Chechnya, and now in Mariupol and across Ukraine.
Another strategy Russia employed was luring Ukraine into a conventional war of attrition in November 2022, particularly in places like Donbas. Ukraine can't win that fight; they'll never triumph in a war of attrition. We're also witnessing 'donor fatigue' in the US and the West, compounded by NATO's waning interest and the world's shifting focus to conflicts like Gaza.
The most likely scenario now is a stalemate, which aligns with Putin's goals. He might aim to turn Ukraine into a landlocked country, negotiate a peace deal on his terms, or install a puppet regime in Kyiv—a tactic he's used before in places like Georgia.
I believe Ukraine has inadvertently transitioned from irregular to regular warfare, a battle they can't win. Worse yet, the US has inadvertently pushed them in this direction by supplying more tanks and fighter planes. This approach won't work because no one's thinking strategically. It's a classic case of strategic atrophy: doing the same thing repeatedly and expecting different results. I think Ukraine serves as a prime example of why conventional warfare is becoming obsolete in today's world.
You’re stressing the fact that the West is suffering from strategic atrophy, Russia and China seem to be on the rise today. Can Western powers in general, and the US in particular, redesign their grand strategy to cope with this change?
In essence, I mean by strategic atrophy is that generals tend to fight the last war they won. They prefer to engage in conflicts they understand, and for the West, this means World War II—their benchmark for conventional warfare.
Russia and China are indeed ascending while the West's influence wanes. While I don't believe the West is inevitably doomed, it is clear that its days as the uncontested unipolar power are over. This shift is exacerbated by the strategic atrophy afflicting the US and NATO.
For instance, the US finds itself embroiled in strategic competition against China and Russia, yet its approach to winning seems rooted in outdated thinking. They envision victory through conventional battles reminiscent of Clausewitz's theories, as if they could simply replicate events like the Battle of Midway over the streets of Taiwan, albeit with Ford-class carriers and F-35 jets. In essence, they're conceptualizing World War II with advanced technology, but without any evolution in strategic thought.
Astonishingly, they seem to have forgotten a crucial lesson: nuclear powers do not engage in conventional wars, as any such conflict could escalate to nuclear warfare within hours. This very principle was at the heart of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Yet, the US continues to pour billions into aircraft carriers and F-35 jets – assets that have become largely obsolete in this new paradigm.
The West, therefore, is preparing for a conventional fight in a scenario where such a conflict is highly improbable, if not impossible. This demonstrates a remarkably low strategic IQ, to put it mildly. Meanwhile, Russia and China have developed their own grand strategies, capitalizing on the apparent shortsightedness of Western strategists.
It is quite ironic that the West has the long-seated accumulated knowledge about the art of war, in addition to cutting edge technology, yet we do not see this reflected in its military performance. You talk about this in your book “Goliath: Why the West doesn’t Win Wars.” Why do you think that is?
The US hasn't secured a major military victory since 1945. While it excels at technological innovation, it struggles with evolving strategic concepts. This issue is twofold, requiring attention on both the supply and demand sides.
On the supply side, the US military-industrial complex promotes exorbitantly priced war machines like F-35s and submarines—highly profitable ventures for giants like Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and General Dynamics. This same industry lobbies the US Congress, funneling money into re-election campaigns. In turn, Congress mandates the military to procure this equipment, perpetuating a vicious cycle.
On the demand side, the US military seems resistant to learning from its missteps. It continues to request equipment and training rooted in World War II-era thinking, ill-suited for modern warfare. To put this in perspective, the F-35 fighter jet program has cost US taxpayers and allies a staggering 1.7 trillion USD. If this program were a country, its GDP would surpass that of Saudi Arabia.
Over the two decades of engagement in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria, the US has failed to conduct meaningful combat missions. Instead, it has resorted to publicity stunts that fail to deter adversaries. These actions certainly do not give pause to major powers like China or Russia. Yet, we continue pouring resources into this outdated equipment and pressuring partners such as Finland, Germany, and Israel to follow suit with similar purchases.
Turning to the Middle East and the war on Gaza. Do you think that this decades-long conflict demonstrates the same strategic atrophy as the one we are seeing in the West?
Indeed, I do. I think that Israel's strategic culture bears striking similarities to that of the United States, particularly in their shared focus on conventional warfare. Both nations are heavily investing in formidable weapons systems like the Merkava tank and advanced fighter jets. However, this emphasis on traditional military might has not necessarily translated into effectiveness in modern conflicts.
While both countries boast exceptional special operations forces, the likelihood of facing a conventional armored battle - akin to those against Arab states in the 1960s and 70s - seems increasingly remote.
Iran, for instance, has adeptly employed proxy forces and irregular warfare strategies to undermine Israel's strength. Similarly, Hamas has adopted unconventional methods, utilizing a classic Maoist approach of blending with the civilian population. This tactic forces Israel into a precarious position: any action against Hamas risks civilian casualties, creating a lose-lose scenario for Israel.
I want to emphasize that I'm not taking sides here - neither pro-Israel nor pro-Hamas. However, it's worth noting that Hamas's strategy against Israel has proven remarkably effective.
The war has not ended yet,
To evaluate any strategy, we must assess whether it is achieving the objectives set forth at the outset of the conflict. In my view, Hamas's strategic objectives appear to have been multifaceted: to disrupt the growing diplomatic ties between Israel and the Arab world, to refocus attention on Gaza (which Israel had largely relegated to the periphery), to unify Gazans in both the West Bank and Gaza, and to tarnish Israel's standing within the international community. Remarkably, Hamas has achieved all these goals. While I in no way condone their actions on October 7th or their tactics of embedding within civilian populations, it's undeniable that they've accomplished their strategic aims. Conversely, Israel finds itself in a quandary, uncertain of its next moves even if it were to "win" militarily. The fundamental issues persist: they still face the Gaza problem, the Hamas problem, and the broader Palestinian problem. Compounding these challenges is the issue of hostages, whose families have emerged as a potent political force within Israeli society.
Moving now to the IDF’s performance, do you think they are acting rationally as a professional army? Are the shocking images we are seeing of humiliation, suffering, and killing of Palestinians intended to achieve military or political goals for the Israelis?
Since October 7th, there has been a palpable surge of hostility within Israeli society towards Hamas. In the complex realm of armed conflict laws and collateral damage considerations, confronting Hamas inevitably means navigating through a civilian population. This situation echoes the 2006 war against Hezbollah, where Israel found itself caught between competing narratives. Internally, Israel perceives itself as David battling Goliath—a peaceful nation defending itself against organized criminals. However, on the international stage, the perception is reversed: the world views Israel as Goliath, with the Palestinians and Hamas cast in the role of David.
In his book “The Future of War: a History”, Lawrence Friedman suggests that Western armies and political elite
I respectfully disagree with Sir Lawrence and others. The United States, in particular, is obsessed with technology; it is ingrained in its strategic culture. Let's face it: we all love our iPhones. These gadgets matter in our daily lives, but how crucial are they in actual warfare?
Examining conflicts over the past 70 years reveals a pattern: technological primitives consistently overcoming high-tech militaries and superpowers. Consider France in Algeria and Indochina, Great Britain in Cyprus and Palestine, the United States in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and the Soviets in Afghanistan. These are all instances where advanced, professional militaries fell to adversaries armed with little more than AK-47s and pickup trucks.
So, when will the West learn that technology is no longer the decisive factor in modern warfare? If F-35s, tanks, and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers are so wonderful, why did America falter in Afghanistan? The answer is simple: concepts and ideas hold more weight than equipment. Who cares about the sword if you can manipulate the mind that wields it? That is the real threat.
Victory can be achieved through various means, not all of which unfold on traditional battlefields. The strategies that have proven effective are black operations, mercenaries, and disinformation campaigns employed by both sides. This is the true face of modern warfare.
Artificial intelligence undoubtedly matters, but not in the way many war experts believe it does. Currently, the US military sees AI as a tool for making faster, better tactical decisions by providing more information. That's fine, but physical battles are no longer the crux of modern warfare. What truly matters are elements like disinformation, which can erode a society from within by turning people against each other.
Take Iraq in 2000, for instance. The strategy would have been to pit Sunni against Shia, effectively deflating the entire country. In today's United States, it's about setting Republicans against Democrats – a tactic China, Russia, and others are employing through disinformation campaigns. The endgame isn't a dramatic collapse like Berlin in 1945, with fire and tanks in the streets. Instead, it's a subtle deflation: transforming the United States into a first-world country stripped of its first-world power.
In your books, you say that mercenaries are on the rise. Do you think that professional armies, national armies are going to adapt to this fact?
Well, if they were smart, they would adapt to the fight. But they are not going to adapt because, once again, they suffer from strategic atrophy. Take the Wagner Group, for instance. They rebelled against Putin, and while he eliminated its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, he has kept the organization intact. Despite the destabilization and humiliation they have caused, the Kremlin continues to rely on mercenaries. And it's not just the Wagner Group; there is Ptach and others who are becoming increasingly prevalent. We've witnessed their presence in various conflicts: the war in Yemen, Libya, throughout Africa, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Yet the West still hasn't grasped how to effectively combat them. I believe this is an area where non-Western thinkers will likely have an advantage.
Do you think we need to read classics like Machiavelli and Jomini to learn more about military strategy? If so, how can we make use them?
I regularly read and teach classics like Clausewitz, Jomini, Sun Tzu, Mao, Galula, and to some extent, T.E. Lawrence. There's also Kautilya (also known as Chanakya), an ancient Indian strategic thinker. These works offer a wealth of knowledge. While the West often venerates Clausewitz, and his treatise on war is undoubtedly significant, it's also incomplete. There is a stark contrast between Clausewitz's approach to war and that of Sun Tzu, for instance. Clausewitz focuses primarily on military might in battles, whereas Sun Tzu emphasizes cunning and outmaneuvering your opponent. Mao, interestingly, combines both approaches while innovatively weaponizing time.
Looking at the wars in the latter half of the 20th century, you'll find they're predominantly Maoist in nature. The truth is, without studying these classics, you cannot discern the patterns crucial for formulating winning strategies. It's worth noting that in the information age, you do not necessarily need the world's best military or the richest economy to outsmart your enemy. That is precisely why starting with the classics is essential, even if you don't agree with all their principles.
Unless you understand this ongoing conversation in military strategy, you'll be at a severe disadvantage in today's armed conflicts. It's about grasping the foundations to navigate the complexities of modern warfare.
So
I think literature is a wonderful way of truth-telling without explicitly stating a truth. I enjoy writing fiction because it allows me to convey similar ideas as I do in my nonfiction work, but through showing rather than analyzing, like an academic would. Fiction has the ability to communicate things that are difficult to capture in academic literature. Whether it's through novels or nonfiction, my goal is to reveal the reality of modern warfare so that we can learn how to address it. Otherwise, we will continue to witness more wars and more human suffering, due to the mistakes of inept leaders that are paid for in blood.
The interview was conducted in the spring of 2024, and was published first in Arabic in the 37th issue of FARAS Arabic magazine Itijahat Al-Ahadath, “Trending Events”
