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The Spark at Sidi Hassine

The Tunisian Protests Between Possible Escalation and Containment

16 يونيو، 2021


The stripping of a young man on June 8, by Tunisian police in the district of Sidi Hassine, west of the capital Tunis, has sparked a wave of angry protests that swept the whole country. The popular tensions do not stem only from a rejection of violations by the security forces of the cabinet headed by Hichem El Mechichi. Rather they are being stoked by the escalating political polarization among the presidency, the cabinet and the parliament. This is accompanied with the underperformance of state institutions failing to carry out their essential functions, in addition to the deteriorating living conditions, the messy monetary policies, increasing reliance on borrowing from other countries, while at the same time cutting subsidies. All of this triggered the recent wave of protests.

 

Diverse Motivations

 

Although the obvious main causes of the protests in Tunisia are linked to the populous rejection of abuses of the government security forces, there are still several other reasons behind the demonstrations. These could be understood as follows:

 

1.     Intense Domestic Conflicts: The current anti-government protests cannot be isolated from escalating internal conflicts between the three main state institutions, and from the preoccupation of the various Tunisia’s political forces regardless of their orientation to achieve their personal gains without paying attention to the mechanisms installed to deal  with the current economic crisis hitting the country. For instance, tensions escalated between the presidency and the parliament and were reflected in the president’s refusal to approve a draft law on the constitutional court, which was unanimously passed by the parliament on March 25. The president justified his position by saying that the constitutional deadline for forming the court has already passed. On the other hand, the parliament, led by Ennahda Movement, seeks to amend the electoral law. On April 20, Ennahda introduced a new bill on the amendments, which basically seek to strip the president from the authority to call for meeting electoral deadlines and have these powers transferred to the government.  Relevant tensions began to build up in January when Prime Minister Hichem El Mechichi, prompted by Ennahda, carried out a major cabinet reshuffle without consultation or coordination with the president of the country.

 

The move prompted the president to refuse to receive the newly-appointed ministers and to issue presidential decrees on their appointment. In the latest chapter of political bickering between the state’s two major seats of power, the prime minister’s latest decision to fire Imed Boukhris, President of the National Anti-Corruption Authority (INLUCC) causing widespread controversy on the political scene, which prompted President Kais Saied to intervene and reject the decision.

 

2.    Lack of Trust:  A lot of citizens became firmly convinced that the real goal of parties in power in Tunisia is not to find solutions to the worsening living conditions across the country, but to secure their influence and further their presence on the political scene. This is demonstrated by the endeavors of those parties to exploit the state institutions to serve their political maneuvers, as well as to adopt strict interpretations of the constitution to achieve their own interests. In Maym, results of a recent survey conducted by Sigma Conseil, showed a decline in Ennahda Movement’s popularity, in addition to the fact that the traditional support for the president also eroded, although he continues to lead in terms of voting intentions for the presidential elections set to be held in 2023.

 

3.     Worsening Living Conditions: Tunisia is facing an evident  deterioratation  

of the living conditions due to the mounting economic crisis that hit a peak because of the fallout of the Covid-19 pandemic. The crisis struck all sectors of the Tunisian economy namely tourism, which is the powerhouse of the economy, as well as the negative impact of structural reforms introduced by the government on fixed-income people and the middle class. This was highlighted by recent intense efforts to gradually remove state subsidies for goods and fuel, while also increasing taxes. The suffering of Tunisian citizens reached an unprecedented height due to the continuous currency depreciation, rising unemployment which reached 17.8 per cent and inflation, which hit 4.9 per cent.

 

Potential Scenarios:

 

It can be safely said that a number of scenarios have been materializing due to the current popular protests, which can impact Tunisia’s political landscape. These can be explained as follows:

 

1-    Containment of Controversial Issues: The popular protests may push the opponents within the political forces to reach a mechanism to address the current crisis facing the country. The current demonstrations represent a favorable opportunity to revitalize an initiative proposed by the he Tunisian General Labour Union in late December to promote national dialogue. Under the initiative, a rescue plan would be developed to pull the country from political, economic and social crises through the creation of a council of elders bringing together a number of independent national figures from all walks of life. The council would be tasked with overseeing a national dialogue that leads to reforms in all sectors. But this scenario seems unlikely in the short term, especially because of successful attempts made by the presidency and some opposition parties over the past months to form an undeclared alliance to block the influence of Ennahda Movement. On the other side, Ennahda Movement continues to push towards bolstering and using El Mechichi’s cabinet to impose its own political and social orientations, which provokes the present and the secular opponents of Ennahda.

 

2-     Ongoing Confrontation: On the eve of the death of the Tunisian young man, who was arrested by the police on June 8, President Kais Saied sought to exploit the incident to attack his opponents. On June 11, implicitly referring to Ennahda, he accused what he called ‘lobbies that work behind the scenes of fabricating crises to stay in power’. Additionally, Ennahda does not seem to be willing to allow political dialogue with the authority represented by the president. This was evidenced by recent moves aimed at limiting the president’s powers through introducing amendments to the electoral law. Within this context, continued popular protests remain the likeliest scenario especially in light of the deadlock on the political landscape, and Ennahda’s push to escalate its rhetoric against its opponents following the recent protests. Since June 9,  Ennahda’s leaders have been promoting claims that Rached Ghannouchi, speaker of the parliament and the head of the Ennahda Movement, is being targeted by an assassination plot. The movement noted that the competent authorities on the ministry of interior informed Ghannouchi of a ‘serious assasination threat against him.’

 

3-    Resignation of the Government: Due to the wave of protests and the failure to resolve crises hitting the living conditions, El Mechichi’s government may move to resign; especially since trade union organizations, parties and human rights organizations hold the head of the government, who is also acting minister of interior, responsible for the death of the young man in Sidi Hassine. Additionally, several organizations and associations renewed their call for the resignation of the government.

 

This scenario, however, remains contingent upon Prime Minister Hichem El Mechichi’s conviction that his efforts have failed to make a breakthrough in resolving the crisis, and that his continued presence in the political landscape might very well exacerbate political division. At least the resignation of the government will remain contingent upon the possibility that Ennahda would give him up as well as upon its conviction that naming a new government would help it whitewash its image, on the one hand, and contribute towards containing popular pressure, on the other.

 

In conclusion, it can be safely said that protests across Tunisia are likely to mount in light of the increasingly intense political polarization across the country and the Tunisian people becoming tired of all political powers altogether.