On May 16, 2023, the Libyan parliament votes to replace Fathi Bashagha as Prime Minister, referring him for investigation, and appointing his Finance Minister, Osama Hamad, to take over his duties. This is a significant development that may restructure Libya’s internal dynamics.
An Unanticipated Decision
The Libyan parliament's unanticipated decision to suspend the prime minister-designate can be summarized as follows:
1. Suspending the head of the parallel government:
Libya’s House of Representatives spokesperson Abdullah Belhaiq announced that members of the parliament voted by majority on a decision to suspend Prime Minister of the Government of National Stability, Bashagha, refer him for investigation, and assign Finance Minister to assume the duties as a Prime Minister. Belhaiq ascribed this decision to attributed this resolution to the discontent of certain parliament members with Bashagha's administration's performance, highlighting his inability to fulfill key commitments such as taking over Tripoli and securing international recognition for his government.
2. A preemptive move by Bashagha:
While Bashagha has maintained a conspicuous silence thus far regarding the Libyan parliament decision, he deliberately took a preemptive move prior to the parliament’s vote to suspend him, publicly handing his duties over to his deputy, Ali Qatrani. This move demonstrates Bashagha's foreknowledge of the House of Representatives’ intention to oust him in order to thwart the parliament’s attempt.
According to estimates, the decision to oust Bashagha is deemed a violation of the House of Representatives' internal regulations. These regulations outline a process that necessitates three consecutive sessions, comprising accountability and subsequent evaluation, before any suspension of the Prime Minister can be enacted. Furthermore, it is important to note that the session in which the vote to terminate Bashagha's duties occurred lacked the required quorum. In an attempt to circumvent these concerns, the council opted to employ the terminology of “suspending” rather than “dismissing” Bashagha.
3. House of Representatives implicit accusations:
According to Ahmed Al-Ruwaiti, Bashagha's advisor, recent disagreements have emerged between Bashagha’s government and the parliament over the allocation of the budget, which amounts to approximately USD 1.5 billion, implicitly accusing members of the House of Representatives of attempting to allocate this budget to serve their personal interests.
Key Indications
The Libyan parliament's abrupt decision to suspend Bashagha encompassed various indicators, which can be summarized as follows:
1. A deal between Haftar and Al-Dbeibah:
The suspension of Bashagha signifies one aspect of a newly forged agreement between the commander of the Libyan National Army Khalifa Haftar and former Prime Minister of the National Unity Government Abdulhamid al-Dbeibah. The agreement aims to establish a unified Libyan government by merging the previously opposing factions. This development can be viewed as a resumption of the prior agreement between Haftar and al-Dbeibah in July 2022, which resulted in the appointment of Farhat Bengdara as the new head of Libya's National Oil Corp (NOC), replacing Mustafa Sanalla. This is further solidified by the House of Representatives entrusting the responsibilities of Prime Minister to the Minister of Finance, Osama Hamad, who maintains a close relationship with Haftar.
This is evident in Libyan reports claiming that, in recent weeks, representatives of the Libyan National Army and the Dbeibah government have been discussing the formation of a unified government in Libya, resulting from the merger. According to these reports, Bashagha was initially involved in these discussions, particularly after the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva declared in March 2023 that the governments of al-Dbeibah and Bashagha agreed to consult on the possibility of uniting both governments. However, Bashagha withdrew from these talks, attempting to hinder them due to disagreements about ministerial portfolio sharing.
2. Growing divisions re-emerged in Eastern Libya:
The Libyan parliament is entrenched in deep divisions, evident from multiple recent calls for Bashagha's removal, especially after the latter refused to attend a parliament session aimed at questioning his government about its funding sources. On the other hand, a number of deputies insisted that Bashagha continue to lead the parallel government.
Notably, the stance of Aguila Saleh, the Speaker of the Libyan House of Representatives, regarding the decision to suspend Bashagha was ambiguous, particularly given his absence from the session during which the vote took place.The invitation to this session was extended by Fawzi Al-Nuwairi, First Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Al-Hadi Al-Saghir, Second Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives.
The absence of Saleh during the session raises intriguing possibilities regarding his potential dissatisfaction with the decision to suspend Baghasha. In addition, the way Bashagha was suspended may reflect a potential decline in Saleh's influence and control over the House of Representatives, further solidifying Haftar's role as a representative of eastern Libya.
New Arrangements
The ongoing developments in the Libyan file indicate that new arrangements are currently in the works and poised to reshape the internal landscape of Libya, as shown below:
1. The rising likelihood of the two governments merging:
The suspension of the Bashagha government aligns with recent advances to unify the military and resolving divisions in Libya. The decision to suspend Bashagha could potentially lead to similar steps in the political realm, resulting in the formation of a unified government through the merger of the competing governments.
2. Western support and regional backup:
There appears to be notable American support for the rapprochement between Haftar and al-Dbeibah, which holds the potential to facilitate the establishment of a unified government and pave the way for upcoming elections. Furthermore, indications of Italian support for this endeavor have also emerged, especially since the decision to oust Bashagha coincided with Haftar’s recent visit to Italy on May 5, 2023, and the subsequent resumption of Libyan gas export to Italy following a two-week halt. All these serves as a significant indicator of Rome’s deepening involvement in the ongoing developments between Western and Eastern Libya.
On the other hand, it is worth noting that several Libyan actors in the region have shown their support. Cairo, for instance, is preparing to host an imminent meeting between representatives of Haftar and al-Dbeibah in the coming period. The meeting aims to discuss the prospect of merging the eastern and western governments in Libya as well as agree on appointing new ministers for some sovereign ministries.
3. Restructuring existing alliances:
The ongoing changes imply that the landscape of existing alliances could significantly shift in the upcoming period. As the rapprochement between al-Dbeibah and Haftar takes shape, there are speculations that Bashagha might form a parallel alliance with Saleh mainly due to their previous alliance in February 2021. During that time, they formed a joint alliance and competed with three others to secure the vote of the Political Dialogue Forum for a new executive authority. However, the outcome resulted in the victory of the alliance that included al-Dbeibah.
Khaled al-Mishri, who heads the High Council of State, could possibly support the Bashagha-Saleh alliance, particularly given his strong criticism of Bashagha’s suspension. Despite the State Council’s previous reservations regarding Bashagha’s legitimacy, Al-Mishri’s firm stance against al-Dbeibah’s continued hold in power might drive him towards forming a “troika” with Saleh and Bashagha. Perhaps this explains al-Mishri's recent request for the formation of a third, mini-government to carry out the tasks of election preparation within the framework of a road map agreed upon by the House of Representatives and the state.
In conclusion, reaching an agreement on the structure of the new government remains challenging, even amidst the ongoing consultations between Haftar and al-Dbeibah. This, however, does not rule out the possibility of an agreement, especially given the current support of some international and regional powers.
