Iran officially announced the death of President Ebrahim Raisi following a plane crash in East Azerbaijan Province, northwest of Iran. The crash occurred during his return trip after the inauguration of the Qiz-Qalasi dam with Azerbaijan's President, Ilham Aliyev. Along with President Raisi, the crash claimed the lives of Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian, East Azerbaijan provincial governor Malik Rahmati, Mohammad Ali Ale Hashem (Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's representative to East Azerbaijan), and other officials, crew members, and guards on board.
In the wake of the tragic plane crash, Iran faces a critical juncture in its leadership transition. According to Article 131 of the Iranian Constitution, in the event of the president's death, dismissal, resignation, prolonged absence, or illness exceeding two months, or if a new president is not elected due to unforeseen obstacles, the first vice president, Mohammad Mokhber, assumes the president's powers and responsibilities, after receiving approval from the Supreme Leader. To facilitate the transition, a special council, comprising the Speaker of the parliament, the head of the judiciary, and the first vice president, is responsible for organizing the election of a new president within a maximum period of 50 days.
As a direct consequence of the recent tragedy, Mohammad Mokhber has stepped into the role of interim president, where he will carry out the responsibilities of the presidency on a temporary basis until a new leader is democratically elected.
Key Observations
There are numerous noteworthy observations concerning the circumstances surrounding the death of Raisi and his companions, as per the following:
1. Demonstrating institutional cohesion:
The Iranian regime was quick to affirm that the sudden deaths of Raisi, Amirabdollahian, and their companions would not result in any disruptions within governmental duties or within the country in general. Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, promptly addressed the nation, and assured them there would be no disruption to the state affairs after the incident.
Within a day, Khamenei assigned presidential duties to Vice President Mohammad Mokhber, who pledged to "follow the path of President Raisi in fulfilling assigned duties without any interruption." Additionally, Ali Bagheri Kani, who was deputy foreign minister, was appointed to carry out the duties of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Advisers to the Minister of Foreign Affairs were also appointed, including Abbas Araqchi, Ali Abu Al-Hassani, and Sayed Rasul Muhajir. Furthermore, it was announced that the presidential elections would be held on June 28, 2024.
This response underscores the Iranian regime’s intent to deliver a dual message both domestically and internationally. It demonstrates the regime's ability to maintain cohesion despite the loss of its president and foreign minister. Additionally, it highlights that the regime's foundation lies in its institutions rather than in individuals. This situation is reminiscent of the 1979 events in Iran, when the Shah’s regime was overthrown and the subsequent gaps in the government were rapidly filled to stabilize the new regime.
2. Sanctions and the collapse of the aviation sector:
The fatal plane crash highlights the deteriorating state of Iran's aviation sector, affecting both civilian and military aircrafts. Ongoing sanctions have hampered Tehran's ability to modernize or repair its aircraft, resulting in a series of accidents in recent years.
For instance, in February 2023, a helicopter carrying former Sports Minister, Hamid Sajjadi, experienced a crash while landing in the city of Baft in Kerman Province, resulting in the death of his advisor and injuries to the minister. Similarly, on May 17, 2001, the former Transportation Minister, Rahman Dadman, and all passengers died when his Yak-40 plane crashed en route to Gorgan in northeastern Iran.
Ironically, just two weeks before the latest accident, the Iranian reformist newspaper "Etemad" published a report on May 5, 2024, expressing concern about the dire need for maintenance of most Iranian aircraft. This situation highlights the significant impact of sanctions on Iran's aviation infrastructure and emphasizes the urgent need to address critical maintenance and modernization issues.
3. Miscalculation and weak capacities:
It is widely believed that adverse weather conditions in East Azerbaijan Province, located in the far northwest of Iran, were the primary cause of the plane crash. The region is known for its strong winds, heavy fog, and poor visibility, as well as its rugged and mountainous terrain. These challenging conditions led to a "hard landing" between the Sungun Mine and the Dizmar Forest in the East Azerbaijan Province.
Despite the outbound journey being free of obstacles and relatively clear of harsh weather, a pre-flight weather review should have been conducted before the return trip, especially considering the presence of a head of state and senior government officials.
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that rescue efforts faced significant delays, with teams taking more than 15 hours to reach the crash site. While the mountainous terrain and severe weather played a role in this delay, the fact that a Turkish "Akıncı" drone was able to locate the crash site emphasizes the limitations of Iran's own search and rescue capabilities.
In an attempt to avoid embarrassment, the IRGC provincial commander, Asghar Abbasqolizadeh, stated that Iranian drones had detected the location of the helicopter's wreckage. However, reports indicate that the Turkish drone's involvement was at the request of Tehran to Ankara, as confirmed by the official Iranian News Agency (IRNA).
4. Placing blame on the US:
Despite Washington's official statement denying any involvement in the crash of the Iranian plane, some figures in Tehran have attributed partial responsibility to the United States. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin explicitly stated that the US had no role in the incident. However, former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif asserted that the United States was responsible for the downing of the Iranian president's helicopter. He claimed that this was due to the US imposition of sanctions on Iran's aviation sector, which hindered the procurement of spare parts.
The ill-fated aircraft was an American-made Bell 212 helicopter, produced in 1968, and acquired by Tehran before the 1979 revolution. Notably, some Iranian officials had called for replacing these American aircraft with Russian ones, enabling easier access to necessary spare components.
5. Suspicions of orchestration:
Some theories suggest that the plane crash may have been orchestrated. These theories hinge on the observation that out of the three planes in the convoy returning from the border region between Iran and Azerbaijan, only this particular plane crashed. Despite facing the same adverse weather and challenging terrain, the other two helicopters reached their destinations safely. Additionally, the presidential plane was known to be more advanced than the other two, and the presidential pilot was expected to be more skilled.
Adding to the suspicion, Turkish Transport Minister Abdulkadir Uraloglu revealed on May 20 that the helicopter did not have its signal system turned on or did not possess such a system. This malfunction prevented any signals from being emitted to the Turkish side, which is responsible for monitoring Iranian airspace for emergency response, thereby delaying the identification and location of the crash site. However, it is important to note that these observations and theories remain speculative, as there is currently no concrete evidence to substantiate the claims of a planned incident.
6. Regional and global sympathetic responses:
The plane crash that resulted in the deaths of President Raisi and his companions elicited widespread regional and international sympathy. Several countries, including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Pakistan, and Russia, expressed their willingness to assist in the search efforts for the missing presidential plane. Furthermore, condolence messages poured in from around the world for the loss of the Iranian President and his Foreign Minister.
This sympathy can be attributed to the foreign policies Raisi implemented during his presidency, which began in August 2021. His tenure was marked by efforts to establish extensive networks of international relations and to re-engage with regions previously not prioritized by Tehran. Under Raisi's leadership, Iran joined multiple international organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS. Additionally, Iran initiated a new chapter in regional relations, exemplified by the agreement to restore diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia on March 10, 2023. Raisi's late Foreign Minister, Hossein Amirabdollahian, also conducted numerous diplomatic tours including African, Latin American, and Asian countries, further enhancing Iran's global diplomatic presence.
Potential Ramifications
The significant impacts resulting from the plane crash and the death of Raisi and Amirabdollahian can be summarized as follows:
1. Turning inward temporarily:
During the current transitional period, it is anticipated that Iran will divert its focus inward to stabilize its internal affairs until the presidential elections are held within the 50 days. Following the elections, the country will embark on electing a new president and forming a new government. Consequently, some external engagements may be temporarily paused. This includes the indirect talks between American and Iranian officials mediated by Oman, which were announced prior to the incident. A similar scenario occurred during the transition from former President Hassan Rouhani to Raisi, where negotiations were paused for several months.
During this interim period, Tehran may also refrain from actions that could provoke the United States or Israel. However, this inward focus is expected to be temporary, and Iran is likely to resume managing its external affairs once the new government is in place.
2. Increasing demands to modernize its infrastructure:
Given the speculation surrounding the crash of Raisi's plane, there is likely to be increased domestic pressure to modernize Iran's infrastructure, specifically its aging aircraft fleet. The neglect in updating and maintaining spare parts has rendered much of the aviation sector obsolete.
This situation could result in two potential outcomes. First, there may be increased pressure on Russia and China to supply modern aircraft. However, it is important to note that both countries are constrained by the sanctions imposed on Iran and are cautious about the potential consequences of this situation. Second, Iran might choose to reduce tensions with Western and European powers, which could potentially facilitate progress on the nuclear issue and lead to the gradual lifting of some or all sanctions.
3. Maintaining its foreign policy:
The deaths of Raisi and Amirabdollahian are not expected to bring about significant changes to Iran's foreign policy. This stability can be attributed to the considerable power wielded by the Supreme Leader and the leaders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who have a dominant role in handling foreign affairs.
Although some Iranian presidents and foreign ministers, such as Hassan Rouhani and Javad Zarif, have made attempts to modify foreign policies, their efforts have largely been hindered by opposition from the Supreme Leader and the Shura Council (parliament), which is controlled by hardliners. It is worth noting that the current parliament, elected on March 1, 2024, is almost entirely under the control of the same faction.
This continuity in Iran's foreign policy is further exemplified by the assassination of former Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani in early 2020. Despite his death, Iran's foreign policy remained consistent, with only minor tactical adjustments.
The complex hierarchical structure of the Iranian regime, characterized by strong institutions governed by entrenched doctrine and ideology, plays a significant role in maintaining Iran's policy orientations. In this system, individual influence is limited. Historically, even the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, did not lead to any significant shift in the regime's policies. On the contrary, the regime arguably became more extreme under his successor, Ayatollah Khamenei.
4. The dilemma of the next Supreme Leader:
Ebrahim Raisi was widely regarded as a leading candidate to assume the position of Supreme Leader after Khameini. Raisi, known as the "deep-state candidate" due to his previous leadership in the judiciary sector, leaves a void in the race for this crucial role. With his death, it appears increasingly likely that Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of the current Supreme Leader, will assume the position. This succession seems particularly probable considering the removal of other prominent candidates, such as former Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani, and the passing of influential figures like former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, as well as prominent Iranian clerics Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi and Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi. In recent years, the Iranian regime has seemingly prepared the political and media landscape to support Mojtaba Khamenei's potential succession. The Parliament and the Assembly of Experts, both dominated by conservatives, have been structured to be more compliant, thus setting the stage for selecting the next Supreme Leader.
In conclusion, the deaths of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian are unlikely to significantly alter the overarching policies of the Iranian regime whether in addressing domestic or foreign affairs. The hierarchical structure of the Iranian system has demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt and maintain continuity, ensuring its self-preservation and regeneration. Consequently, the regime's hardline policies, both domestically and internationally, are expected to persist. These policies are deeply intertwined with the regime's fundamental interests, and any substantial deviation from them would require a structural transformation of the regime itself.
