The message sent by Iran to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on March 16, 2017, concerning its production of heavy water indicates Tehran's willingness to indirectly threaten that it would be capable to resume the development of its controversial nuclear program. Regional and International powers have raised concerns that have not ruled out the possibility of having a military aspect to the Iranian nuclear program.
However, at the same time, these threats do not negate the fact that Iran seems to be in dire need of continuing its commitment to the nuclear deal with the P5+1 group of world powers. Some views perceive that it is only exploiting some phrases in the text of the agreement that can be interpreted in several different ways in order to expand its options for countering international pressures. The United States, in particular, may see this step as an indication to Iran's non-compliance that in turn, can prompt Washington to pursue a stricter policy towards Tehran.
Widespread Controversy
Iran also sparked a dispute with regards to its ballistic missile tests. It justified those tests by alleging that these missiles were not designed capable of delivering nuclear heads. Accordingly, Tehran claims that they were not in defiance of the United Nations Security Council’s resolutions banning it to conduct such tests. This has already sparked a debate between the world powers involved in the nuclear agreement, namely the United States and Russia. Additionally, Tehran raised a fresh dispute over its stock of heavy water that was planned for use, before the nuclear deal was reached, at the Arak nuclear reactor to produce plutonium.
Iran, however, deliberately responded to pressures from the United States that sought to force Tehran to fully meet its commitments under the nuclear accord. During a meeting of the IAEA in March 2017, Washington stressed that any heavy water in excess of the cap of 130 metric tons cannot remain in Iran and should be shipped out of the country for sale in the international market.
As reported by Reuters, Iran had sent a letter to the IAEA on March 16, 2017 saying that, “nothing in the (agreement) requires Iran to ship out the excess heavy water, which is made available to the international market, but has not yet found an actual buyer to which the heavy water needs to be delivered”. Iran further sent signals that it might accelerate its production of heavy water to reach the 130-ton limit by May this year, where it had 124.2 tons on its territory in February.
Multiple Aims
Iran appears to be seeking to achieve multiple aims through the recent escalation. The following four stand out in this regard.
1- Iran seeks to prove that it is capable of resuming the development of its nuclear program, if the implementation of the nuclear deal is halted due to pressure from the United States. From the Iranian perspective, Tehran could face a significant reduction of revenue that it sought to generate from the accord, particularly at the economic and technological levels. Such concerns were raised following the United States’ latest imposition of sanctions against some companies and individuals accused of supporting Iran’s ballistic missile program.
2- Iran wants to send a message to world powers. Iran wants to convey that the hard-line policy pursued by the US will not succeed in compelling it to show more flexibility in addressing additional pressure that has transcended beyond the nuclear issue. Such issues include Iran’s support for terrorism, interference in the internal affairs of war-torn states, and the role it plays in destabilizing the Middle East. These issues have received significant attention since the Trump administration assumed office on January 20, 2017.
3- Iran wants to push the world powers to seek other alternatives in dealing with it, instead of constantly ramping up economic sanctions and pressure. According to the Iranian viewpoint, previous attempts have not succeeded in achieving any significant results, namely forcing Iran to refrain from repeating recent provocative measures such as conducting new ballistic missile test-fires.
4- Iran seeks to launch a powerful campaign against the reformists and hold them responsible for the escalated international pressures and sanctions against the country. Iranian Conservatives pretext for the campaign would be that the government of President Hassan Rouhani has made too many concessions during the negotiations of the nuclear deal, and that it was unable to exert pressure on the United States to honor its obligations under the nuclear deal. This is particularly true for the terms that stipulate the lifting of economic sanctions against Iran, and the prevention of new sanctions from being imposed.
Hence, it is safe to say that several views inside Iran still perceive that the country has the upper hand in negotiations, even after it signed the nuclear deal. They think that Iran could possibly impede the involved international powers from achieving their aims through this deal.
Within this context, a significant development is that some Iranian media outlets are implicitly accusing the Rouhani government of colluding with the United States in misleading the Iranian people into thinking that Iran is not capable of confronting the United States. They further accused the government of convincing Iranian citizens that it is better to comply with the agreement, despite the failure of the other party to fulfill their pledges. In these views, Iran, and more specifically its hardline institutions such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, can possibly obstruct such plans through threatening to resume the Iranian nuclear program, and revert the nuclear agreement.
Without a doubt, accusations of this kind will escalate in the coming period, especially in the lead-up to the presidential elections, set to be held on May 19, 2017. Political powers, close to former conservative President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (who will not run as a candidate in the upcoming election as he was barred by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei), are seeking to dent Rouhani's chances of winning a second presidential term. These powers seek to take advantage of the government's failure to exact more economic and technological benefits from the nuclear agreement to support their candidate's chances of winning the elections.
In conclusion, Iran's ability to pursue policies of engaging in disputes with the world powers over specific provisions in the nuclear agreement, and perhaps take more provocative steps, will hinge, on the reaction of the United States. Iranian reaction will further depend on the extent of the United States’ success in convincing the other world powers to exert more pressure on Iran to ensure its literal commitment to the nuclear agreement.
