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Military conscription increases in the Middle East

05 أكتوبر، 2016


The phenomenon of volunteerism in conflict areas in the Middle East is not only limited to acts of humanitarianism, but has expanded to include participation in armed confrontations, both through official forces or within armed opposition battalions fighting alongside terrorist organizations. These groups exploit the state of chaos in countries plagued by conflict in order to expand and recruit both local and foreign fighters, particularly in light of regional and international efforts to eliminate them.

Although this phenomenon is not new, some forces have adopted this policy of conscription in order to address developments in regional conflicts in the area, particularly regarding the conflict in Syria, which has recently gained new dimensions. We can focus on two main aspects of this reality.

The first is that this phenomenon is not limited to regional forces acting within any given area of conflict. Iran, for example, has adopted this policy for many years. Military conscription extends to some international forces such as Russia. There are now indications that mechanisms utilized in the region to achieve the goals of a given country have become internationalized after various international forces became convinced that, from a classical perspective, these tools were appropriate for the nature of armed conflicts witnessed by several countries. This includes the conflicts previously witnessed by both the region and the world in light of the specific features they are now characterized by, especially on a sectarian and tribal level. These characteristics significantly alter the field as the phenomenon spreads on a larger scale.

The second is the upswing of military conscription in areas of conflict in the Middle East. This is not exclusively attributed to economic reasons, although they do represent a key variable in this context, but other considerations related to sectarian and ethnic rapprochement - a cross-border variable - and concern for reducing the cost of direct military intervention also play a role, among other things.

Reflective Indicators

The spread of the phenomenon of military conscription in areas of conflict in the Middle East is based on a number of key indicators which include:

1. Russia recruiting approximately 3000 citizens to participate in armed confrontations in Syria alongside the Syrian regime and their allies. Most were transferred by regime forces and Russian forces to the area of Al-Safirah in the southeastern countryside of Aleppo. Despite the fact that this step was taken around the beginning of September 2016 (according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights), Russia began paving the way for the move in conjunction with the decision to intervene militarily in the Syrian conflict in September of 2015. In October 2015, Russian forces known as the Russian Volunteer Military Movement announced on their website that those who wished to volunteer to go to Syria could participate in military operations alongside Syrian forces under the guise of what they called the, “Russian Mission.”

2. Iran’s keenness to continue forming armed groups and militias that include Shiite volunteers from countries that are home to Shiite sects. Volunteers are drawn from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria to participate in armed battles alongside the Syrian regime. Several reports have noted the large number of fighters recruited by Iran to form what is referred to as the “Fatimid Brigade.” This Brigade allegedly includes between 4,000-14,000 Afghan Shiite fighters who reportedly volunteered in order to defend the Zeinab shrine located in the Syrian capital of Damascus. Other estimations indicate that Pakistani fighters within the Zeinab Brigade number between 1000-5000. This is in addition to the Iranian and Iraqi conscripts Iran sends to conflict areas in Syria to defend their interests and prevent the fall of the Assad regime.

3. A number of foreign Christians have volunteered in the Dwekh Nawsha Brigade. The name of the group is Syriac for ‘self-sacrifice,’ and was founded by Assyrian Christians to participate in military operations against ISIS in northern Iraq, in light of the atrocities committed by ISIS against Assyrians in the area. Some volunteers gained prominent military experience after having fought with armed forces in Western countries, such as the United States. The spokesperson for the Kurdish People’s Protection Units indicated in September 2015 that there were 100 Americans fighting alongside Kurdish militias against ISIS, some of whom had served with US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq in the past.

4. Israeli-Canadian soldier Gal Rosenberg also participated alongside the Kurdish People’s Protection Units against ISIS at the end of 2014 for a period of eight months. She was the first foreign woman to join the war against ISIS within Kurdish militias before returning to Israel in July 2015.

A Variety of Factors

The financial advantages offered for participation in military operations in conflict areas are not the only variable through which the spread of this phenomenon can be interpreted, although it remains the most important variable in this context. Other factors that fostered military conscription in the area can be summarized as follows:

1. Reducing the burdens imposed by military intervention in conflict zones: Russia has clearly striven to recruit Russians and foreigners to participate in military action led by Syria in order to reduce potential human losses if they become more heavily involved militarily in the conflict. This also serves to pave the way for the spread of armed groups loyal to Russia within Syria in light of their continued reluctance (according to several reports) to coordinate with militias loyal to Iran and the Assad regime, such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Shi’ite militias.

2. Keenness not to enter into direct military confrontations: Iran always adopts a policy of proxy wars by establishing local militias in areas of various conflicts which strive to protect Iranian interests and support their role and influence in the country. Examples of countries where Iran has employed this method include Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. The policy was alluded to in recent statements made by Iranian officials which indicate strategic relations linking Iran to these militias. Iranian support for these militias did not decline until the nuclear agreement was signed with the P5+1 countries in 2015.

3. Identification with policies adopted by parties to the conflict: Some leaders of Central Asian and Caucasus countries where Russia enjoys a clear influence have made significant efforts to support Russia’s policies on regional crises. This was clear in the call made by Chechen President Ramzan Kadryov in October 2015 to send Chechen battalions to support Russian military efforts in Syria, and to participate in operations alongside regime forces and allied militias.

4. Response to terrorist organizations’ success in recruiting foreigners: Extremists hailing from Central Asia and the Caucasus have travelled to join ISIS, with many of them having taken on major positions within the organization. For example, Abu Omar Al-Shishany was described as the organization’s War Minister. He was killed in July 2016 and is originally from Birkiani in Georgia. He actually fought against Russian forces in Chechnya before joining ISIS.

Here, one trend now indicates that one of the reasons some countries overlook their citizens who volunteer in armed conflicts in the region can be attributed to a desire to keep local extremists out of their territories. This supposedly aids their ability to maintain security and reduce the likelihood that they will suffer terror attacks committed by the extremists, some of whom may attempt to return to their home countries.

5. Dissatisfaction with Western countries’ roles in fighting terrorist organizations: Several reports have indicated that one of the factors motivating some foreigners to volunteer in conflict areas includes the unsatisfactory results (in their view) of those countries’ efforts in the war against ISIS. ISIS is still capable of striking these countries, as was clear through the ISIS-orchestrated attacks on Brussels and Paris. In other words, some foreigners with military capabilities have participated in the conflict because they undertook military missions as part of the armed forces of their home countries. These fighters believe that their contributions may expand the scope of human and material losses suffered by ISIS due to the military strikes the group has been subjected to.

6. The egregious abuses committed by ISIS in areas inhabited by minorities: Some Christian foreigners have moved to fight alongside territorial militias formed in various areas of northern Iraq to defend themselves against attacks mounted by ISIS, especially following the abuses suffered by minority communities such as the Yazidis and Assyrians.

Overall it can be said that the phenomenon of foreigners volunteering to fight in areas of conflict in the Middle East will likely increase throughout the coming period, due to the low probability of a political settlement to regional crises being reached as a result of the expansion in disputes between relevant parties.