When the term "Superpower" is used in the international relations lexicon, it has typically referred to the United States and Russia (formerly the Soviet Union). In the first decade of the 21st century, however, China started nudging out Russia for second place in this category. Presently, and as we look into the future, Russia seems to be lagging more and more behind—particularly from an economic standpoint. Despite this decline, it continues to outpace China in both its desire and ability to enforce its political will on others, particularly militarily.
Irrespective of their order, these three states will have a paramount role in the remaining years of this decade: All three will interact and engage based on each other's fault lines to fulfill their national interests, and other nations are encouraged to do the same from their own national perspectives.
The Rise of Superpowers
The term "superpower" was first coined by William T. R. Fox, an American foreign policy professor and international relations theoretician at Columbia University in the middle of the last century. It is generally accepted to mean "an extremely powerful nation, able to project and enforce its will upon other states." It is also generally accepted that superpowers have superior influence because of their military, technological, economic, and cultural power as well as governmental policies.
Historically, the Persian Empire is considered to be the world's first superpower. Over the years, it accumulated tremendous wealth, ruling over 44% of the world's population. Thanks to their wealth and respective cultures, Rome and Egypt were also early superpowers. More recently, the British Empire was the first modern superpower, at one point with 25% of the world's population living under its jurisdiction. In our contemporary scenario, the United States, Russia, and China are the predominant superpowers. As for the future—both on the medium and long terms—one may confidently conclude that other states and entities will fall within this category.
What Lies Ahead
As we try to project the incoming world order, scholars and analysts will undoubtedly engage in an in-depth consideration of what political and socio-economic trends are occurring in each of these states and why. I myself may attempt to do so as well at some later date. For the time being, however, the following paragraphs will focus on the immediate or very short term: The remaining six years of the present decade and, particularly, the changing political balance and shifting trends in the United States, Russia, and China. Indeed, one thing all three have in common is that change is in the air.
The Case of China
The Twentieth Chinese Communist Party Conference in 2022 was an opportunity to see both retrenchment and change in the making. With the end of term limits on presidential tenures, an increased focus on security concerns especially in the Asian stage, and cutbacks on private sector maneuvering, a more focused centralized governance system was being reasserted.
I remember personally visiting China in 1976 as a very young member of an official governmental delegation in the midst of the infamous cultural revolution. Superficially, it appeared as a bland, inefficient Goliath with constituencies having limited access to archaic consumer products and a cultural indoctrination symbolized in the spread of standard gray clothing and bicycles. Yet, even then, we could also sense the huge volume of the challenges as well as the pent-up desire for change and creative expression.
By 1978, after the beginning of its reform process, average GDP growth rates reached about 9% and over 800 million people had been lifted out of poverty. The size of China's economy increased almost forty-fold with significant participation from non-state parties.
Looking towards 2025, China is clearly determined to become a global powerhouse in high-tech industries. It is reducing reliance on foreign technologies to enable Chinese companies to compete globally as well as domestically while contending with an aging population, rising debt, and an evidently troubled property sector. However, it has great potential to persevere as an innovation leader and an energy transition power while nurturing significant growth in its capital markets. The country now accounts for the most patent filings and has invested significantly in the energy transition (especially in EV technologies). China's onshore equity and bond markets are the second largest in the world, and it was the top equity capital raising market in 2022.
In the West, all eyes are fixed on the year 2027 as a key short-term marker for China's rumored unification with Taiwan amid speculation that President Xi Jinping has ordered the military to be ready to invade by that year. The president himself, however, has denied these allegations, whether for 2027 or 2035.
It is noteworthy, however, that China's military budget grew by 7.2% in 2024, raising some concerns regionally and globally. The superpower regularly justifies this by attributing the increase to defense and cooperation purposes while noting that the United States military budget is the highest worldwide, more than the following nine countries combined.
The Case of Russia
Since the outbreak of the Ukraine war, Russia first assumed that its "special military operations" would conclusively end without undue delay. Ukraine and the West, however, believed it would be defeated quickly and that its economy could not sustain financing the military operations. All these projections have proven wrong, with military operations at a stalemate (slightly in favor of Russia) and the IMF forecasting a 3.2% GDP growth rate for Russia this year and around 2.8% in the following two years.
After being reelected in March 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin has recently shuffled his senior advisors. Economist Andrei Belousov was appointed as the new defense minister, possibly to address complaints about the inconsistent flow of military supplies. Sergei Shoigu, Putin's former defense minister and close confidant, was moved to a new role as Secretary of Russia's Security Council, replacing Nikolai Patrushev. The latter, a longstanding national security advisor, was moved to another unspecified position. Without violently rocking the boat, these changes could be an attempt to provide a sense of accountability for the war's inconclusive results and extended time frame and to reassert authority, particularly after the infamous Wagner episode where the defense minister was openly challenged.
How Russia deals with Europe, looking forward will be high on the agenda. More urgently, its focus will be on understanding the United States under a reelected Biden or another term for Trump. As a response to Western encroachment and in preparation for the next few years, we have witnessed an increasingly aggressive Russian presence on different global stages. Within the context of calling for a multipolar world and feeding off the corruption and greed of large Western multinationals and governments, Russia's African footprint has expanded in Libya, Sudan, the Central African Republic, Madagascar, Mali, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Cold War slogans have reemerged under the guise of preventing western hegemony along with renewed interest in engaging with China, BRICS, and others.
The Case of the United States
All eyes are on the upcoming American presidential elections, between two candidates who have previously held the title, thus can only serve for one more four-year period at best, are well beyond 70 years of age, and have diverging perceptions of America's roles and responsibilities. While neither of the two candidates is the preferred choice of the core center of their respective parties, Biden and Trump are nonetheless seen as the only nominees who are able to defeat their competitors.
It is likely that the outcome of the election will be decided based on the economy, abortion rights, emigration, and age. Economic policies aside, the other factors just listed are normally not decisive in elections. Both candidates and the issues that will decide their political fate are a clear reflection of Americans' "soul searching," so to speak, as they attempt to determine their identity domestically and their country's role on the international arena. Foreign policy will not factor in much, especially vis-à-vis Russia and China. The Gaza situation could be electorally costly for Biden because of the dismay of both the democratic progressives and the Pro-Israel lobby, neither of whom feel any inclination towards the current president.
Conclusion
I expect the United States, China, and Russia will remain "superpowers" until 2030, at least in that order. That is unless military conflict occurs, in which case Russia would come ahead of China.
All three are in a state of change and realignment, thus will be highly calculative and tactical throughout the 2020s, while at the same time will search for indicators that better define the futures of the other two powers after their present leadership change during this decade or the following one. My real concern is that mistakes made out of bad judgment or miscalculation can still be extremely damaging worldwide.
Biden's reelection would probably entail a continued adversarial attitude towards Russia, particularly since Putin has just been reelected. China is defined as the greatest challenge to America in the present administration's security outlook and, therefore, would be closely followed, particularly on economic and technology transfer issues. The reunification of Taiwan would probably lead to a stronger reaction from Biden. Trump is less inclined towards aggressive engagement with other superpowers or anywhere else. Consequently, strategic aggressive confrontation would probably be less tense under his tenure, especially if coupled with comparable economic gains for both sides.
Regarding Middle East relations, China will continue to grow economically and slowly politically. Russia is on a reactive curve as it picks at Western weak spots to slowly gain strategic assets, especially in terms of logistic facilities. None of the three will really be particularly aggressive or forceful towards Israel or Iran, whether on peace process issues or to cap Iran's potential. Yemen, Libya, and Sudan will be posturing and balancing arenas for the US and Russia, less so for China.
In essence, the strongest conclusion to be drawn is that the roles of the US and Russia will not be commensurate with the past, and China has a good way to go before it can claim leadership if it actually decides this is desirable. Looking forward, from this standpoint, greater openness on all fronts and diversification is thus the best option for Arab States, with a greater dependence on national capacities and regional relations.
