The Middle East, and perhaps the world, stands on edge, awaiting a significant event that everyone expects, but no one knows when and where it will occur or what consequences it might have. Many regional and international leaders call for restraint and de-escalation, but their appeals seem to go unheeded. The anticipated escalation is the reaction of Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas to Israel's series of high-profile assassinations of several of their leaders in Tehran, Beirut, and Gaza. The assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas' Political Bureau, on July 31, 2024, in Tehran, was a humiliation and embarrassment for Iran, as it failed to protect an official guest who came to attend the inauguration of its new president, Masoud Pezeshkian. The region is gripped by fear that the expected reactions might alter the rules of engagement between Israel on one side and Iran and its proxies on the other, potentially dragging them into an open regional war.

1. Iran's Response

Iran has vowed that retaliation is inevitable. On the same day as Haniyeh's assassination, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stated that the response would be "harsh" and that Israel's action "prepared the ground for a harsh punishment for itself." Iranian President Pezeshkian declared that those responsible for the assassination "will soon see the consequences of their cowardly and terrorist act." On August 1, Hezbollah's Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah warned, "The enemy, and those who are behind the enemy, must await our inevitable response." In a statement on July 31, Hamas described the assassination as a "critical and dangerous incident that takes the battle to new dimensions."

Recently, many questions have arisen about when this retaliation will occur. Will it be a solo act by Iran or a strike coordinated with Hezbollah and Iran's proxies in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen? Will Hezbollah participate in a joint military operation or take independent action?

Iran is the crucial player in this scenario, holding the trigger for an all-out war in the region. As a significant regional power, Iran has a strategic vision for the region's future and its leadership role within it. It carefully considers the balance of power among regional and global forces. Iran is unlikely to act rashly, deviating from its strategic and military doctrine towards Israel, which is based on three pillars: 

1. The conflict with Israel is "long-term," aiming to keep Israel in a constant state of insecurity, thus adhering to a long-held policy of "long breath" or "strategic patience."

2. Encircling Israel with Iranian-aligned armed groups capable of striking deep into Israeli territory, forming a "ring of fire," as described by Israeli media. This allows Iran to adopt a policy of "remote strikes."

3. Avoiding a direct war with Israel, knowing that Washington would support Tel Aviv.

Today, Iran faces numerous and intersecting pressures. It is determined to take military action in response to Israel's violation of its sovereignty because Haniyeh was assassinated on Iranian soil. This determination is heightened by suspicions that some Iranian security agencies might have been complicit in the event, possibly through misunderstandings with Washington. The credibility of these suspicions will be judged by the ongoing investigations by the Tehran Public Prosecutor and the nature of Iran's forthcoming military response.

However, Iran's military response is constrained by its unwillingness to escalate matters to a direct war with Israel, as it seeks to gain more time to complete its nuclear weapons program. This decision is also influenced by the election of a reformist president, who is unlikely to start his term with a decision to wage an uncontrollable war.

Moreover, Tehran has its own assessments regarding the US stance on current events, especially after the announcement of a call between US President Joe Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on August 1. In this call, Biden reaffirmed his commitment to Israel's security against threats from Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. Additionally, Washington has indeed increased its military presence in the Gulf, Eastern Mediterranean, and Red Sea.

Iran aims to punish Israel and prove its ability to breach Israeli borders with its drones and missiles, showing that the "Iron Dome" cannot stop them. However, it seeks to avoid significant human losses or sliding into a full-scale war. This was demonstrated in Iran's retaliatory attack on Israel on April 13, in response to Israel's attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus two weeks prior.

Iran's response could be unilateral, emphasizing that it is punishing Israel for actions on Iranian soil. This might take the form of cyberattacks targeting vital Israeli infrastructure like communication and power grids or drone and missile strikes on Israeli gas fields or other targets. Another scenario involves Iran coordinating with its proxies to inflict maximum damage on Israel, weakening its ability to conduct effective retaliatory strikes. In all cases, Tehran aims for a controlled escalation it can manage without forcing Tel Aviv to respond directly.

2. Israel's Gamble

Under Netanyahu's leadership, Israel appears to be the most adventurous party that is most prepared for escalation, driven by a desire to restore the "deterrence power" lost on October 7, 2023, at the hands of Hamas and on April 13, 2024, when Iran conducted a retaliatory strike on Israeli soil. This desire is also fueled by Hezbollah's tit-for-tat strikes against Israel in southern Lebanon. Netanyahu and military leaders may seek to achieve victories to present to the Israeli public as compensation for the failures of October 7. Tel Aviv also aims to exploit the political turmoil in the US ahead of the November presidential elections and is confident that Washington will back it in any confrontation with Tehran. Netanyahu declared that Israel is fighting a multi-front war and is capable of countering any attacks.

Conversely, Israel asserts that it does not wish to extend the war into a regional conflict, perhaps because its army is exhausted after being engaged in continuous combat operations for months. Israel also suffers from a shortage of munitions and military equipment due to occasional tensions with the United States and from worsening social division issues caused by the extreme religious right wing's growing appetite to impose its ideas on society and the state.

3. Hezbollah's Constraints

Hezbollah will have to respond to the assassination of its top military commander, Fuad Shukr. The armed group has the military capability to strike vital economic targets in Galilee and Tel Aviv. On August 4, it targeted the settlement of Beit Hillel for the first time with dozens of rockets. On August 5, it announced that it had targeted several Israeli military bases and sites with suicide drones, claiming casualties. While Hezbollah enjoys considerable decision-making freedom, its response will be constrained by Lebanon's deteriorating situation and Iran's assessment of the regional context.

4. Hamas' Position

Hamas leaders are willing to respond to the assassination of their political bureau head. However, its ability to do so depends on the military situation on the ground, the supply of weapons and ammunition, and their organizational cohesion following successive strikes that have targeted several of their military leaders. Israel's announcement of the deaths of Mohammed Deif, the commander of the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades, the military arm of the Hamas movement, and his deputy Marwan Issa further complicates matters. Hamas' response might take the form of a large-scale rocket attack on Israel.

5. Other Actors

Other Iran-aligned parties might play several roles, acting for their own reasons. For instance, the Houthis in Yemen might conduct a military operation in retaliation for Israel's strike on their bases in Hodeidah port. The Popular Mobilization Forces (al-Hashd al-Shaabi) in Iraq might respond to US attacks on their bases and the targeting of one of their leaders. These actors might act in coordination with Iran and its proxies, launching simultaneous or sequential military operations. Reports on August 4 noted the transfer of Iranian weapons through the Syrian border town of Albu Kamal from Iraq to Iran-aligned factions in Deir ez-Zor, eastern Syria. Additionally, at least five American soldiers were injured in an attack on the Ain al-Asad base in western Iraq on August 5.

We have not discussed the role of Russia, whose National Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu visited Tehran on August 5, nor China, and the likelihood of their intervention to support their Iranian ally if the US participates in an attack on Tehran. 

The picture remains grim amid an atmosphere of ambiguity and uncertainty. The coming days are likely to witness a flare-up of violence, with developments taking the form of intense and advanced weapon strikes between Israel and other parties. A comprehensive regional war, potentially involving American interests and oil sources and waterways, remains a "catastrophic scenario" unlikely to be pursued by any party due to its dire consequences.