It is normal and even realistic that the apparent political propensity of religious groups and organizations, led by the MB, would place the issue of "adaptation" on its agenda. Some groups are preoccupied with presenting themselves to the society by speech and presence in order to win its acceptance, particularly during the election seasons. Other groups are hostile and seek to subdue people and to change their ideas and ideals by force, refusing to advance on the map of society through peaceful settlements, where elections come as a key step. They view democracy as a "blasphemous process", which they should not consider or delve into.
A political project
Since the MB's founding statement, it has been clear that this is a political project, which seeks power, even if its founder Hassan al-Banna initially portrayed it as a religious advocacy approach. Five years after the launch of his group in 1928, Al-Banna himself got into politics, and asked his followers to delve into politics with him. Some of them withdrew, and those who remained understood that this is a political project that utilized religion as means and that adopted Islam as an ideology.
Realistically, as MB presented themselves to people, they had to consider the surrounding setup, which is saturated with opposing ideas, parties, and rival groups. This is a context that would clash with them, as it is based on material and moral power. Thus, the MB must consider the potential of this setup, deal with it, and gradually undermine it.
The MB's political project made it concerned with soliciting people and befriending them during the stage of "patience". This shifted to blatant confrontations, when they reached the stage of "empowerment". However, the circumstances of these people and the rules governing their relations with the political power, their affiliates and sympathizers vary from one place to the other place. The regimes that the MB has to deal with also differ, as does the level of radicalization of the Islamic perception in the minds of the public sphere.
Such a setting has made the group's "center", with its mentor, guidance office and council in Egypt, seek to understand the "surroundings". This came of particular significance after the MB's widespread in over 80 countries around the world, whether under the name of the MB itself, or parties and religious associations or think tanks, as part of the International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, which sprang in 1958.
Thus, the MB's leadership has left its branches with a margin of free self-reliant movement, using their local forces and their own evaluation of the surrounding political, social, cultural and economic contexts, which ultimately serves the group's overall interest. This did not mean that the branches would be in constant contact with the headquarters, but that the latter had the upper hand in making decisions, even if this meant keeping the leadership informed.
MB's behavior
Accordingly, the MB's positions differ from one country to the other, whether in dealing with the political power, the political system or with the society in general. Thus, everywhere, the MB employs available opportunities, which dictate certain behavior as it seeks to "adapt" and "reinforce" itself. This behavior can be illustrated as follows:
1- Showing flexibility regarding the inclusion of the MB:
At the vulnerable stage, the group has no objection to accepting allusions and actions of political power towards the inclusion of the group, which is perceived as an opportunity to secure years of acceptance, enabling it to advance, even a little, toward its key goals.
2- Reaching understanding with the authorities over key political issues and positions:
When a crisis intensifies and people are on the verge of an outrage or are actually bursting into anger, political power reasons with the MB, so as to stay away or contribute to the process of appeasement. This happened frequently in Egypt, even in the early days of the 2011 revolution, and was repeatedly seen at a lower level in the parliamentary elections, where the MB's candidates coordinated with the candidates of the ruling party in the distribution of the electoral districts. This was also witnessed in the recent Algerian movement, where the MB's were asked not to escalate and to help with absorbing public outrage.
3- The authorities' ability to utilize the MB politically:
Here, the boundaries of the relationship with the political power extend beyond containment, understanding and appeasement, as the MB's potential is used to achieve certain political balances. President Sadat used them to strike the left Wing, and Mubarak used them as a warning to the West, considering that the MB and its allies would fill any vacuum resulting from his removal or the breakdown of his regime, which would threaten the interests of the US and Europe in the Middle East.
4- The MB's consent with the available margin:
The MB demonstrates a great deal of political humility, so as not to irritate the ruling power, pretending to be content with the limited space available for it. The claims the MB kept repeating about faithfulness to the slogan of "participation, not dominance" or "We want to be ruled not rule by Islam" proved false, since when they found their way to power in Egypt, following the January 25 revolution, they sought to seize everything, until their overthrow on June 30, 2013.
5- Interim cooperation with the political opposition:
This is a key tactic pursued by the MB, by raising the slogan "We cooperate in our agreement, and excuse each other in our disagreement". Sometimes, the MB hides behind the opposition's walls as the latter competes with or challenges the political power. This was clearly evident in the Egyptian, Moroccan and Jordanian cases, and in Tunisia immediately after Bin Ali's departure.
6- Exploiting the availability of public freedoms:
Although the essence of the MB's political project is filled with reservations about the freedom of thought, expression and management of any party other than the group, including other Islamist political groups, the MB has definitely leveraged any space where the society has taken away some of its required freedoms, or was granted them by the authorities. This was utilized in the publication of "Brotherhood discourse" through publications of newspapers, magazines and books or through podiums and mosque lessons.
7- Utilizing the rights of citizens stipulated by the constitution and recognized by the law:
Members of the MB in any country are citizens whose rights are guarded by a constitutional and legal umbrella, and no matter how much of that is violated, whatever is left benefits citizens. Prior to enacting laws countering terrorism in some countries, the MB benefited from this umbrella, and those of the group who commit no violence continue to live under it even after the enactment of the Terrorism Act. In many Arab and Islamic countries, and through an army of lawyers affiliated with the MB, MB members benefit from constitutions and laws in defending their existence and protecting their interests.
8- Capitalizing on external pressures that call on political reform and a democratic transition:
These pressures are exerted by the West on most Arab countries. Accordingly, some regimes give up their inclusiveness, which is beneficial to the MB as well as various religious and civil parties and movements. In this setting, the MB engages in calls for reform and liberation, not out of firm belief in freedom and its implications in the social, religious and cultural spheres, but as a mere step that helps the group reinforce its presence, which brings it somewhat closer to its objectives.
9- Exploitation of internal political crises:
The MB is vigilant about any looming crisis, which may pose pressure on the political power. Here, the group would exploit its ability to mobilize, and would employ its accumulated political capital to negotiate with the political power for any potential gains. This has been witnessed more than once in Egypt, culminating in the days of the 2011 revolution. It has also been witnessed in the Algerian movement, in the Tunisian revolution, and even following the US occupation of Iraq, and the emergence of an armed resistance movement against it.
10- Employing economic capacities to expand the circles of sympathizers with the MB for their benefits:
These capabilities have played a paradoxical role in the MB's life. As much as they have employed them in recruiting and mobilizing, whether for elections or demonstrations, they have also listened to the calls to take into account their inflated wealth, to appear more flexible, to make concessions, and to go with the rule that "Capital is a coward". Gradually, the partnership logic has largely prevailed over the group's perceptions and behavior.
11- Benefiting from the saturation of the public sphere with a religious discourse that has politicization tendencies:
This religious discourse often tends to be politicized, whether by going back to speaking of the past "Caliphate" or by jumping to speak about the MB’s future return.
Different experiences
Those 11 factors govern the MB's handling of the crises it has experienced, whether in recent years or much earlier. They also determine whether the group is containable, even ready for a temporary integration within the ongoing political process, or it would rebel and resort to violence, as shown in various Arab experiences.
According to these elements, the MB varies between "pro-conformity" and "opposition", from conformity with and reassuring the monarchy in Morocco, to adopting inciting rhetoric and resorting to symbolic, verbal and material violence in Egypt. Between these two scenarios, the MB in Algeria accepted inclusion under the umbrella of the state, learning from their bitter experience with the "bloody decade" at the end of the 20th century. The MB in Jordan was also satisfied with the space granted by the state. Whenever they sought to expand or deepen it, this would be according to accurate calculations without venturing or gambling.
The MB Renaissance movement in Tunisia included all that, starting with vulnerability and submissiveness, shifting to vivid presence and revival immediately after Bin Ali's departure, moving on to the talk about participation and harmony with the interim authority, onward to empowerment and monopolization. Facing major challenges following the recent actions taken by President Kais Saied on July 25th, the MB returned to a befriending mode, and a talk around accepting dialogue and negotiations.
