Great powers tend to prefer stability, and their stances rarely change year on year, barring a significant event that would compel decision-makers to alter their foreign policies. Regarding their foreign policy on the Middle East, all signs indicate that great powers would continue their 2022 policy in the new year, given the context of the war in Ukraine marking its 13th month and the polarization it has created in the international community.
Russia’s operation in Ukraine has given great powers more reasons to strengthen their relations with countries of the Middle East. As the West mobilizes support against Russia, they have sought to secure the support of key regional countries. Yet as the prospects of ending the war diminish, leaders of Western powers will have to make fundamental changes to their policies.
In this context, we forecast what sort of policy changes China, Russia, and the US would make towards the region, particularly Iran, Turkey, and Israel, in 2023. With fighting in Ukraine and economic sanctions set to continue, we look at the trajectories of great powers in navigating a highly changing global scene.
The US
Middle East's biggest ally, the US, only significant change has been the Democrats’ House of Representatives majority and the implication this would have on US Middle East policy and the US budget.
In light of the Democrats’ achievement, the US administration under Biden is expected to take one of 4 possible approaches toward the Middle East, summarised as follows:
The first trajectory concerns America’s historical allies and their position on the ongoing war in Ukraine. Contrary to what American policymakers had expected, some of the US longest allies opted for positions less in line with their American partner, whether at UN General Assembly votes or in statements given at the Riyadh Summit, which President Biden attended in July 2022. More surprisingly, Arab members of OPEC+ took positions that generated much criticism from Washington. Despite rocky relations, the US has managed towards the end of 2022 to mend its ties with Egypt, Saudi, and the UAE. Democrats are keen to rebuild America’s partnership with those countries, yet they recognize the region’s capacity for autonomy and influence.
China’s Xi Jinping meeting with leaders of the GCC and Arab League in December was a milestone in Arab-China relations. US Coordinator for Strategic Communications at the National Security Council in the White House, John Kirby, said in a press briefing that the US understands every state must protect its interests and that Washington never expected the GCC to choose between the US or China. Kirby’s statement, however, carried a conflicting message to Biden’s during his Jeddah summit, where he asserted that there was no “vacuum for China, Russia, or Iran to fill.” In light of these shifting strategic relations, the US has opted for a moderate approach to the rapidly developing Arab-China relations.
The US interest in the region will continue to grow and expand, especially with countries like Algeria, who’s maintained long and strong relations with Russia. Western powers such as the US, France, and Italy have started recognizing Algeria’s pivotal role in the global energy market and have invested in growing their relations. Similarly, Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, received the newly assigned Algerian ambassador on September 20. Washington did not let the occasion pass without issuing a statement through its Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Barbra Leaf, who reiterated the importance of Algeria-US relations and the role it plays in maintaining regional stability.
The US is expected to continue this policy despite its concerns over growing Algerian-Iranian relations. Another sticking point is Algeria’s position on the Polisario. Washington would continue its efforts to strengthen its relations with Tunisia, Morocco, and Mauritania. For America, these countries reflect its policy towards the region: Morocco’s normalization with Israel, and Mauritania, having been invited to NATO’s 2022 summit in Madrid, reflects its essential role in counterterrorism efforts in West Africa.
Similarly, the US has increased its diplomatic activity across the region. Having brokered a gas deal between Israel and Lebanon, the US now mediates between Lebanese factions to help elect a new president. In Sudan, the US has been mediating an agreement between civil and military factions to reach an agreement on a new government. In Iraq, the US has supported the government against military Turkish and Irani military operations in Kurdistan.
The second trajectory, a key priority for the US in the region, is deterring Iran from attacking American allies, especially as nuclear talks reach a dead end. Iran, in recent months, has carried out ultrasonic ballistic missile tests, which has raised concerns in the region. The US reacted by sending its USS West Virginia submarine to the Arab Gulf and B-52 bombers for reconnaissance over the region last October. In addition, US special representative said that President Biden would be ready to use ‘any means necessary’ to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The Pentagon warned Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from attacking any American warship cruising the Arab Gulf.
Israel’s newest right-wing government has escalated its warning messages against Iran and supports the current US-deterring policies.
Politically, the US and the West are expected to continue their support of popular unrest across Iran. They are banking on the Iranian regime losing its legitimacy as it uses excessive force to deal with protesters. Washington continues to support protesters through sanctions against the regime, aiming to weaken and ultimately topple the cleric regime.
The third trajectory is centered on Turkey-US wavering relations. Turkey’s land operation against Kurdish regions in Iraq has severed its relations with Washington. As Ankara carries out vast military operations to ‘clean’ the region of Kurdistan Workers' Party fighters, Washington still considers the party a key ally for its presence in Syria and its fight against ISIS. The Pentagon has voiced its disagreement with the way Turkey views the Kurds in the region.
Tensions between the two countries peaked after a period of stability supported by the US lifting the F-16 sales ban on Ankara in October. An American envoy visited Turkey that same month to discuss points of contention between the two countries on issues of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey’s wider policy in the Mediterranean.
The fourth trajectory is on Israel. With the return of Benjamin Netanyahu to power in what’s been described as Israel’s most conservative government yet, relations with the US are expected to deteriorate. Israel’s new government already has revealed plans for increasing its illegal settlements in the Palestinian Occupied Territories, diminishing the possibility of a sustainable resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and complicating the ongoing gas negotiations with Lebanon. Nevertheless, we may add that any disagreements between Israel and the US would remain at a ‘media’ level, for the strategic relations between the two countries have become stronger following a Republican majority of the US House.
Russia
Arab states are expected 2023 to maintain good relations with Russia. None of the Arab states have participated in economic sanctions against Moscow, a stance that was well received by Russia’s Putin. More official visits between the two sides are expected to happen in 2023, cementing Russia’s presence and role as a stabilizer in the region. Jordanian foreign minister, Ayman Safadi, said in a press briefing following a visit on November 3, 2022, by his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, that Russia’s presence in the south of Syria is an agent of stability under current circumstances.
Moscow is expected to expand its relations with OPEC+ Arab members. From coordinating oil production to strengthening relations with strategic countries like Syria, Russia considers the region its gateway to the Mediterranean. In Africa, Algeria is the second largest trade and defense partner, having participated in military exercises, the latest being a 14-country drill in September 2022, which included China and India.
Moscow also aims to play a more active role in Libya. A new Libyan ambassador to Russia and the opening of a new Russian embassy in Libya have given Putin a new channel to play a mediating role in the war-torn country. Russia is also considering opening a consulate in Benghazi, revealing Russia’s plans to communicate between both sides of the conflict in the West (Al-Dbeibah’s government) and the East (Khalifa Haftar, backed by the House of Representatives).
And despite being preoccupied with a prolonged operation in Ukraine, Russia seems to be committed to delivering key strategic projects in Egypt, where it has been awarded a contract to build a nuclear power plant. Indeed, the first out of four power generators have been constructed in El-Dabaa.
Beyond the Arab world, Russia is expected to strengthen its relations with Iran. However, on the other side, Russia-Turkey relations have suffered a blow owing to Ankara’s military presence in Idlib and its continued air raids on Kurdish majority regions in northern Syria, to which Russia retaliated in October 2022 by raiding Turkey-backed armed groups in Afrin, Azaz, and northwest Alepp. Yet Turkey’s role in mediating an agreement on grain exports between Russia and Ukraine has mitigated some tension between Ankara and Moscow.
Finally, the tension between Russia and Israel will continue in 2023. Tel Aviv’s threats against Iran and recurring airstrikes in Syria may well lead to a diplomatic rift.
China
2023 began just a few weeks on the heels of a historic visit by President Xi to Saudi, where he met Arab leaders in December. President Xi described the summit as a historic landmark in Arab-China relations. The meetings are expected to herald a new era of economic and political partnership between China and the Arab world. The new year will see unprecedented numbers of economic and trade agreements, technological advancement, and investments. Beijing has recognized the region’s importance in its strategic Belt and Road Initiative. It thus has built stronger relations with Arab states based on mutual interests, aiming to drive a multipolar vision of the international system.
Furthermore, China is growing its presence in the region amid a visible concern by Washington. Granted, China’s growing relations with the Arab world do not please US policymakers who would seek to fend Arab regimes from importing Chinese technology or accepting large investments.
2023 is expected to witness new agreements implemented between China and key Arab states following China’s Xi visit to Saudi. His closing remarks revealed a great alignment between the two sides, which is only expected to grow.
Moreover, the 2017 strategic agreement between China and Iran has driven their relations exponentially. Israel, on the other side, is growing ever more concerned about this relation and may well be displeased with some of the outcomes of Riyadh’s summit, which asserted the centrality of the Palestinian cause, a commitment to a just and sustainable two-state solution, and the illegality of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories. Although, this would not necessarily hurt Israel-China strategic relations.
