During the recent period, Iran has witnessed a troubling surge in both moral and physical attacks targeting clerics and turbaned men. These acts are carried out by ordinary citizens, who are often not driven by ideological motives. This trend has escalated to the point where the mere presence of clerics in public spaces or streets has become a risky endeavour with potentially unsafe consequences. The instances of attacks observed in Iran underscore a significant aspect: the transition of the protest movement from peaceful demonstrations to the assault of clerics. This shift signifies the failure of peaceful methods and the emergence of social violence as an alternative course of action. Consequently, it is imperative to analyze this phenomenon, considering its growth and proliferation in the Iranian society.
Frequent Incidents
The decline in the status of clerics in Iran is evident through various prominent indicators, which can be outlined as follows:
1. Increase in death and injuries:
Physical attacks targeting clerics and turbaned men have been on the rise in Iran. While specific statistics are lacking, certain sources, such as the Iranian Farda website, claim that the number of incidents has exceeded 30 in the last decade. These incidents are not limited to prominent clerics but also extend to individuals at lower echelons of religious authority.
For instance, on April 26,2023 Ayatollah Abbas Ali Soleimani, a member of the Assembly of Experts, the body responsible for selecting, appointing, and dismissing the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, was assassinated by gunfire from a bank guard in Babolsar city, located in Mazandaran province. On April 29, 2023, two clerics in Qom, the central city known as a stronghold of the fundamentalist movement and the headquarters of religious seminaries, were run over by a passer-by who also stabbed one of them. This incident followed the rare murder of two clerics and the injury of a third in April 2022 at Iran's largest Shiite holy shrine, the Imam Reza shrine in Mashhad. In addition, a cleric was injured while delivering a sermon at the Imamzadeh Muhammad shrine in Karaj, Tehran, in July 2022, while Mustafa Qassemi, a religious seminary teacher in Hamadan province, was killed with two Kalashnikov rounds in April 2019.
2. Intentional insults against clerics:
In the recent protests in Iran, which began in mid-September 2022 in response to the death of Mahsa Amini, a young Iranian woman of Kurdish origin, in a morality police detention center in Tehran, deliberately directed insults to clerics and turbaned men in Iran. The trenf of "turban tossing" emerged, with young men and women sneaking up behind clergymen and removing their turbans, an act that brought about contempt and mockery. The media also reported incidents, where a young man slapped a cleric in public, accusing him of harming his future, and a female attacked a cleric in Tehran's metro station, shouting “Mullahs must get lost”.
3. Breaking taboos and challenging symbols stereotype:
The recent protests in Iran featured noeable signs indicating a growing disregard among citizens for the sanctity of religious and political symbols. Protestors chanted for the downfall of the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, and shouted 'death to the dictator', which may have been directed at Khamenei himself. They also burned his pictures, and those of Qassem Soleimani, the former head of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC's) Quds Force, as well as other symbols of the regime in the streets and public places. The demonstrations also witnessed the hanging of symbolic gallows of "Mullahs" dolls on bridges.
Things did not stop here. Protesters set on fire the ancestral home of Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder and biggest political and ideological symbol of the Iranian regime, marking a significant precedent in Iran's modern history. Deliberate arson attacks also occurred at seminaries, not only during the recent events but previously as well, such as when a seminary was set on fire in Turkestan, Qazvin Governorate, northern Iran, during protests in early January 2018.
Motives & Impact
There is a growing tendency within the Iranian society to criticize clerics and reject their interference in public matters. The following are the main reasons behind this trend:
1. A growing public dissatisfaction with the regime's policies:
Iranian society has experienced significant discontent, both economically and socially, due to the policies implemented by the ruling regime. This has been evident in the recurring anti-regime demonstrations, which have gradually escalated and even called for the overthrow of the regime. As a result, Iranians have directed their anger towards clerics, perceiving them as representatives of the regime. Many attacks on clerics are driven by a desire for revenge against those seen as symbols of the regime. For example, the assassination of Abbas Ali Soleimani involved an assailant who had no prior knowledge of the target. The assailant's anger was unleashed on Soleimani due to the belief that the clerics themselves are responsible for the challenges faced by the attacker.
2. Failure of peaceful methods to achieve demands:
The decline of the recent protests in Iran has led some individuals to resort to violence as an alternative means to demand economic, social and political rights. This shift was prompted by the violent response of Iranian authorities, the absence of clear leadership and the lack of external support. Although the protests have been suppressed, the underlying demands of the protestors remain steadfast. This indicates the potential for renewed upheaval in response to any triggering incident, as these demands continue to remain unmet. Additionally, despite the Iranian authorities’ announcement of dissolving the Morality Police, the introduction of surveillance cameras to monitor potential violators reveals a continued emphasis on surveillance and control. Ongoing strikes by workers in various industries, particularly in oil, gas, and steel, further indicate the potential for violence against religious elites as a means to pressure the state into meeting demands.
3. Blurring boundaries between the regime and clerics:
The nationalization of seminaries and subordination of clerics to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei have diminished their autonomy and influence, which they enjoyed prior to the 1979 Islamic Revolution and Khamenei's assumption of the Supreme Leader role in 1989. Khamenei implemented measures at consolidating his power, including reducing the influence of the Hawza (religious school), providing benefits to some clerics while intimidating others, and restructuring the financial dynamics of the clergy. These include diminishing the influence of the Hawza, providing favors and incentives to some of its clerics, while using tactics to intimidate and fear to control others. Moreover, Khamenei restructured the financial dynamics of the clergy, shifting their reliance from contributions and endowment funds to a system where their salaries became directly linked to the state treasury. As a result, the Iranian turbaned men became obligated to adhere to the directives of the Supreme Leader and abide by his jurisprudential decisions in public matters, creating an unparalleled state of identification and compliance. Consequently, the demarcation between clergy and government officials has blurred within the Iranian society, leading civilians to perceive clerics as an easy target. This perception is mainly due to the limited official security measures and their frequent engaging with the general population on the streets.
4. "Generation Z" does not support the Islamic Revolution’s principles:
The emergence of "Generation Z" in Iran can be attributed to the Covid-19 pandemic. Defined as those born after the year 2000, this generation accounts for approximately 7% of the Iranian population, totaling around 6 million people. This phenomenon can be attributed to the Iranian authorities' imperative to provide internet services to a wide spectrum of Iranian citizens, aimed at countering the prevailing sense of confinement during the pandemic. Simultaneously, it reflects the inability of the regime's institutions' to adequately address the economic, social, and political demands of the people. This new generation of young individuals dissent from the fundamental principles upon which the Islamic Revolution of 1979 was founded, and they do not believe in its ideologies or slogans.
Additionally, there is a strong desire among Iranians to put an end to the accumulation of wealth within the religious elite, a phenomenon often referred to in the media as the "Ayadollar" instead of "Ayatollah." This phenomenon highlights the prominence of financial influence. According to reports, it was revealed that the reason behind cleric Abbas Ali Soleimani's presence in a bank in Babolsar, where he was assassinated, was to receive a sum of 4 billion and 200 million tomans. This incident occurred at a time when a significant portion of the Iranian population is facing the burden of daily living and economic hardships, worsened by ongoing Western sanctions imposed on Tehran.
A Flawed System
These incidents are likely to have various consequences in the near future, with one of the most significant being the growing discontent and dissatisfaction among clerics towards the policies of the regime. The increased threats against them may push the clerics to seek protective measures. Another potential outcome is the adoption of divergent ideologies by the clerics, given that maintaining alignment with the regime’s orientations could pose a risk to their safety. On May 6, 2023, Kazem Siddiqui, the head of the Iranian Committee for the Promotion of Virtue, claimed that the “clerics, a beleaguered segment, bears the brunt of societal oppression and targeted attacks, and are devoid of any privileges or authoritative positions.”
This sentiment is further reinforced by the stances adopted by certain Iranian clerics who oppose the regime's policies, particularly condemning the use of excessive force against demonstrators in recent protests. Notably, Ayatollah Morteza Moghtadai, a member of the Assembly of Leadership Experts is among those who have expressed their opposition. There are also others who disagree with social constraints, such as mandatory veiling, and the monitoring of compliance by guidance patrols. They believe that such measures serve to isolate and alienate the population.
The increasing frequency of targeted attacks on clergy in Iran indicates a growing trend goes beyond individual instances. The circumstances surrounding these incidents suggest that the attacks are motivated by a deliberate targeting of the clerics based on their identity, as they have come to symbolize the regime that has deprived the people of their economic, social, and political rights. It is also likely that the strained relationship between society and the clergy in Iran will endure as long as the regime adheres to its old narrative in dealing with society demands and continues to exploit religion as a mean to bolster its legitimacy and suppress opposition. That is further compounded by the fact that clerics often choose to align themselves under the protective umbrella of the regime to safeguard their own interests and gain personal benefits.
