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The Drone Deal

Analyzing why Iran’s deal with Bolivia is alarming for South American countries

07 أغسطس، 2023


The statement made in July by Bolivian Defense Minister Edmundo Novillo Aguilar, expressing his country's interest in obtaining Iranian drone technology to protect its borders and combat smuggling and drug trafficking, has raised widespread debate within Bolivia and neighboring countries. Bolivia would become the second country in South America to use Iranian drones, following Venezuela, which acquired the equipment in 2007.

These developments have raised security concerns among South American countries, particularly in Argentina, which previously experienced Iranian security breaches on its territory. Buenos Aires views Iranian drones as a security threat to its borders and as a tool for Tehran that is capable of penetrating the South American country's territory once again.

Division in Bolivia

On July 16, 2023, Bolivia's Defense Minister, Edmundo Novillo, met with his Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Reza Ashtiani, in Tehran. During the meeting, the two ministers signed a memorandum of understanding on defense and security. Following the meeting, Novillo announced that his country is interested in utilizing the expertise of Iranian drones for the purpose of protecting borders and combating drug trafficking.

Although the Bolivian minister did not confirm a deal to purchase drones from Iran or even that Bolivia would receive the drones as a grant from Tehran, the discussion about Bolivia's desire to acquire Iranian drones following the signing of the agreement brings to mind an announcement made in 2010 by the then Bolivian Minister of Finance, Luis Arce expressing his country's intention to purchase Iranian-made aircraft and helicopters for training and transportation, based on a memorandum of understanding signed previously by former Bolivian president, Evo Morales, and his Iranian counterpart at the time, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in Tehran during an official visit in October 2010.

This memorandum was criticized by the Bolivian opposition, expressing their concern over any potential role that Iran could play in Bolivia and rejecting Iran's attempts to extend its influence in South America. This sentiment was echoed once again after the recent announcement by Defense Minister Edmundo Novillo Aguilar. 

Members of the Bolivian opposition requested clarification about information in the memorandum of understanding pertaining to defense and security signed by the defense ministers of Bolivia and Iran. The request was expressed by Gustavo Aliaga, the Secretary of the Defense and Armed Forces Committee in the Bolivian Chamber of Deputies, who stated, "The defense minister must explain the agreement and why it has been signed with a country that has complications on the international stage when Bolivia is supposed to be pacifist according to its constitution. I can't understand why Bolivia is getting involved in such a complex and difficult relationship."

The Bolivian-Iranian agreement came just a few weeks after President Ebrahim Raisi wrapped up a visit to three South American countries, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba, from June 12 to 16, 2023. The visit is evidence that Iran is once again interested in relations with its former allies in this continent, which hold significant importance in Iran's foreign and defense policies. The visit resulted in numerous economic, investment, and military agreements that would help maintain Iran's presence in the region.

It's worth noting that during the presidency of the former leader Hassan Rouhani, there was a decline in the priority given to Latin America in Iran's foreign policy agenda. This shift was caused by his government's efforts to improve relations with the West and focus on achieving a significant breakthrough in the nuclear issue.

Argentina's Concerns

The strong relationship between Iran and Bolivia is one of the reasons why Argentina has to be wary of Bolivia's alliances outside of South America. These relations have consistently led to diplomatic disputes between Bolivia and its neighbor Argentina, especially during the tenure of the former President Evo Morales. Morales was considered one of Iran's key allies within the "Bolivarian Alliance," also known as ALBA-TCP, which includes Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Dominica, Antigua and Barbuda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Grenada, Saint Kitts, and Nevis.

The tenure of former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad marked a golden era for Iran's relations with South American countries in general and Bolivia in particular. Ahmadinejad visited Bolivia three times during his two presidential terms, further solidifying the ties.

In the context of Argentina's concerns about the growing relationship between Iran and Bolivia, Buenos Aires requested La Paz in June 2011 not to continue hosting Ahmad Vahidi, who was Iran's defense minister at that time. Bolivia complied with this request, avoiding a diplomatic dispute with Argentina. Argentina sought to bring Vahidi to trial based on accusations from the Argentine Public Prosecutor's Office that he was the mastermind behind the AMIA bombing, an attack on the building of Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina in Buenos Aires on July 18, 1994. The attack resulted in the deaths of 85 people and the injury of hundred others.

At that time, Bolivian Defense Minister Maria Cecilia Chacon explained that the invitation to Vahidi to attend military ceremonies had been extended without knowledge of the Interpol arrest warrant issued against him.

Furthermore, Argentina swiftly presented a memorandum requesting information to the Bolivian embassy in Buenos Aires. In this memorandum, Argentina sought details regarding the scope of discussions and any agreements reached during the visit of the Bolivian Defense Minister, Edmundo Novillo, to Tehran in July. Former Argentine politicians warned of the presence of Iranian agents in Bolivia as a result of agreements signed between La Paz and Tehran, ostensibly under the guise of cooperation in combating drug trafficking. They expressed concerns that such arrangements could potentially impact the security of Argentina. 

Motives for Concern

Despite Bolivia's attempts to downplay the reasons for Argentina's apprehensions regarding its growing relationship with Iran, and despite its assertion that Buenos Aires' stance on the memorandum of understanding signed with Tehran stems from the political exploitation by the Argentine right-wing ahead of the upcoming presidential elections scheduled for October, several reasons could justify Argentina's concerns. These concerns spill over into Bolivia's neighboring countries, many of which maintain good relations with the United States. The most important of these reasons are as follows:

1. Apprehensions about Iranian presence on Argentina's borders:  

Given Argentina's border with Bolivia, which spans over 700 kilometers, Argentina is facing the potential threat of the presence of Iranian security and military elements along this border. This concern is particularly heightened by the possibility of reviving the memorandum of understanding signed between the two countries in 2010. The memorandum stipulates that Iranian military experts train their Bolivian counterparts on Iranian conventional and unmanned aircraft. This implies that Iranian security presence in Bolivia could continue for an extended period, allowing for the establishment of arms for the Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC, in Bolivia.

This situation is especially concerning for Argentina because it previously experienced instances of Iranian-backed security breaches. The 1994 AMIA bombing was not the first incident. An attack on the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires on March 17, 1992, was attributed to Lebanon's Hezbollah.

2. Anticipating reaction from South American Jewish organizations: 

The DAIA organization (Delegación de Asociaciones Israelitas Argentinas), an advocate of the Jewish community in Argentina that holds political influence, has expressed concerns about the security agreement between Bolivia and Iran and its potential repercussions for Argentina and South America's security. In a statement, DAIA emphasized that the agreement poses "risks to the security of Argentina and the region as a whole." The statement, signed by the organization's Secretary General Alejandro Zuchowicki and its President Jorge Knoblovits, urged the Argentine government to condemn the agreement signed between Bolivia and Iran.

DAIA based its concerns on a report from the American Institute for the Study of War (ISW), which suggests Iran might supply Bolivia with drones similar to those it provided to Russia during its ongoing conflict with Ukraine. The organization wields political and economic influence in many South American countries and has a strong relationship with the Jewish lobby in the United States. Over the past 29 years, DAIA has consistently rallied against Iran, criticizing Argentina's recent approach of seeking reconciliation in managing the investigation into the attack on the organization's headquarters in Buenos Aires.

3. American threats: 

Within the geopolitical landscape, South America emerges as a pivotal region for Iran. Several nations on this continent exhibit an alignment with Tehran's anti-Washington sentiment, having themselves been subjected to US-imposed sanctions. Similarly, this region poses challenges of paramount importance for the United States. Historically, over recent years, the US has achieved diplomatic rapprochements with some of its former adversaries, with Venezuela notably at the forefront of such engagements.    

In this context, Washington views signing any defense agreement between Iran and a South American country as potentially destabilizing the region. The US is closely monitoring Iran's efforts to boost its influence in South American nations. Furthermore, Washington has asserted that it has imposed several sanctions on Iran, some of which are related to Iran's direct support for Russia with drones, and has hinted at the possibility of imposing sanctions on Iranian technology exports that could disrupt stability in South American countries.

In conclusion, it can be said that the recent security agreement between Bolivia and Iran may represent a step towards solidifying Iranian influence among its old allies in South America, which serves as the backyard arena for the United States. This could impose requirements on both South American countries on one hand, and Iran on the other to ensure the realization of each other's interests. Bolivia's reassurances to its neighboring countries, which aim to alleviate concerns about the security agreement with Iran, indicate La Paz's determination to finalize the agreement on its acquisition of drones from Tehran without causing tensions with its neighbors that are inherently cautious about such agreements.