Iran, as a state and regime, navigates a critical juncture in its history, possibly the most significant since the 1979 revolution. The country faces mounting internal pressure caused by severe economic crises affecting a broad segment of the Iranian population. These challenges are compounded by political and social restrictions imposed by the regime on a people inherently inclined toward freedom and openness. Moreover, Iran confronts the impending transition of leadership as a successor to the current Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, must eventually take his place in the event of his incapacity or death. The prospect of this transition looms heavily over Iran's internal political dynamics and will undoubtedly influence its foreign policies.
External
pressures on Iran are no less significant than those within. Tensions between
Tehran and Western powers have escalated to unprecedented levels over a range
of contentious issues, including the nuclear and missile programs and Iran's
support for Russia in its war on Ukraine. The result has been successive waves
of severe sanctions, intensifying economic and livelihood challenges
domestically. Futhermore, the "shadow war" with Israel has
increasingly turned into direct confrontations, as witnessed during the clashes
of April 2024. Iran also remains steadfast in its regional ambitions,
supporting militias that destabilize the security and stability of neighboring
countries.
In light of these
circumstances, a pressing question emerges: could these internal and external pressures
lead to a transformation in the behavior of the Iranian regime, regardless of
the scale, extent, or impact of such a change?
Pressing Factors
Numerous pressures surround and constrain the Iranian regime both internally and externally, potentially driving changes in its conduct and policies. These pressures can be outlined as follows:
1- Generational
change:
In recent years,
Iran has witnessed the emergence of a new generation of young men and women,
particularly those born between the mid-1990s and the end of the first decade
of the 2000s. Dubbed "Generation Z" (Gen Z), this cohort is
chronologically and ideologically disconnected from the 1979 Iranian Revolution
and its values. Unlike their predecessors, they never experienced the leadership
of Imam Khomeini or the influence of his speeches broadcast from Paris before
the revolution.
Instead, Gen Z is
deeply immersed in social and political spaces marked by globalization,
modernity, and religious tolerance, placing little emphasis on civilizational
and ideological conflicts. Some sources estimate that this generation
constitutes approximately 7% of Iran's population, equating to around six
million people.[1]
Gen Z has been a
driving force behind the protests of recent years in Iran, most notably the demonstrations
that erupted in mid-September 2022 following the death of the young
Kurdish-Iranian woman Mahsa Amini. These protests were primarily fueled by
demands for social and political rights, carrying the slogan "Woman, Life,
Freedom."[2]
Unlike previous
waves of protests, which often centered on economic grievances, the September
2022 demonstrations were unique. Their demands targeted the very foundations of
the ruling system in Iran, particularly regarding social freedoms and the issue
of compulsory hijab (veil) for women.
2- Increasing
boldness and taboo-breaking:
In recent years,
Iran has witnessed a striking decline in reverence for religious and political
symbols—a phenomenon that would have been inconceivable during the first two
decades of the Islamic Republic. Protests have escalated to include demands as
extreme as regime overthrow, accompanied by acts of defiance such as burning
and tearing down images of senior officials, including Supreme Leader Ali
Khamenei.
The unrest has
extended to religious institutions, with seminaries being set ablaze, as seen
in the city of Takestan in Qazvin Province during the January 2018 protests.
Facilities affiliated with the Basij forces—a volunteer militia under the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—have also faced attacks.[3] Even the legacy
of Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, has not been
spared; his home was set on fire during the September 2022 protests.[4]
A particularly
notable trend in Iran has been the rise of incidents targeting religious
clerics, widely reported in the media as the "turban-throwing
phenomenon."[5] These acts have
escalated from symbolic gestures to physical assaults and, in some cases, fatal
attacks. A stark example of this escalation occurred on April 26, 2023, when
Ayatollah Abbas Ali Soleimani was assassinated by a bank security guard in
Mazandaran Province.[6]
3- Impact of
Western sanctions:
Western sanctions continue to exert a profound impact on the Iranian economy, plunging a significant portion of the population into challenging economic conditions. The local currency has plummeted to its lowest value in over a decade, with an exchange rate of 613.55 Iranian rials to the U.S. dollar. Soaring inflation, now exceeding 40%, has contributed to a tripling of poverty rates since 1979, resulting in 52% of the population living below the poverty line. Moreover, the misery index has surpassed 60%, further highlighting the dire economic situation.[7] These economic hardships have fueled widespread public dissatisfaction with the regime's policies, becoming a primary driver of protests against successive Iranian governments, regardless of their conservative or reformist leanings.
4- Public
opposition to foreign entanglements:
Growing segments
of the public and some political circles—particularly within the moderate and
reformist camps—are calling for Iran to avoid involvement in external crises.
Slogans raised during recent protests, such as "Neither Gaza nor Lebanon,
My Life for Iran," reflect this sentiment.[8] Critics argue
that funds Iran spends on regional militias could be redirected to address
pressing domestic issues, especially given the country's abundant natural
resources. Voices within Iran have also advocated for easing tensions and
improving foreign relations to mitigate "Iranophobia," a phenomenon
contributing to severed ties between Iran and much of the world. These strained
relations have consequently had adverse effects on Iran's economy.
Paths to Change
Considering the
factors and motivations previously discussed, Iran's potential for change may
manifest through several pathways, each influenced by the intensity of various
pressures:
1- Recurrent
waves of protests:
Iran has
experienced successive waves of protests in recent years. Following the
widespread demonstrations of 2009, known as the "Green Movement"
protests, other notable waves occurred: the 2017 "Thirst Protests,"
the 2021 "Inflation Protests," and the 2022 "Mahsa Amini
Protests." Iranians possess an inherently revolutionary spirit, with
protests and demonstrations forming a significant part of their historical
memory, dating back to the Persian Tobacco Protest of 1890.
The Persian
Tobacco Protest erupted when the Shah of Qajar, Naser al-Din Shah Qajar, granted
a British company exclusive rights to buy and sell tobacco in Iran. In
response, the religious authority Mohammad Hassan Shirazi issued his famous
fatwa, declaring smoking and the use of tobacco tantamount to waging war
against the Imam of Time (the Mahdi, or the twelfth and final Imam in Twelver
Shia belief). Demonstrations spread across Iran, ultimately forcing the Shah to
reverse the decision.
Subsequently, the
Constitutional Revolution of 1905 laid the foundations for constitutional and
parliamentary governance in modern Iran. Later, the movement led by Prime
Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in the 1950s opposed British occupation,
culminating in the 1979 Revolution.[9]
Recent protests
have unveiled two significant trends: First, the intervals between protest
waves have shortened compared to historical patterns. Second, public
participation and demands have intensified, with each successive wave becoming
more confrontational than its predecessor. Such patterns reflect escalating
public anger and frustration, as each incident serves as a catalyst for further
unrest.
2- Constitutional
amendments:
Calls for
constitutional reform have intensified in recent years, with reformist figures
like Mir-Hossein Mousavi (leader of the Green Movement and former prime minister)
and Mehdi Karroubi (a reformist leader and former parliamentary speaker) at the
forefront. Their demands include limiting the Supreme Leader's extensive
powers, abolishing the position entirely or subjecting it to direct popular
election, introducing term limits for the role, and reducing the powers of
institutions under the Supreme Leader's control. These institutions include the
Guardian Council (also called Council of Guardians or Constitutional Council)
and the Expediency Discernment Council. Simultaneously, reformists advocate for
expanding political and social freedoms.[10]
While the Iranian
constitution allows for amendments in critical cases, such changes require
approval from the Supreme Leader via the Guardian Council he appoints.
Moreover, certain provisions—such as the Islamic nature of the state and the
principle of velayat-e faqih (guardianship or governance of the jurist)—are
considered "supra-constitutional" and immune to amendment.[11]
Nevertheless, the
issue of constitutional amendment holds merit, particularly when considering
the 1989 amendments. These changes institutionalized the Supreme Leader's
absolute authority by ex+panding the concept of velayat-e faqih and increased
the powers of appointed institutions while limiting the authority of the
president and other elected bodies. A similar approach could potentially be
employed to curtail some of the Supreme Leader's powers and those of
institutions under his control, reallocating them to the president and other
popularly elected bodies.
However, such a
development is unlikely to occur without significant pressure on the regime,
whether from domestic sources, external factors, or a combination of both.
Alternatively, it might result from a fundamental change in the structure of
the ruling system itself.
3- New leadership
seeking change:
The selection of
new leaders in key positions in Iran is likely to contribute to
transformations, ranging from structural to superficial, depending on the
extent of changes and the degree to which the deep state permits their
implementation. This analysis focuses on two levels of potential change: at the
Supreme Leader level and at the level of the president, government, and other
institutions.
In the first
scenario, the emergence of a new supreme leader—following the death or
incapacity of the current leader, Ali Khamenei—could catalyze significant
shifts. Such a leader might advocate for limiting the absolute powers of the
Supreme Leader, transferring some of these powers to the elected president, or
even abolishing the position entirely. Particularly plausible is this
possibility if the new leader aligns with the "Montazeri School of
Thought," a clerical faction fundamentally rejecting the concept of
velayat e-faqih. Viewing it as a novel idea introduced by Ayatollah Khomeini,
the founder of the Islamic Republic, this group considers it an innovation
within the Twelver Ja'fari school of thought. Instead, they argue for a focus
on awaiting the return of the Imam of Time (the Mahdi) after the end of his
"Major Occultation."[12]
In the second
scenario, the election of a president with reformist ambitions could drive some
changes. While power in Iran is indeed concentrated in the hands of the Supreme
Leader, the president and their government still possess a degree of political
maneuverability. Although limited, this potential for change should not be
underestimated in the complex political landscape of Iran.
Historically,
presidents from the reformist and moderate camps have achieved notable internal
and external breakthroughs in Iran. Former President Mohammad Khatami and his
reformist movement, which controlled the parliament (Majlis) and municipal
councils at the time, attempted to introduce constitutional amendments limiting
the Supreme Leader's powers. Although these efforts ultimately failed, they
succeeded in bringing a once-taboo issue into public discourse within political
and media circles, marking a significant shift in addressing the Supreme
Leader's authority.
Iran's foreign
policy underwent a substantial transformation during former President Hassan
Rouhani's tenure. The landmark nuclear agreement signed with Western powers in
2015 represented a major turning point in the Islamic Republic's history.
Through this deal, Iran reconciled with the United States and the West,
entities it had long labeled as the "Great Satan." While the
agreement required the Supreme Leader's approval, this fact does not diminish
the pivotal role played by Rouhani and his then-Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad
Zarif in the negotiation process.
In light of these
precedents, the recent statements by Iran's new president, Masoud Pezeshkian,
suggest potential changes on the horizon. Pezeshkian, hailing from the
reformist camp, won the second round of presidential elections held on July 5,
2024, securing 55% of the total vote against his conservative rival, Saeed
Jalili. Based on his campaign promises, it is possible to anticipate moves to
expand political and social freedoms within Iran. Furthermore, Pezeshkian is
expected to pursue more open policies toward both the West and the region.
The success of
these initiatives, however, will depend on Pezeshkian's ability to implement
them without clashing with the regime's deep-rooted institutions, which remain
dominated by the hardline conservative faction.[13]
Scenarios of
Change
Considering the potential avenues for change in Iran, the outcomes and possible scenarios may manifest in one of the following forms:
1- The regime adheres to the current policies:
Should the regime
insist on maintaining its hardline policies regarding both domestic and foreign
issues, it is likely that the causes for change may not elicit a response. The
regime's reliance on its fundamental pillars (doctrinal, political, and
economic) forms the basis for this scenario. Furthermore, support from a
segment of the Iranian population that remains loyal to the regime and its
ideologies provides a popular base for the regime's authority.
In this scenario, the Iranian regime would continue to restrict social and political freedoms domestically while persisting in closing off the public sphere and preventing popular participation in decision-making. Moreover, the regime would maintain its destabilizing regional behavior, threatening the security and stability of the area. Such actions include supporting allied militias, continuing a brinkmanship policy with the United States and the West, and escalating tensions with Israel. These heightened tensions could lead to direct confrontations, as witnessed in April 2024. Additionally, ongoing escalation in the nuclear and missile dossiers would remain a significant concern under this scenario.
2- A more rational
regime:
Several potential
paths for change in Iran could lead the regime to adopt more rational and
pragmatic policies regarding domestic and foreign issues. The scenario
envisioned here is predicated on the regime undergoing internal reforms,
influenced by external pressures, as the next generation of second-tier
revolution supporters assumes leadership. Such a transition would occur more
than four decades after the revolution, in a global, regional, and local
context vastly different from the situation in 1979.
Key features of
this scenario would involve expanding political and social freedoms within the
country and providing citizens with opportunities to participate in the
decision-making process. Furthermore, Tehran would adopt less aggressive
policies towards the region and work to reduce tensions with the West.
Iran has, at certain stages, implemented some of these features. During the presidency of the late Ibrahim Raisi, for instance, Iran pursued a path of opening up and improving relations with neighboring countries. These efforts culminated in the signing of a landmark reconciliation agreement with Saudi Arabia on March 10, 2023. Moreover, former presidents Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani both sought to open up relations with the West.
3- The
“Normal State” model:
The "Normal
State" model posits that certain paths of change in Iran could lead to a
transformation, resulting in a more harmonious state—one that aligns with its
citizens, fosters peace with neighboring countries, and cultivates mutual
understanding with the West and the global community. This transformation,
however, hinges on a fundamental shift in the regime's policies, necessitating
either voluntary or reluctant abandonment of its hardline stance on internal
political and social freedoms.
For this model to
materialize, the regime would need to create space for genuine popular
participation in decision-making processes and ensure a clear delineation
between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government.
Moreover, the phenomenon of "parallel institutions" within the system
must be eradicated, with each institution's powers precisely defined to
eliminate policy variations between them. These variations have significantly
contributed to the hardline policies on both domestic and foreign issues since
the Islamic Republic's establishment.
A prime example
of this institutional discord is evident in the conflicting stances often adopted
by the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Revolutionary Guard on
particular issues. Frequently, the IRGC's position has prevailed, leading to
tensions within the government. This internal conflict was notably highlighted
when former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif criticized this duality, even
submitting his resignation in February 2019. Although he withdrew his
resignation days later following directives from the Supreme Leader, the
incident underscored the deep-rooted challenges within Iran's governance
structure.
In parallel with domestic openness, the regime would abandon its principle of exporting the revolution and confine itself to its recognized international borders, eschewing the "forward defense strategy" of extending its reach. The expansive regional agenda, implemented through intervention in other countries' internal affairs and the use of militias, would be discontinued. Moreover, the pursuit of nuclear weapons would cease, replaced by a peaceful nuclear program for civilian purposes. This new program would be characterized by transparency and clarity, subject to international oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
4- A coup staged by the IRGC:
Several factors
could precipitate a coup by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). These
include overwhelming popular pressure becoming unmanageable for the regime,
demands for abolishing the Supreme Leader position, or the current Supreme
Leader's death or incapacitation without a successor due to internal discord.
Under such circumstances, the Revolutionary Guard might swiftly seize power,
positioning itself as the Islamic regime's guardian.
Such a takeover
would likely spark open confrontations with the Iranian populace, potentially
rejecting these measures. The resulting scenario could devolve into chaos and
civil war, reminiscent of events in several Arab countries. In this model, the
new regime's internal and external policies would be difficult to predict,
likely characterized by chaos and reactionary approaches.
In conclusion,
the political system in Iran rests upon two fundamental pillars: the religious
"Islamic" element and the popular "republic" component.
While the former remains firmly entrenched, the latter has experienced
significant erosion in recent years. A substantial portion of the population
yearns for freedom and change, aspiring to live in peace and harmony with their
neighbors and the global community. The election of President Masoud
Pezeshkian, a member of the reformist camp, potentially reflects this desire, standing
in stark contrast to a system still operating on ideologies and values from the
1970s and 1980s.
Consequently, a
widening chasm has emerged between the regime and its citizens, pointing toward
two potential outcomes: either the regime will acquiesce to the people's
demands for change, or an internal upheaval will occur. Change in Iran appears
inevitable, with the most critical question centering on the nature of the
impending transformation and its ramifications for both Iran's domestic
situation and its foreign policy.
[1] Arash Aalaei, "Iranian Counterculture and Gen
Z", Washington Institute, Jan 4, 2023. https://tinyurl.com/5en6zeat
[2] “Why are Iran’s Protests Different?”) by Hediyeh Omari,
published in the Afghan newspaper Hashte
Subh on October 2, 2022. https://tinyurl.com/mu5v76yc
[3] Coordinated Operations of Youth
Uprising Against the Mullah Regime in Iranian Cities”) published by the National Council of Resistance of Iran
on April 30, 2024
[4] "Protesters in Iran Set Fire to
Khomeini’s House and Qom Seminary
[5] "Turban Knocking… A New Phenomenon In the Iranian
Protests”), published by Asharq Al-Awsat
on October 30, 2022 https://tinyurl.com/3s93zszv
[6] “Iranian President Orders
Security Forces to Investigate the Motives Behind the Assassination of
Ayatollah Soleimani”, published by Mehr
News Agency on April 27, 2023. https://tinyurl.com/bdcf8ufa
[7] The Misery Index in Iran Rises to 60.4%”, published by Iran International on September 19,
2023. http://tinyurl.com/mr3mc738
[8] Sadegh Zibakalam’s account on “X”
(formerly Twitter) from June 19, 2023
Protests
in Mashhad, Iran, in Protest Against Unemployment and Rising Prices) from
France 24, dated December 29, 2017 https://tinyurl.com/2ef9yvdx
[9]
“Gardens of Sorrow: Iran and the Rule of Velayat-e
Faqih”. Mustafa Al-Labbad, (Dar Shorouq, Cairo, 2007)
[10]Karoubi
Proposes the Idea of Amending the Iranian Constitution,” Asr Iran Website,
April 13, 2009. https://tinyurl.com/k6h2c5bw
[11] Article 12 and Article 177 of the Iranian Constitution,
‘The Complete Text of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran https://tinyurl.com/mrxjbpun
[12] Mustafa Al-Labad, pp. 22-24
[13] Susannah
George, Iranian reformist wins presidency, seeks engagement with the West,
Washington Post, July 6, 2024, https://tinyurl.com/yc8396zc