Tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan recently flared up again after Azeri troops, on November 2, conducted a military exercise in response to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps’ mid-October wide military manoeuvres along the Azeri border.
Earlier on September 13, Azerbaijan launched attacks on targets in southern Armenia in a bid to seize control of the Zangezur Corridor, on the border between Armenia and Iran. The exclave links Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan region. Iran believes the Azeri attacks are part of an international conspiracy to surround its territory. Tehran vowed to foil any attempts to change the region’s geo-political map.
Signs of Escalation
Relations between Iran and Azerbaijan underwent tensions and escalation the recent signs of which can be outlined as follows:
1- Military manoeuvres on the border
Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC, on October 17, launched a large-scale military exercise along the border with Azerbaijan and, for the first time, deployed temporary floating bridges to train troops and equipment on crossing water obstacles. The manoeuvres drew special attention because of the increased number of involved troops and equipment. Iranian foreign minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian emphasized that Iran will not allow any disruption of its territorial links with Armenia, and that Iran launched another military manoeuvre in the same region to achieve this goal. This indicates that Tehran held the manoeuvres to threaten Azerbaijan and sway it away from opening the Zangezur Corridor.
Azerbaijan did not hesitate to respond to Iran’s provocations and its special forces held military drills on the border with Iran on November 2, which threaten to exacerbate the situation in the Caucasus, if escalation between the two sides continues to accelerate.
2- Opening an Iranian consulate in Armenia’s Kapan city
On October 21, Iran opened a consulate in Kapan city in the Armenian province of Syunik, which came under Azeri attacks in September. The consulate was opened in a hurry even before the internal renovation work was over. The move reflects Tehran’s willingness to send multiple messages, the most important of which is that Iran’s alliance with Armenia is firm and that their ties are set to be further promoted. Furthermore, through choosing a location near the planned Zangezur corridor for its new consulate, Iran seeks to emphasize that the border with its northern neighbour cannot be changed. The move was followed by a visit by the Armenian foreign minister to Tehran, where he met his Iranian counterpart. The two top diplomates underscored the need for further deepening ties between the two countries.
3- Reinforcing economic relations with Armenia
Economic and trade relations between Iran and Armenia have recently improved significantly. Armenia is the only member of the Eurasian Economic Union that has borders with Iran. Following talks between the head of Iran’s Trade Promotion Organization (TPO) Alireza Peyman-Pak and Armenia’s Deputy Economy Minister Narek Teryan, the two countries agreed to launch a production line for Iranian cars in Armenia. Moreover, Yerevan hosted the Iranian-Armenian Business Forum to promote bilateral economic relations to the highest level. Trade between the two countries grew significantly over the first half of 2022 to USD 307, up from USD 224 million in the same period of the previous year. The efforts reflect Yerevan’s plans to attract Iranian investments and open new markets for Armenian manufacturers and exporters. Tehran seeks to establish exceptional ties with Armenia in response to the alliance between Turkey and Azerbaijan which Iran claims is backed by Israel and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
4- Azerbaijan’s imposing tolls on Iranian trucks
In summer 2021, Azerbaijan imposed tolls on Iranian trucks heading to Armenia on the Goris-Kapan highway, which came under control of Azerbaijan following the conflict which broke out between Baku and Yerevan on September 2, 2020 and went on to October 2020, that became known as the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. As a result, Iran is seeking to find an alternative transportation route to Armenia, and launched plans to construct a highway from Tatev to Aghvani to bypass Azerbaijan territory. Moreover, Turkey is determined to complete the construction of the Igdir-Nakhchivan gas pipeline as a partnership between Turkey’s gas grid operator Botas and Azeri state oil comply Socar. This would mean the autonomous region can do without Iranian gas supplies, which inflicts economic losses on Tehran.
Catalytic Rifts
Historically, tensions have always marred the relationship between Iran and Azerbaijan. Geopolitical conflicts between regional and international powers involved in reshaping the political, security and economic landscape in the Caucasus have further exacerbated these tensions. The following are the main causes of tensions.
1- Planning the Zangezur Corridor
Plans to construct a corridor between Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan region, its landlocked exclave inside Armenia, along the Iranian-Armenian border, has provoked Tehran because the corridor would isolate Iran from Armenia and by extension from Eurasia. This means Iran would be deprived of economic and geopolitical advantages, while it is under sanctions for its nuclear program and oppression of protests, at a time when Iran is seeking to become an alternative energy supplier for Europe.
Tehran opposed the plans for the new corridor. Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenie, at a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putine and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan, during the Astana Summit in July 2022, emphasized Iran’s rejection of closing the border with Armenia. Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi reiterated Iran’s position during a phone call with Armenian President Vahagn Khachaturyan.
In a bid to counter Iran’s opposition, Baku and Ankara said that Armenia would give up the corridor in return for economic benefits and access into the Nagorno-Karabakh region. But this proposal was also rejected by Iran with its foreign minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, in a phone call with his Azeri counterpart Jeyhun Bayramov, reiterated that internationally-recognized borders between Iran, Armenia and Azerbaijan should not be changed.
2- Threatening Iranian land transportation routes
Iran views the Zangezur corridor as an attempt to deprive it of revenue from the passage of Turkish exports to Central Asia countries as well as tolls imposed on Azeri trucks heading to the Nakhchivan region located inside Armenia following an agreement signed between Iran and Azerbaijan in March 2021. The agreement which gives Iran access to the autonomous region was signed after Armenia dragged feet on honouring the Russia-brokered truce agreement, signed with Azerbaijan in November 2020, and refused to grant Azerbaijan access to the region. If and when the corridor is completed, trucks will not have to use Iranian territory, and Iranian trucks will have to pay tolls to travel to Azerbaijan and to use the corridor on the border with Armenia.
3- Iran’s concerns over Turkey’s growing influence
Tehran is preparing to counter Turkey’s growing influence in the Caucasus driven by Ankara’s close ties with Azerbaijan and its grand nationalist ambitions in the region. Turkey and Azerbaijan hold regular military exercises the latest of which was “the Caucasian Eagle 2022”, held on September 5 in the Azeri city of Ganga. The two states held other exercises in Nakhchivan region near the Iranian-Azeri border in June, viewed as a Turkish bid to send threat messages to Tehran.
Iran believes the Zangezur Corridor is essentially as a joint Azeri-Turkish project that is backed by the United States and the European Union and that it is meant to create a link Turkey to its ally Azerbaijan and give it access to the Caspian Sea, which will also help Turkey to gain access into Central Asian countries. Moreover, the corridor is the fastest route to India, China and Southeast Asia, which means it will weaken Iranian influence in this region.
4- Iran’s concerns over revival of Azeri nationalism
Iran is concerned that the growing influence of Azerbaijan and Turkey on its northern border, especially after the construction of the Zangezur Corridor is complete, will revive separatist ambitions among ethnic Azeris inside Iran. Iranian Azeris claim a population share close to 22 percent, or 20 million who live in western and north-western provinces. The Iranian regime accuses Azerbaijan of backing separatist movements in these provinces.
It should be noted that Iran was angered by a poem read by Turkish President Recept Tayyib Erdogan during a visit to Baku in December 2020. The poem has connotations of Azerbaijani irredentism. The poem laments how the Aras River, which runs between Azerbaijan and Iran, has separated Azerbaijani-speaking people in Azerbaijan and Iran. Angry Tehran summoned the Turkish ambassador to express rejection of the connotations. This revealed how sensitive Tehran can be about attempts to revise Azeri nationalism, especially by Turkey and Azerbaijan.
5- Iran’s concerns over Azerbaijan’s growing relations with Israel
Iran accuses Israel of supplying Azerbaijan with weapons and military equipment, and that the central Asian country has a huge stockpile of Israeli-made advanced weapons bought from Israel over the past years. Iran also claims that Israel supplied Azerbaijan with attack UAVs and advanced technologies that, along with backing from Turkey, helped Baku make a sweeping victory over Armenia.
In light of the growing relationship between Azerbaijan and Turkey, Tehran accuses Baku of hosting Israeli intelligence agents who took part in carrying out sabotage operations inside Iran mainly against the Iranian nuclear program.
Moreover, on October 1, 2021, the Iranian army held a military exercise named “Conquerors of Khaybar” near the Azeri border, to send threats to Baku over hosting Israeli spies on its territory. In the same context, the Iranian president, on the fringes of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures, held in Astana, Kazakhstan on October 13, criticized Azeri President Ilham Alyiv for “obeying Israel”.
Potential Trajectories
The rift between Iran and Azerbaijan is historic, but is governed by multiple geographic, demographic, economic and security dynamics, as well as the high sensitivity of the Caucasus region which became one of the most volatile arenas of multilateral conflicts involving Iran, Turkey, Russia and the United States. In light of the recent development, disagreement between Iran and Azerbaijan may follow one of the following trajectories:
1- Continued limited escalation
Tehran would place pressure on Azerbaijan to sway it from completing the Zangezur Corridor, seen as a way to impose a siege on Iran currently suffering from economic and political sanctions imposed by the West. This scenario would also see Iran holding large-scale military war games on the border with Azerbaijan, and even conducting limited operations in border areas where Iran believes that Israel maintains military presence to launch attacks on targets inside Iran.
2- Engaging in an all-out military confrontation
Because Baku, backed by Ankara, insists on building the strategic corridor to Nakhchivan and ignoring Iran’s concerns, Tehran may be prompted to opt for fighting a war with Azerbaijan. Tehran believes the corridor means it will be surrounded in the Caucasus and its regional influence is set to diminish while also suffering economic losses. This would lead to calling NATO to intervene in that area, called the “Turkish NATO corridor”. Moreover, Iran has growing concerns over Israel’s presence on its northern border with Azerbaijan.
But the possibility of such a scenario becoming a reality is extremely limited because of geopolitical calculation by involved regional and international players, as well as because Russia will not allow it to break out. Moreover, Iran is not willing to engage in a fresh conflict in the Caucasus while tensions with the West remain unresolved.
3- Russian-brokered de-escalation
Moscow plays a crucial role in controlling interactions in the Caucasus to prevent involved parties from sliding into an all-out escalation. Moscow pushes for bolstering political understanding and economic cooperation between regional countries through the “3+3” format of talks involving the three South Caucasus countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia plus their three big neighbours, namely Russia, Turkey and Iran. Russia hosted the first meeting on this format on December 9, 2021.
Moscow announced that Iran does not have the right to oppose the planned corridor between Azerbaijan and Nackchivan because it runs on Armenian and not Iranian territory. This reveals Russia’s implicit approval of the corridor, which may place pressure on Tehran to accept a compromise on the issue because it is does not need a rift with its ally Russia, which backs its position in the nuclear talks and receives Tehran’s backing for the Russian war on Ukraine.
The conclusion then would be that Iran is aware of the scale of threats posed by the construction of the Zangezur Corridor, set to weaken its political influence in the region while also imposing negative economic consequences. It is hard to tell what would be the Iranian regime’s next step on this issue while it is reeling under ongoing internal crises that would push it towards de-escalation and accepting a compromise while also trying to minimize its losses. It might, however, opt for extra-territorial escalation to distract from its internal protests and woes.
