Several studies show that violent terror groups can only be eliminated by the use of military force. Moreover, Western approaches to combating terrorism in Africa proved to be useless. Very often, violent strategies embraced to combat terrorism fire back because they violence incites more violence and cause highly complicated humanitarian issues. That is why non-military soft approaches are increasingly embraced as a more realistic and pragmatic way of eliminating the root causes of terrorism and achieving sustainable peace on the long term.
Despite that, there is considerable controversy among researchers and policy makers about the effectiveness of non-military approaches that mandate negotiating with terrorists and pardoning former terrorists and dissidents. Recently, when the Somali Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre appointed Mukhtar Robow, AKA Abu Mansur, who is a former commander and former spokesman of the Somali terror group al-Shabab, as Minister of Religious Affairs. While some criticized the move as a reward for those who have innocent blood on their hands, others believe it is a step towards reconciliation and a strategic approach to combating al-Shabab and drying up its sources of recruitment.
This article keeps its focus on the implications of the Somali government’s decision of appointing a co-founder of al-Shabab as a senior official.
From Kalashnikov to Politics
Robow was in jail since December 2018 after the government of former president Mohamed Farmago accused him of forming an anti-state group and attempting to destabilize the town of Baidoa. Robow’s arrest by Ethiopian troops deployed as part of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) triggered violent popular protests in which 11 people were killed. The development prompted the United Nations to extradite him to the Somali government. A team of UN experts later accused the Ethiopian troops of oppressing Robow’s followers during the operation that led to his arrest.
Mukhtar Robow was born on October 10, 1969 in Hudur, a town in the southern region of Bakool. He studied the Quran and Islam in a Quranic school. Later, he moved to Moghadishu to continue his religious education. In the early 1990’s, he moved to Kahrtoum, the capital of Sudan to study Islamic Sharia.
The following are the most important stages of Robow’s career:
1. The Kalashnikov stage:
After he embraced the “violent change” ideology, Robow joined several armed Islamist militant groups, including the Islamic Courts Union, in the 1990s. In 1996, in Bakool, he founded the first training camp of Islamist militants in Somalia. In 2000, Robow traveled to Afghanistan where he received training with al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters for about one year. While there, he likely received training on street fighting and bomb-making and gained skills that he later used in Somalia. He co-founded the al-Shabab group after the Islamic Courts Union, which seized control of most of Somalia's southern and central regions, including the capital Moghadishu, in 2006. He became the first spokesperson of al-Shabab and later was promoted to the rank of deputy-leader. Despite his rise to higher ranks, Robow had disagreement with the former leader of the group, Ahmed Abdi Godane, also known as Mukhtar Abu Zubair, who was killed by a US drone airstrike in 2014.
Robow rose to prominence in 2007 when al-Shabab resisted Ethiopia’s presence in Somalia. He often boasted that he once shook hands with Usama bin Laden when he was in Afghanistan. His comments about violent attacks carried out by al-Shabab when he was the group’s spokesperson are still lurking in the back of the minds of many Somalis. But he soon fell from prominence and went out of sight with a group of his followers in Hudur, where he claimed that he defected from al-Shabab in 2012 for ideological and religious reasons that he has not yet explained.
2. The stage of political engagement:
Washington designated Robow as foreign terrorist who had a US$5 million bounty on his head from the State Department. But later successful attempts to dissuade him from continuing as a militant and to sever his ties with the terror group enabled the Somali government, in cooperation with international parties, to reach a settlement and eventually remove his name from the black list. Consequently, the man adopted a totally different rhetoric giving up jihadi advocation of violence. Not only did he embrace a new rhetoric, he surprised everybody, including the government of former President Farmago, by announcing his decision to run for the presidency of Somalia's South West state. Central to Robow’s campaign were ways of countering security challenges, especially those posed by al-Shabab, as well as the need to give women a larger role in political life. But the former government’s political calculations undermined Robow’s plans, pushing him away from the presidency of the region into jail.
Significance and Implications
The significance of appointing the former al-Shabab leader as Minister of Religious Affairs in the current Somali government, derives from several potential implications on the short-, medium- and long-term.
These include:
1. Adopting the fight against al-Shabab as a national priority:
Upon taking office, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud pledged to work for establishing a Somalia that is reconciled with itself and the world. He further underlined that he is focusing his efforts on security. This is a sign of change in government work, because former President Farmago was focused on engaging in political conflicts in the country and aligning the country with regional alliances that eventually damaged Somalia’s higher interests. In implementation of this view, the new Somali government is seeking to achieve reconciliation as part of its strategy of combating al-Shabab, considered as its highest priority. This change of direction was evidenced in a tweet by Prime Minister Barre in which he wrote: “I am honored to release the list of Somalia's new Cabinet which I will lead to deliver on our enabling national priorities.”
2. Adopting the soft approach to combat Terrorism:
The current Somali government has obviously realized that the security approach did not succeed in uprooting terrorism in the country, and as a result is attempting to build reconciliation and reintegration as a way of eliminating violent extremism. That is, the appointment of a former spokesperson and co-founder of al-Shabab as a high-ranking official is likely to set an example for current members of the group who can be potentially reintegrated into society. The hope is that a counter-al-Shabab narrative will be built up because this man has a deep understanding of the group’s philosophy and tactics. On the other hand, and despite the comparison can be deemed inaccurate, the case of Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed Islam Madobe, the President of the Jubaland of State of Somalia, which borders Kenya, is a thought-provoking one. Madobe, who was a member of the Islamic Courts Union, succeeded in forcing al-Shabab out of Kismayo, the region’s capital, and continues to have wide political support in southern Somalia. So, will Mukhtar Robow become another example of shifting to politics and reaching power through peaceful means?
3. Promoting the “violent approach” to combat al-Shahab:
Robow, who joined jihadist groups, relocated to Afghanistan and remained an al-Shabab fighter for ten years, knows the group’s tactics and methods, especially in Bakook where he and his supporters resisted a targeted attack from al-Shabab fighters. Given his long years of activity as a violent jihadist, it is believed that he knows the al-Shaba tactics and strategies and how they run their war against the Somali government. Additionally, he has a large number of followers and supporters in his town Bay and across Bakool, where the group controls large swathes of territory. Prime Minister Barre confirmed this view when he stated that appointing Robow is an opportunity to strengthen the fight against al-Shabab to contain and defeat it, especially in Robow’s home region. Moreover, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud pledged to fight al-Shabab by military, financial and ideological means.
4. Easing the impact of violent attacks on Somalia:
Recently, Somalia saw an increase in attacks from violent militant groups, in Mogadishu and the south. In the first week of August, al-Shabab executed seven hostages accused of spying for the Somali government and the United States and killing a number of members of the group. Earlier in May, al-Shabab fighters stormed a large military base of the African Union in Mogadishu and killed a number of peacekeepers. In late July, the group carried out a rare attack inside the Somali Region of Ethiopia which prompted the Ethiopian army to send a high-ranking delegation to Somalia for talks with the government about such attacks on the Somali-Ethiopian border that left several people dead. Overall, these developments are sign that there are alternative national and regional approaches in place for containing the growing danger posed by al-Shabab.
Multiple Concerns
The appointment of Robow as a cabinet minister raised the concerns of observers inside and outside Somalia over impunity, as well as a lack of a government overarching approach to combating violent extremism and reintegrating former fighters, in addition to the potential further complication of the already messed-up situation in Somalia.
These concerns can be outlined as follows:
1. The risk of political rift.
The appointment of Robow can exacerbate divisions in the Bakool, in southwestern Somalia. President of the region believes that Robow is a political rival. But in any case, over the past decades, the reintegration of former fighters from al-Shabab and tribal factions has become a main issue of politics in Somalia, and is likely to continue to further complicate governance efforts even after the peaceful transition which took place in May.
2. The Issue of impunity:
There are concerns that the Somali government's inclusion of a former commander of al-Shahab who is accused of committing violent crime represents a good example of impunity and failure to administer justice. Although this holds true according to law and human logic, we should remember that since 1991, not even one warlord or former military commander was held accountable for taking part in the civil war. The case of Robow is no exception given the fact that many other individuals accused of committing crimes against humanity are today members of the parliament or government officials.
3. Lack of a comprehensive plan for reintegrating former fighters:
Somalia likely lacks a comprehensive plan for combating violent extremism and reintegrating former fighters and terrorists. The reason is perhaps the nature of the highly complicated situation in Somalia where tribal, religious and political dynamics are all interconnected while state institutions are weak and fragile. Despite that, and compared to Nigeria’s experience, the challenges posed by reintegration of former members of terror groups raise several essential questions in Somalia and other African countries.
These can be outlined as follows:
a) Lack of community participation:
People affected by conflicts often do not take part in government approaches to reconciliation and reintegration. This led to deepening negative views upheld by affected communities about reconciliation programs in affected communities. Experience in Germany, Sweden, Norway and the UK showed that any program designed to combat extremism should be comprehensive and take involved communities into account. In the case of Somalia, this perception, at the tribal and federal levels, seems to be dominant.
b) Lack of efficient structures for true reconciliation and tolerance:
For example, atrocious experiences that victims went through at the hands of individuals who repented or defected from terror groups are not cited. This led to a growing belief that the government gives more attention to repentant terrorists than to their victims. This probably makes it important to establish commissions for fact-finding and reconciliation.
c) Inefficient plans for post-reintegration community participation:
A pardon program in Niger Delta, for example, includes a plan for economically engaging dissidents after rehabilitating them. But this goal was not achieved because the economy is unable to bear the cost. This means that initiating the process of reintegration without a large-scale economic empowerment plan will render the whole effort useless, and can prompt former terrorists to re-join militant groups.
Countering Challenges
The appointment of Robow came at a time when the new Somali government is facing several challenges including a looming famine, absence of security due to the fragility of state institutions and the attacks carried out by al-Shahab terror group. Drought which hit the Horn of Africa affected the life of 7.1 million Somali people- about half of the country’s population- who cannot meet their daily food requirements today, with more than 200,000 facing catastrophic hunger, according to the United Nations World Food Program.
In the face of these challenges, the government of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is trying, perhaps with support from the United States, to encourage fighters to defect from the al-Shabab group. Its underlying belief is that any defection, especially by senior members, will impact the extremist group which has thousands of fighters and continues to control large swathes of rural areas in Somalia’s southern and central regions.
In any case, the new Somali approach of appointing a former jihadi as a cabinet minister is controversial. Some believe that Robow’s becoming at the helm of the ministry of religious affairs is a declaration of ideological war on al-Shabab group, while others view it as a way of covering up crimes that were committed when the man was a member of an al-Qaeda-linked terror group.
The most important implication of appointing Robow as a minister in Somalia is an acknowledgment that security measures alone are not enough to contain terrorist threats. Based on that, it is important to adopt political approaches while also promoting empowerment of local communities to build their capabilities and prevent the recruitment of more terrorists. While Somalia, after the formation of the new government, is trying to take a different strategic approach to addressing terrorism, it is necessary to engage local communities in all stages of the implementation of the strategy. Within this context, the country can benefit from the experiences of other countries. Kenya’s experience in developing work plans for combating violent extremism sets a good example of national efforts that consider changes to motives of extremism and radicalism that are related to local communities.
