The power structures in the Eastern Mediterranean region have witnessed major changes throughout the past decades. After Cairo has had a conventional role in the Mediterranean basin; the balance has changed in favor of other regional Arab and Non-Arab powers. This resulted in obvious repercussions that influenced the interactions of the regional system on one hand, and those between Cairo and Ankara on the other.

The most probable is that the policy exercised by US President Obama towards the region since his assumption of office led to the retreat of Washington’s influence, which encouraged Moscow and regional powers to return to the Eastern Mediterranean region, primarily Egypt and Turkey. The first shifted from a preventive policy to dashing into foreign policy to defend its interests, while the latter has been oriented to underline its regional presence and to attempt to dwarf the Egyptian presence in the Mediterranean basin, especially after the isolation of former President Mohamed Morsi and the failure of the Political Islam project to control power in several of the Arab spring countries.

While the number of  energy and oil exploration projects are increasing in the Mediterranean region through complementary and conflicting  policies between the international or local actors, confrontation exists between the Eastern Mediterranean basin States, specifically Cairo and Ankara, especially with Cairo’s extended leverage within the Mediterranean, whether through direct or indirect policies.

Demarcation of maritime borders: features of a crisis

With the rising hopes regarding oil and gas discoveries in the Mediterranean basin, the region's states entered a phase of spite and tension. A study issued by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) in 2010 estimated the volume of gas reserve in the Eastern Mediterranean basin to be 345 trillion cubic feet. This basin also contains enormous amounts of oil reserves estimated to be 3.4 billion barrels, in addition to great amounts of liquefied gas.

Thus, the Eastern Mediterranean region became the focus of international attention after Southern Cyprus has announced on December 28th, 2011 the discovery of its first gas field off its southern shores, whose reserve is estimated to be 5-8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. This discovery is considered the first of its kind in the south of the island.

Despite the coordination opportunities that emerged between some of the basin states, foremost of which are Egypt, Greece and Cyprus; the overlap of maritime borders between Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, Lebanon, Turkey and Greece resulted in an unseen conflict and a competition to win the enormous energy reserves, especially that Israel and Cyprus have already started utilizing some fields.

Most probably Cyprus’ search and exploration within economic zones -it deems its own- has relatively caused damages to Egypt, and aroused Turkey’s concerns, especially that Turkey has engaged with Greece decades ago over demarcation of maritime and aerial borders between them in areas in the Aegean sea. At the time Greece and Cyprus succeeded to stir stagnant water in regards to demarcation of maritime borders with Egypt -which was unveiled by the meetings between officials from the three countries throughout the past three months- the Cypriot-Turkish relations has exacerbated  due to the escalated tensions related to the Cypriot decision to start exploring for gas in the waters in the far south-east of its exclusive economic zone.

The maritime areas that the countries claim for commercial utilization are known as exclusive economic zones, and are normally governed by the United Nations Law of the Sea or bilateral agreements between the neighboring countries that normally agree on equidistant borders from the shores.

According to the concept of the exclusive economic zone, the state has the right to utilize and explore maritime resources. The law defines this zone as “200 nautical miles” starting at the state’s land baseline, which is the line marking the boundary between the land and outer sea, each and every country deposits a group of coordinates of points determining the baseline of this state. On the contrary, Ankara doubts Greek Cyprus’ right to explore oil and gas; Cyprus –the EU member- rejected the Turkish statements and determined its exclusive economic zone in 2004, and demarcated its maritime borders with Egypt and Israel since then.

And at the time the Egyptian Interim President Adly Mansour signed an agreement in December 2013 –which aroused a wide controversy over the 10 km wide exploration area along the Egyptian-Cypriot borders, at the Egyptian side of the halfway line- the conflict over the Eastern Mediterranean gas has recently escalated as Turkey dispatched a research vessel, supported by a maritime force, to the joint exploration area between Turkish and Greek Cyprus, which accordingly aggravated tension in the region.

The Government of Ankara does not recognize the legitimacy of the agreements demarcating the exclusive economic zone that Cyprus has signed with Egypt, Lebanon and Israel; as Cyprus is still a divided island, and theoretically cannot represent the interests of Northern Cyprus. Turkey also has demands in the continental shelf, starting from west Cyprus to the midline between Turkey and Egypt, which partially overlaps with a part of the Cypriot exclusive economic zone. Moreover, the Turkish hypothesis about the stance towards Cyprus is still a legal controversy, as a considerable sector of legal experts believe that Ankara’s argument might be considered when it comes to the small or rocky uninhibited islands; however, it is inapplicable for Cyprus.

The third law of the sea: conflicting interpretations

On November 16th, 1973, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) –launched by the UN General Assembly- was adopted, and was tabled for discussion at the 3rd UN Conference, held in New York in December 1973. The Convention was completed in 1982 and states were invited to sign it; then entered into force on November 16th, 1994. Egypt was among the signatories and ratified the convention in 1987, while Israel and Turkey did not sign.

This convention had been reserving the rights of the Eastern Mediterranean States till April 19th, 2004, until Egypt and Cyprus signed an agreement on the demarcation of maritime borders between the two countries, based on which the two countries shared the economic waters equally. And when the United States Geological Survey (USGS) announced, in March 2010, the existence of enormous gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean, in the area between Egypt and Cyprus, Israel signed an agreement on the demarcation of borders with Cyprus on December 17, 2010 without referring to Egypt.

There has been muffled tension between Cairo and Cyprus, given the individual Cypriot exploration in fields that fall under the Egyptian sovereignty. Concern was overwhelming relations until meetings were held between the Egyptian President and his Cypriot and Greek counterparts, during which they agreed upon re-demarcating maritime borders, as well as  considering the agreement Egypt had signed with Cyprus; provided that any amendments should be negotiated between all parties to serve the Peoples of the three States, not a single State in particular.

More likely, the re-communication between Egypt on one hand and Greece and Cyprus on the other is connected to the political tensions between Cairo and Ankara since the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood and Erdogan’s insistence on naming what happened on June 30th a “military coup”.   

Thus, the communication between Cairo, Cyprus and Greece might affect the Turkish interests. If Egypt succeeded to adjust the maritime borders with Cyprus -that were agreed upon in 2004- and to amend the agreement on demarcating borders signed in 2010 between Cyprus and Israel to stipulate sharing the rights to explore gas in “Leviathan” gas field which is under Israeli control, and “Aphrodite” gas field which falls under the Cypriot control, there would be negative repercussions on Turkey that persists that the full economic zones are determined according to the borders of the states solely, not the islands. Not to mention that Turkey believes that any negotiation between Cyprus, Egypt and Israel on the maritime borders would be insignificant as Northern Cyprus is not represented in the negotiations.

Cairo and Ankara in the Mediterranean: victories and defeats

Despite the fact that Turkey seemed to be re-positioning its geographic and political role in the Middle East since 2002; and has developed a foreign policy -at the current stage- that completely differs from the traditional one it has been exercising; in addition to being diplomatically and strategically effective under the leadership of the Justice and Development Party through the active re-positioning after the retreat of its regional role and after its foreign policy towards the neighboring countries -which is based on “zeroing problems”- has been exposed to violent tremors following the Arab uprisings, Turkey is currently rushing towards embarking on disputes with a number of the regional actors in the region, foremost of which is Egypt.

Tension re-emerged between Turkey and Turkish Cypriots after the Turkish Cypriot Leader Mustafa Akinci won the presidential elections in Northern Cyprus in early May 2015. Greek Cyprus welcomed –for the first time- the election of a new president for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Akinci called for what he considered as correction of relations between Ankara and Northern Cyprus, and rejected an expression used by the Turkish State to describe this relation as fraternity between a brother and his young sibling, and said: “it is time for the young brother to grow up and sit with his sibling”.  The Northern Cypriot Leader also expressed his rejection of Ankara’s imposition of “guardianship” on Turkish Cypriots, pointing out his preference for “unifying the two parts of the island and settling the Cypriot issue”.

These developments affected Turkey’s image and power in the Eastern Mediterranean region, and the Turkish position became more confused, especially that Egypt, Cyprus and Greece signed “Nicosia Declaration” on April 29th, 2014, which stipulates commitment to mobilization of all potentials to support joint interests through a tripartite consultation mechanism that regularly convenes at various levels with the objective of working on releasing the region’s full potentials. The declaration added that the discovery of significant oil and gas reserves in east the Mediterranean would catalyze regional cooperation.

Despite the fact that Ankara funds one third of the Turkish Northern Cypriot budget since the split in 1974; Akinci’s choice reflects the conviction reached by the inhabitants of the two parts related to the feasibility of the reconciliation that enables them to work together to benefit from the island’ share of the enormous reserves of gas and oil in its territorial waters, which is shared with several neighboring countries, excluding Turkey that does not hide its aspiration to the Turkish Cypriots’ share.

Therefore, the winning of the moderate Akinci might add to the difficulty of the Turkish existence in east the Mediterranean, as he hopes that the recently discovered gas wealth would eliminate the obstacles facing the diplomatic negotiations on unifying the two parts of the Cypriot island. In addition, Akinci does not want Ankara to use the Cypriot issue to bargain with Cyprus and Israel about extending the gas line through Turkey with Ankara’s conditions, so that the Cypriot issue remains frozen till the Turkish Government secures its economic interests. 

The gist of the argument is that there are unseen and declared conflicts among the Eastern Mediterranean basin states, fueled by the gas and oil discoveries on one hand, and the cooperation and conflict frameworks between the basin states on the other; thus, at the time Egypt, Greece and Cyprus achieved significant progress in strategic cooperation, conflict continues between Greece and Cyprus on one hand and Ankara on the other.