Libya’s outgoing Government of National Unity (GNU), led by Abdulhamid al-Dbeibah, failed to host a meeting of Arab foreign ministers in the capital Tripoli on January 21, 2023. The chief diplomats of most of the Arab states and the organization’s secretary-general boycotted the meeting. Representatives of only seven Arab states, including Tunisia’s and Algeria’s foreign ministers, attended the gathering, which was a diplomatic blow to the al-Dbeibah government.
A Consultative Pan-Arab Meeting
The al-Dbeibah-led government failed to meet the quorum required to hold the 158th session of the ministerial meeting. The failure prompted the Tripoli-based administration of Foreign Minister Najla al-Mangoush to rename the meeting and call it a consultative meeting.
1- Diplomatic underrepresentation:
Only seven out of the 22 member states of the Arab League, and the envoys of the United Nations and the African Union, showed up at the meeting. Except for Algeria and Tunisia, which sent their foreign ministers because of strong ties with al-Dbeibah, the participant states downgraded their representation to the level of ministers of state. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates boycotted the meeting.
2- Agnered Bashagha-led government:
The foreign ministry of the government of Fathi Bashagha, appointed by Libya’s east-based parliament, condemned al-Dbeibah government’s call for the Tripoli meeting, saying the move runs against the laws of the Arab League. Moreover, while thanking Arab states that boycotted the gathering, Bashagha urged Tunisia and Algeria to reconsider their positions after they joined the meeting.
3- Al-Mangoush criticizes the Arab League:
Al-Mangoush sharply criticized the Arab League secretary-general for taking sides with a state she did not name and attempting to disrupt the Tripoli consultative meeting. She claimed that the internal regulations or the Charter of the Arab League do not state that the written approval of at least 14 member states is a prerequisite for holding the meeting. She went further to accuse some Arab states of attempting to disrupt efforts to achieve stability and hold the elections in Libya.
Significant Regional Implications
Arab states’ boycotting of the meeting called for the outgoing Tripoli-based Government of National Unity has several significant implications that can be outlined as follows:
1- Undermining al-Dbeibah’s legitimacy:
The failure of al-Dbeibah government to host the Arab foreign ministers meeting reflects receding Pan-Arab recognition of al-Dbeibah government’s legitimacy. This was reflected in al-Manghoush’s angry statements after failure to rally Arab support for the legitimacy of the Tripoli-based government, which she said insists on exercising its full rights at the Arab League.
2- Security instability:
The absence of Arab states at the Tripoli gathering was perhaps also caused by security tensions in the east of Libya, where militias operating there renewed the call for mobilization following a failed assassination attempt on the commander of the 3 Infantry Company led by Ramzi al-Laffaa, which prompted the Warshafana-based militia to threaten escalation and response. The recent tensions coincide with the recent infighting near the Tripoli airport between the RADA Special Deterrence Forces led by Abdulrauf Kara and the 111 Brigade led by Abdelsalam Zoubi.
The al-Dbeibah government sought to organize the Arab ministers meeting to emphasize further its ability to enforce security and stability and control all armed groups in western Libya and, by extension, its ability to run the country until the elections are held. Despite that, the recent security tensions in Tripoli, which forced the government to impose a lockdown on the city to guarantee the security of participating delegations, have discredited this government, especially after the recent clashes that broke out between its allied militias near Tripoli International Airport.
3- Arab divisions about Libya:
The recent developments reflected a division between Arab states about al-Dbeibah’s government. While some states support al-Dbeibah, a majority of Arab states have not recognized his government either because they already recognized the Bashaga government appointed by the eastern-based parliament; or because of their view that al-Dbeibah government’s mandate is over and a new government should be formed.
4- US-Russia rivalry:
The escalation of rivalry between Washington and Moscow about Libya was reflected by an unannounced visit last week by the Director of the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), William Burns, to Libya last week where he met the head of the Government of National Unity Prime Minister Abdulhamid al-Dbeibah and Commander of the Libyan National Army Khalifa Haftar. Later a US delegation including Leslie Ordeman, Chargé d’Affaires at US Embassy in Libya, and Lt. Gen. John D. Lamontagne, Deputy Commander of the United States Air Forces in Europe – Air Forces Africa Air Forces in Europe and Africa, visited Benghazi and met Haftar. According to reports, these visits coincided with intensified meetings between Russian officials and the commander of the Libyan army.
The meetings appear to be revolving around Washinton’s efforts to degrade Russian private military firm Wagner Group used by Moscow to expand influence into the Sahel and Mali, in particular where France’s influence suffered a setback. Moreover, these meetings were held amid much talk about Haftar’s intentions to give up his bid for the presidency to one of his sons, Saddam or Belkacem.
Looming International Polarization
The momentum gathering around Libya can, in the coming period, lead to implications that can be outlined as follows:
1- Weakening Dbeibeh’s influence:
Arab states’ boycott of the Tripolic meeting is likely to impact Libya’s internal balance of power due to Dbeibeh’s failure to rally support for his government’s eroding legitimacy, which is also likely to undermine his influence.
2- Divergent views of Arabs and the United States:
Western reports noted that the current US moves in Libya aim to enable the completion of presidential and parliamentary elections by the end of 2023 and, in the meanwhile, keep the Dbeibeh government in power until after the elections. However, the position taken by Arab states opposes the US bid because a majority of them oppose keeping Dbeibeh in power.
On the other hand, the position of Arab states backs the moves of Aguila Saleh, Speaker of the House of Representatives of Libya, who, on January 25, unveiled his proposal to the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to form a new single government to run the country and prepare for the elections which Saleh said can be completed by the end of November 2023 thanks to existing agreements with the High Council of State and preparations to announce the constitutional base which is meant to regulate the elections.
3- Exacerbating regional polarization:
Rapprochement is likely to occur between al-Dbeibah government, on the one side, and the governments of Tunisia and Algeria, which will deepen intra-Arab division about Libya. This, in turn, will impact the upcoming meeting of Arab foreign ministers in Cairo next month. Fresh tensions are expected about Libya’s representation at the meeting because Algeria and Tunisia insist that the al-Dbeibah government has the right to represent the country. At the same time, a majority of Arab states still do not recognize it as a legitimate government.
Turkey continues to take a vague position on the al-Dbeibah government’s continuation in power despite a recent visit to Tripoli by Turkish intelligence chief Hakan Fidan following a court ruling suspending an energy exploration deal between al-Dbeibah’s government and Turkey.
In conclusion, the landscape in Libya is likely to witness a new phase of regional and international rivalry that can escalate and see the use of various pressure tools despite regional and Arab actors’ attempts to avoid getting involved in new international alignments that negatively impact Libya. Yet, regional actors can play a vital role in shaping the trajectories of Libya’s landscape in the coming period.
