Historically, the Turkish-Iranian relationship is characterized by conflict and rivalry in the Middle East. The legacy of this conflict underlines the disagreements between both countries in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon based on a mix of sectarianism, economic and political interests, and regional power. In spite of this historical conflict, both Turkish and Iranian counterparts are keen on two main aspects.
First, to establish better economic relations and build mutual interests despite degrees of political difference. For example, the severe contradiction between Ankara and Tehran’s policies towards the Syrian crisis does not hinder further development of economic relations. Second, both sides are working together to face common security challenges especially those related to sovereignty and combating country division projects. An example is the aggravating Kurdish issues in Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and Iran to a certain extent. Tehran and Ankara recognize that any developments in the Kurdish issue in any of the aforementioned states will ultimately reflect on both countries, by virtue of the large Kurdish community present in both Iran and Turkey, where the largest Kurdish presence is in Turkey (approx. 20 million people) and in Iran (approx. 8 million people).
The surprise visit by Turkish Prime Minister, Ahmed Davutoglu, to Tehran on March 4, has raised many questions in terms of timing, objectives, and implications of such a visit. Will this visit create a shift in Turkish-Iranian relations? How will it affect regional alliances and conditions?
Agenda behind Davutoglu’s visit
Davutoglu’s visit to Tehran addressed several issues with the Iranian counterpart. These issues go beyond mutual relationships and include regional conditions and alliances, primarily the following:
1. Rejecting Country Divisions: Turkey and Iran share a common conviction that the United States and Russia have secretly agreed to divide the Middle East. This conviction is reinforced by Moscow’s announcement that it does not reject establishing a federal system in Syria. This means, according to both countries, establishing a Kurdish region in North Eastern Syria, similar to the Kurdish region in Iraq. Hence, Ankara and Tehran believe that they will be gravely affected as both countries have the biggest Kurdish population.
In this context, Davutoglu’s and Rohani’s statements are similar; stressing a unified vision against a federal system and emphasizing Syrian and Iraqi unity. Yet, the problem which weakens their unified vision is their conflicting policies towards the Syrian crisis on one hand, and their limited role compared to the US and Russian roles in the region, on the other.
2. The Economic File: Turkey forms the Iranian economic gateway to the west. Iran, on the other hand, is Turkey’s gateway to the Far East, according to their geographical proximity. After the enforcement of the Iranian nuclear agreement and gradual lift of sanctions starting mid-January 2016, Turkey believes that it will benefit from this agreement and make up for its economic losses due to the Syrian crisis.
Thus, Turkey has great expectations in terms of developing economic relations with Iran. It will benefit from the nuclear agreement to increase commercial exchange between both countries to approx. 40 billion USD through transportation, energy, and trade projects. In addition, Turkey will secure an alternative to the Russian gas, in case Moscow decides to cut gas supplies to Turkey; which secures 65% of Turkish needs.
3. The Syrian Crisis: Turkey and Iran hold contradictory stances towards the Syrian crisis. Each party has its reasons, motives, and strategies. Since the beginning of the crisis, Tehran announced its full support of the Bashar al-Assad regime. Considering the long alliance between both regimes, Tehran supports the Syrian regime at all levels against opposition forces both internally and externally.
Ankara, however, moved in various directions to topple the al-Assad regime in Syria. The Turkish leadership pursued an approach of specifying deadlines and opportunities for the departure of the al-Assad region, whilst also providing military support to opposition groups. As a result, the Syrian Crisis turned into a cold war between Turkey and Iran. Five years after the crisis, both countries recognize their weak position, considering the US-Russian agreement on dealing with the conflict, which could see both Ankara and Tehran follow the policy of “rounding corners” to limit the consequences of the US-Russian vision to the Syrian crisis.
4. The Iraq file and liberation of Mosul: Any high-level security or political meeting between Iran and Turkey cannot be held without addressing the Iraq file. The current critical issue is concerned with the battle to liberate Mosul. In spite of their differences, both Tehran and Ankara want to fight this battle and not through American or Kurdish forces. Iran fears that US participation in the battle means restoring US influence Iraq and thus control policy across the technocratic government of Iraq’s Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi. It is possible that Iran could contribute in the battle through the Popular Mobilization Forces.
Turkey, on the other hand, does not want the Kurdish Peshmerga or the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) to participate in the battle. Turkey believes that this form of Kurdish participation will strongly establish the Kurdish state and strengthen the Syrian Kurds. Thus, Turkey is seeking the participation of Sunni Arab, Turkmenistan forces, and Turkish military and security forces to ensure control the developments in Iraq.
Consequences of Davutoglu’s Visit
Davutoglu’s visit to Tehran revealed, for the first time, public Iranian criticism of the Russian ally policies concerning Syria. Iran’s President, Hassan Rouhani, clearly criticized the Russian proposal of a Syrian Federation. Rouhani stressed Iran’s support of Syrian unity and sovereignty of its lands. Rouhani stated that the Iranian leadership has informed Russia that the principle of maintaining a country’s sovereignty is supported by Tehran, specifically in both Iraq and Syria.
Based on mutual interests between Ankara and, Tehran, it could be said that the recent Davutoglu visit marks a new phase of relations between the two states. The scope of such a relationship will be made clearer during the upcoming visit of President Rouhani to Turkey. Questions that remain: what are the implications of this Turkish-Iranian rapprochement on Turkish-Saudi & Gulf relations? And how will this affect Iran-Russia relations?
In this regard, Iran deems Turkey as a gateway to ease unprecedented tensions with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), following tensions reaching an unprecedented level in the recent Gulf crisis with Hezbollah in the light of the latter’s relation with Iran. Moreover, Turkey considers Iran as the best channel to ease tensions with Russia. Ankara strongly believes that the US and the West in general, do not want an improvement in Turkish-Russian relations, considering the West’s strategy of depleting all Russian allies, including Turkish.
On the other hand, the previous view is sometimes considered as a mere expression of Turkish-Iranian desires which may not resonate in Riyadh, Moscow, and Washington. For Saudi Arabia, such a perception could have an adverse impact on good relations with Turkey. Riyadh considers problems with Iran are not related to dialog and relations, but rather relate to Iran’s expansionist policies and projects in the region. Furthermore, Moscow, which has rejected all calls to restore relations with Ankara, will not bestow this honor upon Iran. This is especially since Russian President, Vladimir Putin, insists that his Turkish counterpart, President Erdogan, respond to conditions set by Putin before restoring relations between both countries.
In conclusion, the Turkish Prime Minister’s visit to Iran was a step towards easing tensions and streamlining the viewpoints of both countries. The current challenges, aspirations, and mutual relationships push both sides to transform their relations. This may form a new axis which changes many regional formulas.
