On April 6, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian and his Saudi Arabian counterpart, Faisal bin Farhan Al-Saud, signed a joint statement in Beijing announcing the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries, which follows a tripartite agreement signed under China's auspices on March 10.
Dimensions of the Beijing Meeting
Upon analyzing the joint statement, we can make several observations, outlined as:
1. Activating Agreement:
Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed to activate a host of terms stipulated in the agreement signed on March 10. Several vital times include a security cooperation agreement signed in 2001 and a general agreement for cooperation in the economy, trade, investment, technology, science, culture, sports, and youth, which was signed back in 1998. Additionally, the two sides agreed to take steps to exchange ambassadors and reopen their consulates within the next two months, as well as resume flights and facilitate visas for citizens of the two countries, including for Umrah.
2. Official visits:
Minister Al-Saud invited his Iranian counterpart to visit Riyadh to join bilateral meetings. The latter welcomed and reciprocated the invitation, which the Saudi minister received positively. The King of Saudi Arabia, Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, also extended an official invitation to the president of Iran, Ibrahim Raisi, who welcomed the initiative. Iran's Vice President Mohammed Moheel indicated that a presidential visit to Riyadh would follow the meeting between foreign ministers in Beijing soon. He also added that his government would extend an invitation to King Salman to visit Tehran.
3. Implementation follow-up:
The joint statement remained generic about the nature of the new agreement. Little detail was shared except for generic terms such as non-intervention principles. Still, the statement did not touch on the official positions on the ongoing war in Yemen, especially since this was a sticking point in the negotiations mediated by Iraq last year.
US intelligence reports revealed in mid-March that the two sides may have agreed that Iran would stop arming Houthi militias in Yemen. The Iran-backed group has been threatening Saudi Arabia's national security and targeting strategic infrastructure. Therefore, if the reports are correct, then an agreement by Iran to stop arming the Houthis would be considered a breakthrough for Saudi Arabia. This also reveals Beijing's role in exerting enough pressure and China's role as a strategic security partner for Saudi Arabia. The latest meeting may have covered this point to evaluate Iran's commitment and progress in settling the Yemeni civil war.
Significance of the Second Meeting
The meeting between the foreign ministers of Iran and Saudi Arabia marks a significant step forward in the normalization of relations between the two countries. Here are the key takeaways from the meeting:
1. China’s commitment towards normalization between Iran and Saudi:
The meeting reflects China's commitment to promoting the normalization of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Beijing agreement, which aims to exchange ambassadors and enhance diplomatic cooperation, is a positive sign of progress towards this goal. Both ministers affirmed their countries' commitment to expanding cooperation and achieving stability, security, and prosperity in the region. Despite the existence of contentious issues, such as the Iranian nuclear program, the meeting demonstrated the parties' determination to pursue normalization.
2. Washington's quest to restore its role:
Washington had sought to derail the Saudi-Iranian agreement, arguing that it does not detract from its regional role. However, US activities revealed that this claim was only partially valid. The Wall Street Journal reported on April 5 that the Director of US Central Intelligence, William Burns, visited Saudi Arabia unannounced. He expressed Washington's disapproval of the Saudi move to normalize relations with Iran. Burns also assured Riyadh of the US's desire to strengthen cooperation on security and counterterrorism.
3. Iran’s openness to the region:
On the day before the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia and Iran met, Tehran announced the appointment of Reza Amri as its ambassador to the UAE. The Iranian ambassador's appointment followed a visit by Ali Shamkhani to the UAE on March 16, during which he met with senior officials.
Iranian think tanks affiliated with the foreign ministry have indicated
Tehran's desire to use the agreement with Riyadh as a platform to launch a
comprehensive dialogue with other Gulf Arab states. This position reflects
Iran's goal of breaking out of the US-imposed isolation by improving relations
with its neighboring Gulf states. Indeed, Iran may leverage its newfound
relations with Arabian Gulf states in its nuclear negotiations.
However, this would require Tehran to make fundamental changes in its
foreign policy, including making serious concessions regarding its regional
activities. Tehran would need to abandon its ambition to dominate the region
and start anew with relations based on mutual respect. If Iran were to make
such changes, the region might enter a new era of stability.
4. Iran facing US pressure:
By normalizing relations with Saudi Arabia, Iran aims to resist Israeli and US pressure. Building diplomatic relations with regional heavyweights would enable Iran to break out of its US-imposed isolation and thwart Israel and the US's attempts to weaken it. This strategy might work, as US Intelligence Director William Burns expressed his government's disapproval of the agreement during his meeting with Saudi counterparts.
The meeting between the two ministers coincided with an escalation of mutual attacks between Iranian militias and US forces in northeastern Syria and Israel's intensification of its strikes on positions belonging to those militias in Syrian territory. These clashes and strikes resulted in the deaths of over 14 members of Iran-backed militias and other high-ranking officials of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Syria..
Possible Trajectories
The resumption of normal relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia could take several scenarios, which are as follows:
1. Partial openness:
This scenario suggests a series of meetings between the two countries to resolve vital outstanding issues, such as the Yemen war. Iran would need to cease its threatening activities, such as drone and missile attacks, while reaching an agreement over its nuclear program may be difficult. Iran would aim to build investment relations with Saudi to ease economic pressure due to American sanctions.
While the agreement could lower tensions between the two countries, it may not lead to a permanent solution because of the complexity of outstanding issues.
3. Return to pre-2016:
Bilateral relations could regress to pre-2016 levels, where a group broke into the Saudi embassy in Tehran. Diplomatic relations might continue, but distrust and tensions could jeopardize any opportunity for settlement because of Iran's inflexibility.
It may be said in conclusion that the potential for success is dependent on Iran’s approach in towards the region in the coming months. Most important of all outstanding issues is the war in Yemen. Iran would have to cease arming the Houthis in order to signal its seriousness towards mending relations with the region. China, however, appears adamant on pushing Iran towards keepings its commitment. In the meanwhile, Washington might step in as a player in this new situation, especially as US director of intelligence increases his visits to Riyadh to strengthen security cooperation.
