Fighting in Sudan has continued for nearly two weeks after the April 15 outbreak of violence in the country, pitting the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, headed by Hamdan Dagalo (aka Hemedti). The fighting was sparked by efforts to integrate the RSF into the military; more details about the causes of the dispute can be found in this April 17 analysis. The situation remains fluid, and while the SAF appears at this point to have the upper hand nationally, the RSF – an outgrowth of the Janjaweed militias that were found in the western Darfur region throughout the 2000s and early 2010s – is viewed by many analysts as effective in urban areas and in Darfur.
At this stage of the conflict, attempting to predict how events will unfold on the ground seems futile. However, it is worth analyzing the impact of the fighting on Sudan’s seven neighbouring countries, as well as their perspectives on the conflict and potential motivations for involvement. Such involvement may take many forms, ranging from peacemaking efforts, supplying arms to one side or another, or even military intervention. While there have been no indications of radical interventions yet, the longer the conflict rages –displacing refugees from Sudan and potentially undermining neighbouring economies – the more regional governments will be pressured by their populations to act.
The Ethiopian Dilemma
The regional issue that is most likely to be impacted by the Sudan conflict relates to Ethiopia’s ongoing construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile River, less than 50 km from the Sudanese border. Construction of the dam began in 2011 and started filling in 2020. Earlier this year, the Ethiopian government announced that it was 90% complete, with the fourth and final reservoir set to be filled this summer. The GERD began generating electricity in early 2022 and will be the largest hydroelectric dam in Africa upon completion. For Ethiopia, the dam will be a transformational project, allowing it to provide consistent power to its citizens as well as develop manufacturing and other electricity-intensive industries.
While the GERD is seen as a boon to Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan, view it as an existential threat. Millions of farmers in both countries rely on the Nile for their livelihoods. Both governments claim that the construction of the GERD reservoirs will lead to increased evaporation, ultimately reducing the amount of water available to their citizens. Egypt is also concerned that reduced flows will impact its own hydroelectric production from the Aswan High Dam. To address these concerns, both Sudan and Egypt have actively called for international mediation to settle the issue, earlier this year raising the issue with the UN Security Council. However, Ethiopia has been unresponsive to these overtures, with formal negotiations having ceased in April 2021.
The question now is what impact Sudan’s unrest has on the GERD talks. It’s worth noting that for most of the 2010s under former President Omar al-Bashir, Sudan was widely perceived as more pragmatic and even-handed in its approach to the Ethiopian government and the GERD than Egypt. However, since the military coup that toppled Bashir in 2019, Sudan has taken a more confrontational stance.
It is worth noting that despite Sudan's strained relations with Ethiopia, Hemedti was the most recent high-level visitor to Addis Ababa, where he held talks with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and other senior officials in January 2022. The meeting was seen in the local press at the time as an attempt toward detente and resolving the border dispute, but it did not lead to any significant progress on the GERD issue. In March, Hemedti also had a high-level meeting with Eritrea, which is currently closely aligned with Addis Ababa.
This raises questions about the extent to which Ethiopia would act to ease the situation in Sudan. A protracted conflict would limit Sudan’s ability to raise objections to the upcoming filling of the fourth reservoir, for example, and distract its government from involving itself in future GERD talks. Perhaps Addis Ababa possibly views Hemedti as a more reliable and cooperative partner than Burhan. It is impossible to say at this stage, but the GERD issue is likely to be a critical factor in shaping Ethiopia's response in the weeks and months ahead.
Adding to the Refugee Crisis
The GERD issue will certainly create tensions among regional states, but Sudan's potential to contribute to the region's growing refugee problem should give neighbouring countries a common purpose. The Horn of Africa region is estimated to be home to 4-5 million refugees, with both South Sudan and Ethiopia each having over 2 million internally displaced persons due to civil conflict. Chad alone hosts up to 400,000 Sudanese refugees, and press reports suggest as many as 20,000 more have already arrived since the start of the fighting. While only about 60,000 are considered refugees, Egypt has an estimated 4 million Sudanese, most of whom are economic migrants. This conflict is compounded by UN reports from February that as much as a third of the population is facing a hunger crisis, and it is clear there are several factors that could lead to a new outflow of Sudanese refugees.
It is important to note that the regional patchwork of displaced persons also includes more than 800,000 South Sudanese in the north; nearly 150,000 Eritreans; 50,000 Ethiopians; 20,000 from the Central African Republic; and thousands more from other sub-Saharan countries, many of whom use Sudan as a springboard to migrate to Europe. Although regional relief and humanitarian organizations are well versed in dealing with such crises, any significant outflow of refugees will put a significant strain on their limited resources, in turn raising new demands for international donors.
Economic Woes on the Horizon
Continued conflict in Sudan will have a deleterious impact on economic growth across the region. For several years, the Sudanese economy has been struggling to replace the oil production lost after South Sudan gained independence in 2011. While Khartoum still benefits from charging Juba to ship its roughly 170,000 barrels a day of crude oil through Port Sudan, this is a pittance compared to what the government previously earned. Additionally, the crisis has already led to logistical issues in shipping crude to port, which could result in costly delivery disruptions if they continue. Meanwhile, efforts to diversify the economy have lagged due to a lack of dynamism, political uncertainty, and brain drain, while rates of poverty and unemployment remain stubbornly high. Even before the ongoing crisis, economic growth was pegged by the IMF at just over 2% in 2023; it is difficult to see it reaching even this anaemic level now.
Once again, it is not only Sudan that will suffer. Any disruption to oil shipments will have a significant negative impact on South Sudan, which was set for substantial economic recovery this year. It is challenging to predict the effect of the civil conflict on other struggling regional economies like Chad and the Central African Republic, but refugee inflows would certainly strain budgets. Ethiopia, projected to have 6% growth, is probably the most insulated. But looking at regional growth more broadly, another conflict in an already unstable part of the continent will be another deter international investment.
Can Anyone Play the Peacemaker?
Ultimately, the conflict in Sudan is damaging to the entire region. Still, none of the neighbouring states is well in a good position to act as a neutral party to help mediate and resolve the conflict. The rest of the continent is not well placed to act; Nigeria and Kenya have new presidents with enough troubles at home, although Kenyan President Ruto is beginning to show signs of regional leadership. Meanwhile, South Africa has been frittering away its diplomatic influence for decades. Beyond Africa, the ‘International Quartet’ consisting of the United States, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates have previously facilitated mediation in Sudan under UN and African Union auspices. They are likely to be called upon again to assist.
It's important not to overstate the potential for outside actors to successfully mediate this conflict. Mediation can only be effective when both sides of the conflict are willing to make peace, which is currently far from the case in Sudan. Burhan and Hemedti are in a conflict that they see as existential over dwindling resources. The proverbial pot is not big enough to go around, and this is not going to change.
