A storm has been raging through Sudan’s fragile political scene since October 25, 2021. Amidst the turmoil, an unusual political alliance, between the military, the civil, and religious factions, has been taking shape. In Mid-April, a new consensus document seen by the African Centre for Governance, Peace and Democratic Transition Studies in Khartoum was signed and handed over to Mr Malik Agar, member of the Transitional Sovereign Council and head of the political engagement and outreach committee. Delegates present on the day agreed it is an important initiative. More than 76 of Sudan’s factions signed the document, except a few groups affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and the previous ousted regime.
The proposal of a transitional government assigned by the Sudanese military council is expected to be strongly opposed by Sudan’s pro-democratic civil groups. If government goes ahead, Sudan risks international isolation and a worsening economy. This article provides an in-depth analysis of the consensus document, the possible scenarios it may spawn, and the chances of these scenarios materialising under the uncertainty engulfing the transitional period in Sudan.
A controversial document
Sudan’s consensus document aims to achieve the following ambitions:
1. Building trust amongst all factions, by pardoning political prisoners, implementing the Juba agreement for peace in Sudan, and facilitating political dialogue across the entire political spectrum during the transitional period – excluding the party of ousted president Omar Al-Bashir.
2. Formulating a new constitution based on consensus, and extending the transitional period for additional 9 months, culminating in general elections in May 2024.
3. Strengthening the relationship between the civil and military institutions, and the parties to the Juba agreement during the entire transitional period, as well as instating a federal government.
4. Introducing a new sovereign council comprising 8 seats split between civil and military representatives and including 3 representatives of parties to the Juba agreement would be on the council. Additionally, a new prime minister would be nominated after consulting with all Sudanese factions and parties to the Juba agreement.
5. Forming a new transitional parliament, comprised of 300 members.
Major Sudanese political parties signed the consensus document, including the National Umma Party, the Democratic Union Party, the coalition of the National Censuses Gathering, Justice and Equality Movement, Sudan Liberation Movement – the Transitional Council, and the Gathering of the Sudan Liberation Forces. Yet, signing the document did not come about without contention. Following the signing of the document by the chair of the Umma party, Major General Fadlallah Baramah Nasser, General Secretary Elwathig Elberir was quick to release a statement rejecting the document, claiming that the party was not consulted. General Baramah in a later statement said he had signed the document in an independent capacity.
Furthermore, a statement by the Democratic Union Party was released following the announcement of the document, asserting the party’s commitment to political dialogue – although the Party did not nominate a signatory. In addition, both the Gathering of Sudan Liberation Movement and the Sudan Liberation Forces, which are party to the Sudan Revolutionary Front, said they did not sign the document. They are, however, committed to the Front’s initiative in line with their programmes to find a way out of the current stalemate.
Under the consensus document, the military could be perceived as the institutional authority overseeing the political transition in Sudan. It empowers the military institution through executive powers that supersedes the civil groups with which it had been sharing the power. The consensus document, thus, is supported by military affiliated parties, tribal and religious leaders, as well as former insurgent groups now party to the Juba agreement signed in 2020. Ending the power sharing arrangement with the Alliance for Freedom and Change, General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan has sought the support of former and traditional parties.
The document is a bid to fill the political vacuum in Sudan. It is seen as an initiative to exist the current political impasse. An agreement was reached to begin a national dialogue in May 2022 aiming to draft a new democratic constitution that would end the transitional period, said the African Union envoy to Sudan, Mohamed al-Hassan Lebatt.
Four challenges
Gruelling challenges lay in the path ahead for Sudan. Consensus is the only viable way out of this political deadlock.
1. Securitisation of politics:
Generals Al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (generally referred to as Hemetti) are effective rulers of the country, supported by a loose coalition with former insurgents. Withstanding formidable policing measures, ailing economy, and Sudan’s notoriously hot climate, sweeping democratic protests swept the country. They were highly orchestrated and organised, succeeding in ousting Al-Bashir. Popular protests thus proved unyielding. Therefore, clashes between protesters and security forces that took place in October 2021 resulted in some 93 dead and thousands injured, according to reports. Despite being faced with police forces, thousands continue to protest the military rule, the latest of which during a rally celebrating the three-year anniversary of the popular uprising that saw the overthrowing of al-Bashir.
Whilst the security apparats seem unified in comparison to civil groups, recently rifts amongst the ranks seem to have come to the surface especially ever since Al-Bashir established the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), headed by Dagalo. This perhaps explains Al-Burhan’s manoeuvrings and may diminish chances for political stability as power competition amongst the generals.
2. Economic failure:
Living standards in Sudan have deteriorated sharply. Global price hike in food supplies and severe shortages in energy, wheat, and medical supplies have aggravated Sudan’s economy. Inflation is nearly touching 250. In the black market the Sudanese Pound has lost more than quarter of its value. Prices of commodities such as petrol, soap, and other essential imports have soared. The agriculture sector too has been affected negatively. In recent years, poor irrigation infrastructure, absence of electric supplies, and problems relating to climate change has led to 30% drop in wheat and corn production causing draughts and crop diseases. The Food & Agriculture Organization and the UN World Food Programme estimate 40% of Sudan’s population will face food insecurity in 2022.
3. Schism amongst civil society:
Historically, fractions within the civil society have caused political collapse in Sudan, which led the military to stepping in and claiming power. Whilst the 2019 uprising simultaneously produced a popular uprising and a military coup, breaking this empty cycle requires creative solutions that build on consensus.
In contrast to more traditional and typical political parties, there are many decentralised political alliances that exist in Sudan. They often do not have a defined hierarchal structure. A case in point is Forces of Freedom and Change, a coalition of opposition parties including union parties such as the Sudanese Professionals Association. These factions are unanimous in their aim for a democratic change in Sunday, yet they are divided on how they want to achieve it.
Also, there are local resistance committees, colloquially knows as district committees. These are local organised groups of civil activists who organise and lead protests demanding democracy. They arose because of calamitous economic conditions under Al-Bashir’s rule. In the following years, they became increasingly politicised, especially after October 25, 2021. They do not follow a clear hierarchal structure, working in a decentralised fashion. Often mobilised by younger activists, they overlook class, age, and ethnicity. Historically, these committees prefer non-violent forms of activism, and strongly discard customary ways of doing politics – elitist and conducted behind closed doors.
Most notable disagreements amongst the opposition centre on political and ideological differences, which in turn translate into disagreements on political agendas and path towards political transition that breaks away from the current gridlock.
4. Ripples of the Ukrainian war:
As Russia aims to shift the international system, it has become clear that the military, led by Al-Burhan and Hemetti, in Sudan is keen to take advantage and break Sudan’s isolation. A major global power, Russia could throw Sudan a lifeline out of its current situation. The classic male leader figure is returning, epitomised by Vladimir Putin. It is no secret that Russia has been active in Africa for some time, through its security contractors and ever-expanding investments. In Sudan, Russia has been cementing its relations with the military regime through contracts by Wagner security group with Hemetti’s RSF to protect the lucrative gold mines. Some reports indicate Russia has had access to more than 30 tons of illicit gold in recent years, alleviating the effects of Western sanctions imposed on Russia. In addition, Russia’s ambitions in the region reaches far beyond as it eyes a naval base in Port Sudan that would offer easy access to the Red Sea. The US may have threatened Sudan’s officials with economic sanctions to curb Russia’s activity in the country, but the receding role of the US in the region means these sanctions just aim to create pressure to hinder the strengthening alliance between the Sudanese and the Russian leaders.
The risks ahead
The path to consensus is marred with multi-vector risks. One one hand, if the military regime succeeds in achieving its goals, then more popular protests are expected in the short term. Tightening international isolation and a worsening economic crisis are more predictable in the long run. On the other hand, more factions are raising their discontent with the document which in their perspective lacks popular support. Effectively the military holds control and may well pass the document without the need for civil or popular support. Finally, the military may capitalise on the loose and vague language of the document to achieve these aims, through two key instruments:
1. Reinvigorating an alliance with the Islamists to build a civil legitimacy:
A wide-reaching security apparatus reminiscent of ones existing under Al-Bashir regime will enable Al-Burhan to tighten his grip on power. A unique alliance has to be formed to achieve this: with the Islamist bloc on one end, the only civil faction willing to support Al-Burhan; and the former insurgency groups that are now party to the Juba peace agreement, on the other. To this end, Al-Burhan replaced key senior officials in ministry of justice and intelligence agency who had been appointed by the former Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, and reinstated extensive authorities to the general security agencies.
Supported by the Islamists, Al-Burhan aims to reinforce the status quo through a network of old guard inside and outside of the government. A prominent figure in the old regime was released – former foreign minister and the former head of the ruling National Congress Party, Ibrahim Ghandour. In addition, a new Islamist movement called the ‘Broad Islamic Current’, chiefly comprised of the Muslim Brotherhood has been established, who is one of the main signatories of the consensus document, alongside the International Organisation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Islamic Unity Initiative.
2. Abandoning the UN-sponsored democratic process that followed October 25 events – ending any last hopes for a fully-civil government:
Al- Burhan and other high-ranking officials asked the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sudan and Head of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan, Mr Volker Perthes, to leave Sudan following a speech in which he said the situation in Sudan is deteriorating unless a political consensus is reached as soon as possible.
Three Scenarios
Sudan faces three possible scenarios in the short term. They encompass differences in approaches to government, security and economic circumstances, and access to essential commodities and services. These scenarios are:
1. The abyss:
In the short term, if a deal is reached without considering the wider popular demands spearheaded by the Alliance for Freedom and Change, then the prospects look more violent and complicated. The security forces would respond more harshly to supress the demonstrations. Another reason for increased violence could result from rifts within the security institution, as the powers and authority of Hemetti’s Forces grow bigger.
In the mid to long term, it is likely that the mounting power of the military institution and its alliance may lead to partial elections, resulting in international isolation and the UN envoy withdrawing from Sudan. These circumstances would accelerate Sudan’s economic collapse and food insecurity, leading to large waves of Sudanese refugees.
2. The civil government:
A workable solution may still be attainable by reaching a nation-wide consensus between the military, and the civil, religious and political factions. Reasonable election timelines could be agreed to allow fair campaigning and election. A civilian figure could lead the transitional period. In this scenario, regional partners such as the United Arab Emirates and Egypt would offer support. The UN would also offer support alongside the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) under the auspice of the African Union to realise a democratic transition in Sudan. Yet this scenario is contingent on implementing security arrangements outlined in the Juba Peace Agreement, achieve cease fire in Darfur and other regions, protests winding up, and receiving international aid.
3. The return of Islamists government:
The military and members of the former regime are working hand in hand to take control of power in Sudan. Yet protests keep intensifying in Khartoum, though waning in regional areas. Also, insurgents who did not sign the Juba Agreement continue the violence in Darfur. Economy is expected to hit a sharp recession – although limited trade with sympathising states and international aid may prevent a total collapse. In this scenario, the military alongside the supporting Islamist bloc would run a presidential election in 2024 to cement their grip on power through a veneer of legitimacy.
In reality the recent local and regional development taking shape away from Sudan’s capital in areas such as Darfur and easter region may allow for more than one scenario to materialise. What complicates the way out of this gridlock is the political ambition military officers combined with a total popular rejection of military rule. At the end of the day politics is the art of the possible; if Sudan was to avoid the falling into the abyss, a diarchy of military and civil rule might be the best viable solution out of the current cul-de-sac.
