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The Future of Dbeibeh

The dimensions of the current tension between the House of Representatives and the Government in Libya

24 يناير، 2022


On January 17, Libyan Parliament Speaker Aguila Saleh announced that Abdulhamid Dbeibeh's Government of National Unity is no longer legitimate. Saleh stressed the urgent need for a new government, capable of running the country efficiently during the transition period till the elections (which were supposed to be held on December 24, 2021). Saleh's words show that the tension between the House of Representatives and the government in Libya is escalating.

Saleh made this statement during the first parliamentary session he presided over since he resumed his duties as Parliament Speaker. It was supposed to take place on December 24, 2021. The session was attended by both Head of the High Electoral Commission, Emad Al-Sayeh, and head of the Civil Status Authority, Muhammad Baltamr.

 

A Tense Situation

The situation in Libya has lately witnessed several important developments pertaining to the future of Debeibeh's National Unity government (henceforth GNU). These developments can be summed up as follows:

 

1.    The Parliament is calling for the dismissal of the government:

15 MPs petitioned Saleh to dismiss Debeibeh's government and to form a new technocratic government to carry out well-defined tasks.  They accused the government and the Prime Minister of corruption, demanding that the Attorney General investigate these allegations.

In this respect, Saleh commenced the first parliamentary session by announcing that Dbeibeh's government is no longer legitimate, emphasizing that a new government should be formed. However, the two parliamentary sessions which were held on January 17 and 18 did not witness any decision concerning the future of the government and the features of the new roadmap. Instead, they were dedicated to listening to the briefings of the Head of the High Electoral Commission and the head of the Civil Status Authority regarding the reasons why the elections could not be held on December 24, 2021, and the possible ways of overcoming the obstacles which are hindering the success of the electoral process.

At the end of the parliamentary session on January 18, Saleh demanded that the Roadmap Committee proceed with its consultation with Libyan political players as well as with the Constitution Drafting Assembly, so as to submit a final report by January 22, 2022, clearly defining the future of the government and the date on which the elections are to be held.

 

2.    Debeibeh refuses to step down:

On January 17, GNU spokesperson Mohamed Hamouda said that Aguila Saleh's statement is merely a personal opinion rather than the official stance of the Parliament, contending that several parliament members have a completely different opinion, in a reference to certain members who believe that the GNU should remain in office so that further conflicts can be avoided.

Furthermore, several presidential candidates launched an initiative in which they demanded that the GNU remain as a caretaker government. They also stressed that in case the Parliament fails to form a new government, the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum should be restored to its previous role in the Libyan political scene, providing that its members who held government posts, as well as those who were found to be corrupt, should be replaced. In addition, they demanded that the UN impose sanctions on any individual or entity seeking to hamper the elections.

 

3.    UN and international players are expressing concern:

The UN Support Mission in Libya is particularly concerned over the possibility of forming a new government. Stephanie Williams, Special Adviser of UN Secretary General on Libya, announced that the last stages of the roadmap drawn up by the Political Dialogue Forum are scheduled to be carried out next June, which means that the current government should remain in office till that date. Besides, Williams believes that replacing the GNU will not result in resolving the current crisis in Libya.

In a similar vein, international players involved in the Libyan situation support the idea that Dbeibeh's government should remain in office till the presidential elections are held. For instance, British Ambassador to Libya Caroline Hurndall was outspoken about that.   

 

Important Implications

The recent developments have important implications for the future of GNU. Following is a discussion of these implications:

 

1.    The discrepancy between local and international stances:

Given the current circumstances, it is clear that regional players on the one hand and international players on the other hand have remarkably different opinions as to how the transition period should be managed. International players are pushing for elections, both parliamentary and presidential, believing that they should be held within the next months. By contrast, political players inside Libya itself are seeking to revive the idea of beginning with drafting the constitution in order that the elections should be held on well-defined legislative and constitutional bases.  

The international viewpoint was reflected in recent statements by EU Mission in Libya as well as in statements by UN Secretary General António Guterres, which stressed the importance of holding the legislative and presidential elections as soon as possible.  

The UN Mission believes that the GNU should continue to do its duties in order to avoid extending the transition period, stressing that the elections should be held before the end of June 2022. This probably explains why Stephanie Williams has lately toured several countries, including Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Turkey and Russia, in an attempt to mobilize regional and international support for Williams's roadmap.

 

On the other hand, in the second parliamentary session (on January 18), Aguila Saleh announced a new roadmap which is being drawn up by the Roadmap Committee, led by Nasr al-Din Muhanna, in coordination with the High Electoral Commission. Apparently, this new roadmap will involve postponing the elections for months so that the hindrances and controversial issues which precluded holding the elections on December 24, 2021 could be dealt with first. In addition, the new roadmap will entail that a new government should replace Debeibeh's GNU. This scenario seems to be highly likely, as the Head of the High Electoral Commission announced in the parliamentary session of January 17 that a period of 6-8 months is needed so that the electoral process can be properly carried out.

 

2.    The uncertain future of GNU:

The future of Debeibeh's government has not been decided yet. Several MPs are making endeavors to have the government dismissed, accusing the Prime Minister of using the state's resources to promote himself and enhance his connections inside Libya.  

Last September, the House of Representatives passed a vote of no-confidence in Debeibeh's government, but the decision was not put into effect on account of international objections. This means that Debeibeh will remain in office even if the Parliament decides to dismiss him and form a new cabinet, which can polarize the country again creating two parallel governments, in a reproduction of the former political situation in which the legitimacy of the Government of National Accord, led by Fayez al-Sarraj, was contested by the government of the East. According to some estimates, the House of Representatives is likely to vote on the government on the session of January 24. Before this session, Aguila Saleh is expected to hold intensive meetings with several political figures, including a number of presidential candidates, perhaps the most important of whom are Fathi Bashagha (former Interior Minister) and Ahmed Maiteeg (Vice-Chairman of the former Presidential Council) , with the aim of reaching an understanding between the forces of Eastern Libya and those of Western Libya regarding the formation of a new cabinet.

Aguila Saleh had previously held a meeting with Vice President of the Presidential Council Abdullah al-Lafi on January 15 so as to discuss the elections. A rumour spread on social media that an agreement has been reached, whereby a technocratic mini-cabinet shall be formed. Though some MPs denied the rumor, certain sources in the Parliament and the government refused to comment on it, which imparted a degree of credibility to it. In addition, there has been news that endeavors are being made to form a new government led by Fathi Bashagha.

 

3.    Debeibeh's proactive moves:

Debeibeh is making proactive moves to counter the potential parliamentary decision, which would lead to the formation of a new government. He is attempting to reach an understanding with some members of the Libyan Parliament and the Council of State so as to secure their support. A cabinet reshuffle is expected in the upcoming days, with the aim of excluding ministers and officials accused of corruption. According to a leaked recording by Chairman of the High Council of State Khalid al-Mishri , Debeibeh will have the chance to persuade certain Parliament and State Council members to support him in return for nominating political figures close to them for the ministerial portfolios and other government posts which will be empty as a result of the reshuffle.   

 

4.    The possibility of constitutional crisis:

In the parliamentary session of January 17, Aguila Saleh called for the formation of a new constitution committee. The new committee, which will comprise thirty intellectuals and legislators from the three Libyan provinces, shall draw up the constitution within thirty days from the day of its formation. As a reaction to this, Chairman of the Constitution Drafting Assembly Al-jilani Arhoma objected to Saleh's proposal, contending that this will create a new constitutional crisis.

Furthermore, on January 18, Chairman of the High Council of State Khalid al-Mishri held a meeting with the Communication Committee in the Constitution Drafting Assembly, in which it was agreed that the original path of the constitution should be proceeded with through holding a referendum on the draft of the constitution which had been drawn up by the Assembly.

 

Al-Mishri also insisted on coordinating with the Assembly, on the grounds that its members were elected by the Libyan people. This indicates that though the House of Representatives and the Council of State had previously reached an understanding, the relationship between them is more than likely to experience tension again.

 

It is noticeable that the Parliament's desire to form a new government, as well as the fear that the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum may restore its former role in the Libyan political scene, may force the two parties to attempt to find a solution to the problem. This scenario is particularly likely because in the parliamentary session of January 18, Aguila Saleh called for coordination between the Roadmap Committee and the Constitution Drafting Assembly.

 

In conclusion, it can be said that the situation in Libya is becoming all the murkier. It is expected that the current tension between Saleh and Dbeibeh will escalate, which will, in turn, increase the divisions and polarization in Libya. The situation is worsened by the substantial gap between the attitude of international players and that of local players; the West sees the elections as the main priority, whereas Libyan politicians believe that, first and foremost, a new constitution must be drawn up.  

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