On May 4, 2022, Fathi Bashagha, the Head of the Government of National Stability (GNS), announced that his government is willing to carry out its duties from outside Tripoli, the capital of Libya. Bashagha said that his government could work from Sirte in central Libya. In addition, Bashagha implied that his government will not enter Tripoli by force, but rather later, in a legal and peaceful manner. Bashagha accused the Governmnet of National Unity (GNU) of seeking to cause a new civil war in Libya.
Bashagha’s gorilla diplomacy
As Bashagha issued the aforementioned statements, he has been maneuvering his way across Libya through the following moves:
1. Bashagha paid Turkey an unannounced visit:
According to several reports, Bashagha paid an unannounced visit to Turkey on April 29 with a high-level delegation consisting of members of his government. In Ankara, Bashagha met Hakan Fidan, the head of Turkey's National Intelligence Agency, as well as Ibrahim Kalin, President Erdogan's chief foreign policy adviser. It is noteworthy that this was Bashagha's first visit to Turkey, since he was designated as prime minister by the Libyan Parliament last March.
2. Bashagha allegedly supports Britain against Russia:
The Times published an article attributed to Bashagha, in which he expressed support for the British stance against Russia's current special operation in Ukraine, denouncing the existence of thousands of mercenaries from Russia's Wagner in Libya.
Besides, he declared that London is considered a major ally of Tripoli, which needs Britain's support to force foreign mercenaries to leave Libya. The article's writer also wrote that Tripoli is willing to help the West limit its dependence on Russian energy.
Bashagha denied writing such an article, stressing that the British newspaper should exercise caution so as to avoid misinforming readers and publishing inaccurate information. However, the British newspaper insisted that the article was written by Bashagha, explaining that Bashagha's team made it clear that the information in it was accurate.
3. Bashagha is calling for a comprehensive national dialog:
Bashagha called for a national dialog in which all Libyan politicians should take part. The Libyan Prime Minister regards this initiative as a step towards national reconciliation. Bashagha implied that his government is willing to enter into negotiations even with those who deem his government a rival or an enemy. As for Abdulhamid al-Dbeibah, he did not comment on Bashagha's proposal in any way. Therefore, Bashagha's initiative is unlikely to be successful.
Furthermore, Bashagha directly addressed armed militias in Libya, expressing understanding for their concerns and appreciation for their role in preserving security. He also expressed willingness to reach an understanding with them, with the aim of building Libya. This is an indication that Bashagha is attempting to win the Libyan armed groups so that they will support him.
Key motives
Bashagha’s moves have key motives that will impact the political scene across Libya, as per the following:
1. Bashagha is seeking to win more support inside Libya:
Bashagha’s decision to work from outside Tripoli can be interpreted as an attempt to win favor with more players inside Libya. This is particularly obvious from his intention to choose Sirte, rather than Tobruk, as a base for his government. Choosing Sirte is meant to show that he is adopting a neutral attitude towards all parties rather than representing certain parties. Thus, Bashagha would be able to win favor with all active players in Libya.
2. Bashagha is attempting to establish a new status quo:
According to some analysts, Bashagha’s decision to work from Sirte may be an attempt to establish a new status quo so that he can be on solid ground, which will, in turn, enable him to achieve more balance and flexibility in dealing with the several players in Libya. Furthermore, Bashagha’s decision to work from Sirte can be seen as an attempt to postpone entering the capital, a mission that cannot be safely accomplished without securing full support from regional and international players. As the USA and its European allies are nowadays primarily concerned with the Russian-Ukrainian war and its complicated implications for them, the crisis in Libya has become a secondary issue as far as the West's agenda is concerned.
In addition, Bashagha's decision to choose Sirte conforms with the American vision of the resolution of the Libyan crisis, which was proposed at the end of 2020 when Stephanie Williams, the then-UN Special Adviser on Libya, was leading the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum, which resulted in the establishment of the Government of National Unity. Therefore, this step is expected to meet with the West's approval.
3. Outcomes of the Cairo meetings:
On May 6, UN Adviser Stephanie Williams said that the meetings, which took place between members of the House of Representatives and members of the High Council of State in Cairo, are going to be resumed on May 15. This announcement was made after Williams’ meeting with the Chairman of the High Council of State Khalid al-Mishri.
Resuming these meetings may make it possible for the House of Representatives and the High Council of State to reach an understanding and put an end to disagreements between them. This, in turn, will play an important role in settling the current political conflicts between the two governments in Libya.
4. Attempting to win Turkey over:
According to some reports, members of the Turkish government, who had previously supported Dbeibeh, are highly likely to switch allegiance and start supporting Bashagha. These reports said that decision makers in Turkey are concerned over the hard-line stance that Dbeibeh has lately adopted. Bashagha's latest visit to Turkey gives us reason to believe these reports, especially because Bashagha was particularly discreet about this visit. In addition, the rapprochement between Turkey and Egypt may help the former reach a decision concerning its role in Libya.
Though international reports have repeatedly stressed the aforementioned idea over the past few weeks, it seems that the Turkish government prefers to vigilantly monitor the developments in Libya before deciding to officially support Bashagha or Dbeibeh.
Reshuffling the cards, again:
It seems that the recent developments of the situation in Libya can have key implications, which can be summed up as follows:
1. Influencing Bashagha's alliances:
The claimed Bashagha's article in The Times aroused anger in Libya, especially in the pro-Bashagha Eastern camp. Many objected to Bashagha's foreign policies in dealing with Libya's traditional allies, especially Russia. Libyan analysts, affiliated with the centers of power in Eastern Libya, doubted that Bashagha had consulted with his local allies before writing the article. Others criticized the article's claims that the Libyan National Army has depended on fighters from Wagner since 2014. They implied that Bashagha's opinions may negatively affect solidarity among his supporters inside Libya, and Dbeibeh may see this as an opportunity to turn the tables against Bashagha.
2. Returning to the two-government scenario:
As the West and the international players are preoccupied with the war in Ukraine nowadays, and as Bashagha has so far failed to enter Tripoli peacefully, it is more than likely that the two-government scenario will be proposed again in the upcoming period. However, the analysts who adopt this viewpoint believe that Bashagha's government will not be a reproduction of Abdullah al-Thani's government, which had existed in parallel with the Government of National Accord (GNA); unlike al-Thani's government which did not manage to gain any international recognition, Bashagha's government is supported by several regional and international powers.
3. The dilemma of the budget of Bashagha's government:
On May 9, the Libyan House of Representatives is discussing the draft budget filed by Bashagha's government. This draft budget is expected to be approved (even if amended first). However, this will result in another problem, pertaining to whether Libya's Central Bank will commit itself to allocate the required budget to Bashagha's government in case it is approved by the Parliament, as this will mean that Dbeibeh's government will no longer be able to receive money from the Central Bank. Therefore, if this scenario takes place, Dbeibeh will find himself in an even more complicated position.
4. Dbeibeh's attempt to reinforce control of Tripoli's militias:
Misrata, the most important city in Western Libya, adopts a neutral attitude towards the current political divisions, though its relationship with Bashagha is characterized by relative rapprochement. Therefore, over the past few weeks, Dbeibeh has sought to mobilize support from Tripoli's militias, and allow several leaders of extremist movements to return to Libya. A case in point is the return of Abdel Hakim Belhadj, who, on May 8, held a meeting with Sadiq al-Ghariani, Libya's former Grand Mufti who had been removed from office. This is an indication that Dbeibeh will seek to form alliances with extremist Islamists.
In addition, several news websites published a leaked document that has to do with Dbeibeh, which contained a proposal to form a command-and-control center for all branches of the security apparatus that takes orders from Dbeibeh, who, according to the leaked document, will be the defense minister.
In conclusion, there are several scenarios which the developments of the situation in Libya can follow. Some analysts believe that international players may push harder to convince Bashagha and Dbeibeh to hold bilateral talks that would eventually result in reaching an understanding and putting an end to the current disagreements, whereas others believe that Bashagha's government may gain international recognition. Furthermore, the scenario of armed confrontations is also likely, especially in the light of Dbeibeh's recent moves.
