Tunisia adopts a pragmatic foreign policy aimed at strengthening its relations with some regional and international powers, including Iran and China. This is in an attempt to develop existing relations on all levels, primarily political and economic.
Key Indicators
A number of key indicators show that the Tunisian political system has adopted a foreign policy that seeks political, economic, and security rapprochement with regional and international powers belonging to the eastern camp, as explained below:
1. Saied's visit to China:
Tunisian President Kais Saied paid an official visit to China from May 30 to June 5, 2024, to participate in the 10th Ministerial Conference of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum. Last January, President Saied met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Tunisia. It was agreed at the time on the importance of developing Tunisian-Chinese relations in a number of political and economic fields (agriculture, infrastructure, and renewable energy) in addition to health and sports. Last May, Deputy Secretary-General of the Communist Party of China Guo Fenqi visited Tunisia; the two countries also celebrated the 60th anniversary of their diplomatic relations at the beginning of this year.
2. Cancellation of visas for Iranians:
The Tunisian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a decision to cancel the entry visa to Tunisia for holders of ordinary Iranian passports starting from June 15, 2024. This was part of a decision that included canceling the entry visa for Iraqi passport holders to Tunisia. This came after the recent visit by President Saied to Iran to offer condolences on the death of Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi. During the visit, Saied met with the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, for the first time. Despite the fact that this came after Iran took the same decision last February, it is an important indicator of a Tunisian route to diversify relations with non-Western regional and international powers. Before the death of the Iranian President, there was an agreement with Saied to organize several reciprocal visits by officials of the two countries, headed by the heads of state.
Specific Objectives
Through its current shift towards the East (Iran, China), Tunisia seeks to achieve a set of diverse objectives in all political and economic fields, the most prominent of which are:
1. Establishing strategic alliances:
Tunisia's current foreign policy aims to deepen existing bilateral relations in all domains (politically, economically, and security-wise) with a number of regional and international powers of major importance at both the regional and international levels. Since 1990, a Tunisian-Iranian committee has been formed to explore ways to promote common bilateral interests. The committee has succeeded in the two countries signing more than 20 protocols in several strategic fields over the past years. At the same time, Tunisia is seeking to follow up on implementing the agreements signed to strengthen bilateral cooperation with China in all fields and establish strategic alliances in the near future.
2. Maximizing economic gains:
Tunisia seeks to achieve economic gains through developing its bilateral relations with both Iran and China, as follows:
- China is Tunisia's fourth trading partner after France, Italy, and Germany, with the trade volume between the two countries amounting to about USD 6 billion. Tunisia is keen to establish economic partnerships with China and improve the level of economic and trade relations. The visit witnessed the signing of economic cooperation agreements between Tunisia and Beijing in the fields of development cooperation, trade exchange development, sustainable development, and modern technology. China has also pledged to implement projects in the health, infrastructure, energy, transportation, scientific research, and tourism sectors. However, observers feel that Saied's visit to China had little impact on Tunisia's economic development, particularly in terms of debating the country's USD 2 billion trade gap with China and Tunisia's membership in the "BRICS" group.
Furthermore, Saied should have discussed strategies to attract Chinese investment, as China expects the Tunisian government to enhance economic conditions. On the other hand, other experts believe there are opportunities to strengthen Tunisian-Chinese economic relations during the coming period, based on the size of the economic agreements signed between the two countries in recent years. Tunisia also hopes to benefit from Chinese investments directed to African countries, which are estimated at USD 400 billion. The China-Africa Cooperation Forum also represents an institutional framework for strengthening economic cooperation between China and African countries, including Tunisia. Tunisia's participation in China's Belt and Road Initiative opens the door for Tunisia to achieve economic gains from it.
- Tunisia hopes to gain economic benefits from its political rapprochement with Iran. The two countries share a desire to develop economic relations, and Iran aims to enter African markets through Tunisia to market industrial products, including electric cars. Therefore, the two countries can cooperate in the field of car assembly, supply Tunisian phosphate to China, and strengthen cooperation in the field of maritime transport. Iran is also keen to develop the volume of trade exchange with Tunisia, which amounted to about USD 12 billion in 2017. These relations can be developed by activating the customs tariff reduction agreement signed between them in 2007.
3. Countering Western pressure on Tunisia:
One aspect of Tunisia's shift towards the East (Iran, China) is to pressure donor countries and institutions, headed by European countries and the International Monetary Fund, to ease the pressure they exert on Tunisia. This is in addition to strengthening Tunisia's negotiating position with the International Monetary Fund, which helps it obtain loans and economic assistance, in order to prevent Tunisia from strengthening its relations with China and Iran and abandoning its strategic partnerships with European Union countries.
Multiple Implications
Tunisia's rapprochement with Iran and China carries several important political implications, the most prominent of which are:
1. A pragmatic policy:
The development of the existing bilateral relations between Tunisia and, Iran and China reflects the adoption of a foreign policy by the Tunisian political system characterized by a great deal of pragmatism seeking to maximize Tunisian gains on all political and economic levels. This is in addition to the country's rejection of foreign interference in the country's internal affairs, which is used domestically to strengthen the legitimacy of the Qais Said-led regime in the run-up to the upcoming presidential elections.
2. Diversification of partners:
Tunisia's shift towards the East reflects its desire to diversify its partners, especially in terms of developing economic relations, which contributes to reviving the fragile Tunisian economy. This was evident in the outcomes of President Saied's recent visit to China. Saied wants to convey to both domestic and foreign audiences that the Tunisian decision-making process is independent, particularly in terms of Tunisia's relations with its regional and international partners, and that these relations should be expanded to include strategic relations in all political, economic, and security fields, rather than being limited to traditional relations with Western countries.
3. Tunisian political maneuver:
Tunisia's current efforts to strengthen relations with Iran and China also indicate its desire to use this rapprochement as a pressure card to alleviate the Western pressures facing its government. This is in addition to not succumbing to European pressures nor breaking free from its political and economic dependence. This comes at a time of escalating Tunisian-European tensions due to President Saied's inability to meet the International Monetary Fund's conditions to grant it a loan of about USD 1.9 billion, especially concerning lifting government subsidies, reducing wages and salaries, and falling the number of state employees - all of which Saied rejected. This is in light of the domestic deterioration of economic and living conditions and to avoid stirring public opinion against him, especially before the upcoming elections. Saied's recent visit to China also sparked a reaction from the European Union, which expressed its concern about developing Tunisian-Chinese relations in a way that could reduce European influence in Tunisia and the Maghreb region. Therefore, the European Investment Bank rushed, after the end of Saied's visit to China, to provide 450 million euros in loans and aid to support small and medium-sized enterprises in Tunisia. This was a European attempt to confirm the continuation of European support for the Tunisian economy despite the current differences between the two parties.
4. Breaking out of international isolation:
Tunisian-Iranian rapprochement represents an opportunity for Tunisia to achieve some political and economic gains. Iran sees this rapprochement as a way out of international isolation in light of the global sanctions imposed on it because of its nuclear program on the one hand and the tension in its relations with the United States and European countries on the other. Therefore, Tehran seeks to strengthen its relations with Tunisia and the Maghreb and North Africa region, which gives it greater room for foreign movement and thus alleviates the repercussions of the international isolation imposed on it.
The rapprochement in relations between Tunisia, Iran, and Russia indicates a qualitative change in the current direction of Tunisian foreign policy. One of the most important features of this is the shift towards diversifying partners and establishing a network of strategic alliances on both regional and international levels. This comes after Tunisian relations have been confined to Western countries only, in the context of adopting a multipolar policy, in light of the rapid rise of China as an international power that can be relied upon to achieve multiple political and economic gains; and thus preserve the strategic interests of the state.
At the same time, the compatibility of the Tunisian and Iranian visions in terms of preserving the strategic interests of each on the one hand, and concerning some international issues raised, headed by the Palestinian issue on the other hand, represents a strong basis that can be relied upon to develop the pattern of Tunisian-Iranian relations during the coming period.
The Tunisian shift towards the East comes within the framework of a policy of diversifying partners. This excludes Tunisia completely moving away from its existing allies and strategic partnerships with European countries within the framework of what it achieves from financial benefits at the level of its trade relations with these countries.
