Israel steps into 2022 with lurking internal and external challenges, the developments of which are difficult to predict. One of the key challenges is its threat to use the unilateral military option to impede Iran's nuclear project, as well as the possibility of Tel Aviv entering into a clash with the Biden administration over the Palestinian and Iranian files. This is in addition to the difficulties it may encounter in expanding peace and cooperation agreements to include other Arab countries.
These and other challenges are related to domestic issues pertaining in one aspect to the ability of the current ruling coalition, led by Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, to remain in power, and in another aspect to the unprecedented escalation of internal political and social divisions.
Obstacles to striking Iran
Israel failed to persuade the US, under the Biden administration, to refrain from negotiating with Iran to return to the JCPOA. Tel Aviv stressed that it would not accept reviving the nuclear agreement even in its original form, calling on Washington to adopt the military option against Tehran. Israel also threatened that it might have to act unilaterally against the Iranian nuclear project, even if the US objects to that.
However, there are doubts regarding the possibility of Israel launching a unilateral military strike against Iran, for several considerations, including the following:
1- Israel does not possess the military capabilities that would enable it to destroy all Iranian nuclear facilities, which are distributed in widely separated and highly guarded sites.
2- If Israel is capable of selecting a single Iranian nuclear site or facility to focus its strikes on and disable it completely, by disrupting the project’s integration and slowing its implementation for several years to come, then, if Iran is exposed to direct Israeli attacks with missile strikes or air strikes, this will turn the scene into a large-scale war. In such scenario, Tel Aviv is expected to face intense missile attacks directed at most of its cities by Iran’s arms in the region, specifically in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen. This is a scenario that Israel cannot afford to face alone.
3- Despite Israel’s threats to Iran, which coincided with the former conducting naval and air maneuvers with the US and other allied countries, as well as conducting massive trainings on how the Israeli home front would face multiple attacks from several external parties, and even within the possibilities of confrontations during the war with Iran amidst clashes between Arab and Jewish citizens within mixed cities, these threats can be perceived as part of a "psychological war" waged by Israel, not only against Iran, but also against the US as well as the other five signatories to the 2015 agreement.
Tel Aviv's goal in this respect is one of two: Either to force Tehran to yield and return to commitment to the nuclear agreement, even in the form that does not satisfy Israel, since it will practically deter Iran from reaching the nuclear threshold for a period that may extend to eight years. The other goal is that the US would announce the failure of negotiations with Iran, giving Israel the right to request tougher international sanctions on Tehran on the one hand, and to urge Washington to agree to joint military action against Iranian nuclear facilities on the other hand.
Either way, a direct war between Israel and Iran is unlikely to erupt in the near term, although this will prompt Israel further to intensify its cyber attacks against Iran's nuclear, military, security and even civilian institutions. Tel Aviv may also carry out specific operations within Iranian territory aimed at eliminating Iranian scientists working in the nuclear field.
The ongoing marginalization of the Palestinian conflict
Despite the promises made by Biden regarding reviving the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations which have been stalled for years, with the governing framework of these negotiations being the two-state solution, there are doubts regarding Biden's ability to fulfill his promise, in light of Naftali Bennett's unequivocal and public rejection of this solution. The Biden administration also desires to conclude the Iranian file first, without diverting its efforts in this regard.
The key issue here lies in Israel's ability to exploit the security card to dismantle US pressure on it, as this card has become contingent upon the invisible link between the Iranian and Palestinian files, as well as Tel Aviv's attempts to convince Washington that it cannot pose a double danger to its security. Those threats are represented in Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons on the one hand, and the Palestinians’ efforts on the other hand to either destroy them (as Hamas and Jihad wish), or to impair them (as the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah desires) by adopting the project of taking Israel back to the borders of June 4, 1967, while all Israeli security experts agree that they will be untenable borders that would endanger Israel's existence even in the long run.
In a more blunt sense, if the Vienna nuclear negotiations fail, Israel will exploit the US failure as an excuse to force Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions. This will then justify its unwillingness to expose itself to another danger by making concessions to the Palestinians. Then, it will be difficult for Washington to pose pressure on Tel Aviv in this regard, and therefore the former will be forced to freeze its promises regarding launching a peace process between the Palestinians and the Israelis. Even if the Biden administration manages to persuade Iran to return to the commitments stipulated in the 2015 agreement, Israel will continue to insist that this will not be sufficient to neutralize the Iranian threat, and that it exposes itself to an equal danger posed by the two-state solution.
Developing the Abrahamic Accords
The peace agreements signed by Israel with the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan represent a great success for Israeli diplomacy. Israel also hopes to preserve and develop these agreements and to include more Arab countries in them. However, these successes remain threatened by the unstable conditions in some countries, including Sudan, which announced its disappointment at not receiving the desired return in terms of economic aid and political support.
The same is true for Morocco, where the political Islam movement suffered a major defeat in the recent legislative elections, which got it expelled from leading the government. Thus, this current together with even more hardline currents may turn towards mobilizing public opinion there against the agreement with Israel.
Hence, Israel's expansion of the Abrahamic peace agreements to include other Arab countries may be unlikely to occur in 2022. Instead, Tel Aviv may work to develop or at least maintain the cooperation agreements that have been reached with Arab countries.
Domestic crises
Israel faces complex domestic issues, primarily the existence of a ruling coalition with a limited majority, which makes it vulnerable to disintegration at any moment, and which may lead the country to return to the political crisis of not having an elected goverment. These fears intensify in light of the slow procedures regarding the trial of the former prime minister and the current opposition leader, Benjamin Netanyahu. The ruling coalition led by Bennett is currently seeking in every way to expel Netanyahu from the political map, whether by passing some legislation preventing his candidacy for the position of prime minister as long as he remains on trial, or by pressuring Judicial institutions to speed up his trial.
Naftali Bennett-Yair Lapid coalition is known to have been established based on the pledge of its members not to enter into any disputes that would threaten the survival of the coalition for at least a year (ending this August). This is in the hope that Netanyahu would be condemned during this period, and accordingly will be removed from the political arena for several years to come. However, this pledge does not seem to guarantee the survival of Bennett and his government for a longer period if pressures to speed up Netanyahu's trial do not succeed.
Moreover, Israel suffers from serious tension between its Jewish and Arab citizens, a situation that is difficult to address in a short time. This may impact Tel Aviv's decisions regarding the possibility of it entering into an open military confrontation with Iran, or the possibility of it continuing to reject US pressure to forge paths to peace with the Palestinians. This Israeli concern stems from the precedent of violence between Arab and Jewish Israeli citizens during the military confrontations between Israel and Hamas in May 2021, which then constituted a major security burden on the Israeli home front, and which could be repeated in the event of a broad confrontation between Tel Aviv and Tehran, or on the grounds of Israeli security practices, particularly in Jerusalem and the West Bank.
