In light of the presidential elections unfolding in several Maghreb countries, specifically Algeria on September 7, 2024, and Tunisia on October 6, Future Center for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS) convened a discussion panel. The forum analyzed the results of the recently concluded Algerian presidential elections while also anticipating potential trajectories for the upcoming Tunisian presidential elections slated for the following month.
The panel's primary speaker was Dr. Abu al-Fadl al-Isnawi, a distinguished expert specializing in Maghreb affairs and the Editor-in-Chief of Al-Ahram International Politics Magazine. The event was moderated by Mr. Hossam Ibrahim, the Executive Director of FARAS.
The Algerian Presidential Elections
On September 14, the Algerian Constitutional Court announced President Abdelmadjid Tebboune's victory for a second term after securing 84.30% of the votes in the September 7 elections. Tebboune garnered a total of eight million votes out of 11.2 million voters, with a participation rate of 46.1%. Al-Isnawi analyzed these results and related events, addressing the following points:
1- Election contexts:
The period preceding the Algerian presidential elections witnessed several transformations at the political and economic levels, as well as in foreign relations. These changes directly affected the opportunities for potential candidates, voting trends, and other indicators related to the electoral process. Al-Isnawi identified the following key factors:
A. Improvement of some economic indicators: President Tebboune's achievements in certain economic aspects contributed positively to a slight increase in the participation rate for these elections. He successfully recovered about $30 billion of looted funds and announced efforts to reclaim another $300 billion. Additionally, the inflation rate declined to 5% in the first quarter of 2024, compared to 9.3% in 2023.
B. Bringing forward the election date: The decision to advance the Algerian presidential elections to September 7, instead of the originally scheduled date in December, resulted in a decrease in the number of candidacy applicants. Out of 35 initial applicants, only 16 managed to complete the required legal files and submit them to the Independent National Election Authority. This body, entrusted with managing the electoral process, subsequently submitted these applications to the Constitutional Court. The Court ultimately announced the acceptance of only three candidates to run in the presidential race, excluding other politically and socially influential figures. The three approved candidates were: President Tebboune, Abdelali Hassani Sharif (the candidate of the Islamic movement), and Youssef Ouchich (the candidate of the left).
C. Tebboune's alliance with the ruling parties: President Tebboune's campaign formed alliances with traditional parties, also known as the "party of power." At the forefront of these parties were the National Democratic Rally and the National Liberation Front. Additionally, three Islamic parties that had split from the Movement of Society for Peace and the Ennahda Movement joined the alliance: the National Construction Party led by former presidential candidate Abdelkader Bengrina, the Rally of Hope for Algeria, and the National Reform Movement. Notably, this partnership between the ruling parties and some Islamic parties, which the movement had rejected following Abdelaziz Bouteflika's departure, may have contributed to the withdrawal of the youth bloc from voting. This demographic represents 36% of the electorate inside Algeria.
2- Implications of the results:
Al-Isnawi reviewed the most prominent implications related to the election results in Algeria, as follows:
A. The transfer of the Muslim Brotherhood's voting bloc to the peripheries: The election figures indicate a high percentage of votes for the candidate of the Islamic movement in remote governorates, suggesting that this movement is active in areas abandoned by established old parties. Hassani Sharif obtained the highest votes in Tindouf state, located near the borders of Morocco, Mauritania, and the Sahara; Illizi state in the far southeast of Algeria; and El Oued state in the northeast of Algeria.
B. The fragmentation of votes of the Islamic movement: An analysis of the election results reveals that the percentage of votes obtained by the Islamic candidate Hassani Sharif decreased compared to President Tebboune in states where the Muslim Brotherhood is concentrated. This indicates a clear division within the Muslim Brotherhood movement while simultaneously demonstrating the commitment of Islamic party leaders (National Construction, National Reform, and the Rally of Hope of Algeria) to support President Tebboune, especially Ben Kirina.
C. The decline in the influence of left-wing parties in their geographical areas: Youssef Ouchich obtained a very limited percentage of votes in the 13 governorates where left-wing parties, represented by the "Socialist Forces" party, the "Workers' Party", and other left-wing parties, are concentrated. This outcome signifies the weak presence and influence of these parties in their traditional geographical strongholds. Conversely, residents of these states voted heavily for President Tebboune.
D. The Amazigh vote for the left-wing candidate: Notably, areas inhabited by Amazighs were more likely to vote for Ouchich compared to the rest of the Algerian states. It is worth mentioning that a significant number of young Amazighs were among the drivers of the February 2019 movement. Subsequently, they rejected Tebboune's policies and his alliance with the ruling parties and other Islamists.
3- Potential policies:
President Tebboune is likely to adopt, in his second term, a number of policies at both domestic and foreign levels, as follows:
A. Improving the economic situation: Tebboune is expected to prioritize enhancing the living conditions of Algerians and diversifying the economy. Additionally, he will likely work on developing an urgent plan to attract foreign direct investment, aiming to bolster Algeria's economic landscape.
B. Following up on the smuggled funds file: Given the critical importance of this issue for both the Algerian economy and President Tebboune personally, he and his government are expected to intensify efforts on recovering looted funds. They will likely focus on resuming work on this file, with a particular emphasis on swiftly moving to repatriate funds smuggled out of Algeria.
C. Visiting France: A diplomatic visit to France may be on Tebboune's agenda in the near future. This possibility is reinforced by President Emmanuel Macron's prompt congratulations on Tebboune's second-term victory. Such a visit could signify Paris's attempt to turn the page on recent disputes with Algeria, particularly in light of the tension stemming from France's shift in position on the Sahara issue and its adoption of the Moroccan approach.
D. Activating relations with West Africa: President Tebboune is likely to reinvigorate relations with West African countries, addressing the recent tensions that have emerged. This initiative becomes particularly crucial in light of strained relations with countries such as Mali, following its withdrawal from the Algiers Agreement signed between the Bamako authority and northern Mali rebels. Similar efforts may extend to Niger and Burkina Faso, aiming to stabilize and strengthen Algeria's regional influence.
Tunisian Presidential Elections
On July 3, 2024, Tunisian President Kais Saied issued a decree calling for voters to participate in the upcoming presidential elections, scheduled for October 6. It is noteworthy that the electorate comprises approximately 9 million and 500 thousand voters within Tunisia, while abroad, 620 thousand voters are registered out of a total of 1 million and 800 thousand Tunisians residing permanently outside their country.
Regarding the Tunisian elections, Al-Isnawi highlighted the following points:
B. Dispute between the Elections Authority and the Administrative Court: The Independent High Authority for Elections' decision to reject the remaining applicants led six of them to appeal before the Administrative Court. The court ruled in favor of three appellants, ordering the acceptance of their candidacies. Those are: former minister Mondher Al-Zanaidi, former leader of the Ennahda Movement (the Brotherhood), Abdel Latif Al-Makki, and Imad Al-Daimi, former leader of the "Congress for the Republic" party. However, the High Elections Authority refused to implement the Administrative Court's decision, instead confirming the final list of candidates for the elections with only the three candidates whose candidacies were initially accepted.
2- The path of the elections:
The ongoing crisis between political forces and the Independent High Elections Authority, coupled with the constitutional and legal conflict between the Administrative Court and the Independent Elections Authority, suggests a complex electoral landscape. Despite these challenges, it is highly probable that the Tunisian presidential elections will proceed as scheduled. Kais Saied is likely to secure a second presidential term, albeit with a noticeable decline in voter participation. In response to this outcome, there is a possibility of demonstrations and protests organized by various unions, labor organizations, and opposition parties, reflecting the contentious nature of the political climate.
