A recent sixth round of Syria peace talks held on September 14 and 15 in Astana resulted in establishing a fourth in a series of so-called de-escalation zones in Syria. The four powers backing rival sides in the Syrian war agreed to establish the fourth combat-free zone in and around the northwestern Syrian province of Idlib. The 10-clause agreement also produced three new mechanisms that were not agreed upon in the previous round of talk. The three guarantor nations - Turkey, Iran and Russia- agreed to deploy military forces to monitor for violations in the new zone, set up a trilateral commission to coordinate monitoring for violations, as well as invite the international community to take part in humanitarian relief operations and reconstruction across Syria.
This is the first such agreement between the three nations that reflects an advanced stage of understandings. Moreover, it is the first round of peace talks to witness consensus on the agreement among involved parties, and allow Turkey to deploy troops in opposition-held areas. Based on the tactics pursued by parties to the agreement for Idlib province, it can possibly be argued that the outcome of the agreement can bring the situation in Syria to a new course.
Undoubtedly, this outcome cannot be separated from other developments taking place on the ground in areas surrounding Idlib Province. In Deir Ezzor in the east, the Bashar Assad’s forces crossed the Euphrates River to the eastern bank, a move that improves the benefits that both Syria and Turkey can reap from the anticipated confrontation with the Kurds, despite all conflicting statements made recently.
However the de-escalation agreement faces several challenges arising primarily from a lack of announced details on the envisioned enforcement mechanisms that the involved parties are currently negotiating. Moreover, the positions of parties not involved in the agreement continue to be ambiguous.
New Approaches
The primary goal in the ongoing conflict is currently not to combat ISIS or Fatah al-Sham Front (formerly al-Nusra Front) although it is clearly stated in the sixth clause of the de-escalation agreement. That is, priority was rather given to engineering the influence zones of the three involved powers, Turkey, Russia and Iran, which is more clearly reflected in the fourth clause of the agreement that states clashes between warring parties should be prevented.
Moreover, Turkey’s approach to the conflict in Syria is no longer strictly aimed at confronting the Assad regime. This was evidenced by clear signs of rapprochement between the two sides despite a war of words about the legitimacy of Turkey’s presence in Syrian territory. Most recently, the foreign minister of the Assad regime stressed that the agreed de-escalation zones are a temporary arrangement and that presence of any foreign troops in Syria’s territory without the consent of the government is considered a form of occupation.
The development cannot be dissociated from a noticeable rapprochement between Turkey and Iran especially about the controversial independence referendum held in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region on September 25, 2017. Iran has closed its border with the Iraqi northern region at the request of the Iraqi central government, a move welcomed by Turkey which also strongly opposes the referendum.
This convergence is likely to help settle significant differences between the two states about some arrangements for a settlement in Syria that led to failure to reach significant results at the fifth round of the Astana talks.
According to several reports, Turkey’s approach is based on capitalizing on its presence on the ground in Idlib using the province as a launching pad for attacks on Kurdish militants. Moreover, once the Assad regime’s forces crossed to the eastern bank of Euphrates River, it turned out that the regime’s goal was to fight the predominantly-Kurdish militia called Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and not ISIS. Again, the development played into the hands of Turkey’s strategy for curtailing the expansion of Kurdish militias in eastern Syria.
Different Mechanisms
According to the de-escalation agreement, the three states would deploy their forces to patrol the fourth de-escalation zone in Idlib province, a mechanism that was not previously agreed with Turkey. Accordingly, the legitimization of Turkish military presence in Syria’s territory makes Turkey a key partner, along with Russia and Iran, in sharing influence in the Syrian northwestern province. This view is supported by the following signs:
1- Deployment of a Joint Observer Mission, as per the fourth clause of the de-escalation agreement. The Head of the Russian delegation to the 6th round of Astana talks, Alexander Lavrentyev, said Russia, Turkey and Iran will each send about 500 observers to Idlib, and the Russians will be military policemen.
2- Joint Action Commission, a new body set up according to the fifth clause of the agreement. Previous de-escalation zones were jointly managed by Russia and Iran.
3- Attracting International Support for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Operations. The communique issued after the Astana talks called upon the international community to contribute towards reconstruction efforts, humanitarian aid, establishment of stability in Syria and expansion of the scope of arrangements for de-escalation zones.
Potential Challenges
Despite the remarkable consensus between the three nations sponsoring the Astana talks, a discrepancy between the agreement itself and developments taking place on the ground cannot be ignored. This is likely to pose the following challenges to the agreement:
1- Determining the Functions of Deployed Troops. While the communique notes that military police will be deployed to patrol de-escalation zones, Turkey is talking about a deployment of military forces simultaneously with its deployment of combat units on the ground at the border with Syria.
2- Limited Number. The small number of the observer mission would not be adequate for the situation in Idlib province, where several parties including the Free Syrian Army (FSA) which opposes any Iranian and Russian presence, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HST), which is loyal to al-Qaeda, which rejects any Iranian role or presence.
3- Commitment to Set Missions. There are views doubting that some involved parties would adhere to the outcome of the last round of Astana talks. For instance, Turkey might not be content with the agreed missions and would take advantage of the new arrangements to carry out acts of attrition to exhaust Kurdish forces. Russia too would use the same tactics. Although it emphasized that its goal is to de-escalate tensions, it announced that 35 armed factions, including illegal armed formations, were prepared to join the the regular army in the Idlib de-escalation zone. This means, according to certain views, that troops that took sides with the regime would carry out combat missions and not only observer operations.
4- Geopolitical Division. It is perceived now that Idlib will be divided into three areas of influence between the involved powers. This implies that the outcome of the peace talks does not provide for deployment of joint forces.
5- Excluded Parties. Although Russia convinced the opposition forces to accept the de-escalation agreement, there are still multiple hardships blocking them from accepting Iran’s presence in Idlib. Moreover, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham is not party to the agreement and has not sent signals that it would accept a role for Iran or the Assad regime in this province. Hence, the situation jeopardizes guarantees given by the three countries for the enforcement of this very agreement.
That said, it can possibly be concluded that the latest round of Astana talks has helped in reaching new security arrangements that can potentially impose repercussions in the course of the conflict in Syria. That is, areas of influence and control have taken shape, relatively speaking, and a new track for understandings between the three countries sponsoring the negotiations that would contribute towards shifting balances of power between warring parties. Accordingly, the regime would entrench its positions against the opposition in the next round of Geneva talks, and pressures would mount on the Kurdish militias that are likely to be involved in confrontations with Turkey, Iran and the Assad regime in the coming period.
