The Supreme Guide of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ali Khomeini, is continually attempting to assert his power over the decision-making bodies of the Iranian regime. While this is not a new policy, it has gained increasing importance recently due to a number of reasons. Some of these reasons are internal, related to the rising debate on the government’s - particularly the president’s - authority in decision-making. Other reasons are external, related to the rising regional tensions Iran is involved in, whether thanks to the gradual decline in its role in the Syrian conflict to be replaced by Russia, or the increasing refusal of countries in the region of Iranian interference in their internal affairs. This is all in addition to continuing accusations of supporting terrorism, violating human rights, and involvement in money laundering.
All the above may explain Khomeini’s decision, on September 19th, to reconfirm the Supreme National Security Council membership of his allies from the anti-President-Rouhani fundamentalist conservative bloc as well as the moderates, namely Dr. Saeed Jalili, the Supreme Guide’s representative on the Council, and Ali Shamkhani, the Council’s Secretary General. This step seems to indicate the continuing direction going forward, especially with increasing talk within Iran about the issue of succession to the Supreme Guide. Khameini appears to to have started clearing the way for his successor. One of the steps towards that end was calling on the Assembly of Experts - the body responsible for appointing and removing the Supreme Guide - with the importance of choosing a “revolutionary successor.” This is also indicated by a number of other decisions Khomeini has taken recently, including appointing Ibrahim Raisi as head of the “Astan Kuds Radwa” organization. Raisi is a conservative figure currently facing accusations of participating in the mass executions carried out against the opposition in 1988, and is one of those seen as a potential successor to Khomeini.
Internal Balances
This last step taken by Khomeini seems to indicate that he is sending messages to internal forces that the efforts undertaken by the Rouhani regime to increase its influence on decision-making will fail thanks to the widespread influence of Supreme Guide allies in most, if not all, decision-making bodes; a fact that leads to the power balance in these bodies always leaning towards the Supreme Guide.
Adding to that, the Supreme Guide has used the presence of conservative figures on the Supreme National Security Council - including Saeed Jalili, who had run in the latest presidential elections in 2013 and lost to President Hassan Rouhani - to prevent the president from reopening the case of lifting house arrest from the members of what is known as the Green Movement. The Green Movement had led protests in Iran in 2009 against the results of the presidential elections that had former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad winning a second term. Fundamental conservatives in Iran maintain the importance of both Mir Hassan Moussaoui and Mehdi Karroubi apologizing before a decision is made to remove them from house arrest.
Renewing Jalili’s tenure as the Supreme Guide’s representative on the Council also keeps the former at the forefront of the political arena, perhaps in anticipation of a second presidential election run in May of 2017. This is especially true now that the fundamental conservatives have not yet reached a consensus on a single figure to run against President Rouhani, who will be running for a second term in the upcoming elections.
There is no doubt that all of this does not indicate that Khomeini has made a final decision on nominating Jalili, especially that he is known not to intervene in determining the nominees until right before the elections in case they do not align with his continued efforts to control decision-making elements of the regime. Khomeini uses numerous methods to maintain that control, including the Guardian Council of the Constitution, which has the power to choose presidential nominees and always removes nominees who are unacceptable to the Supreme Guide or the regime’s other powerful organizations. This was the case in the last presidential elections, where Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, president of the Expediency Discernment Council of the System, was removed under the guise of being too old, and Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, former president Ahmadinejad’s Chief of Staff, was removed due to his political leanings, leading to widespread controversy in Iran and becoming one of the factors in the rift between Supreme Guide Khomeini and former president Ahmadinejad.
The list also includes Ali Shamkhani. In spite of some indications that he is a reformist, especially since he was former president Mohammad Khatami’s Minister of Defense, this goes against some of the positions has held in the past. He has recently been very careful to remain aligned with the regime’s extremist rhetoric, especially in regards to the conflict in Syria, having been appointed as the Supreme Coordinator of Security and Military Affairs with Syria and Russia in June of 2016. He also deliberately avoided reopening the case of the house arrest of Ali Moussaoui and Mehdi Karroubi, a case which has received special attention from the Rouhani regime. He has also previously participated in campaigns the regime had launched against figures of the opposition.
Regional Pressures
In addition to all the internal balances above, Khomeini’s insistence on maintaining his allies in some regime organizations or supporting their chances to head some of these organizations reflects the regional pressures Iran is currently under, all of which strengthen the fundamental conservatives. Iran has clear concerns of any deals Russia and the United States may reach in Syria, which may not take Iran’s interests into consideration, especially when it comes to Bashar al Assad’s continued rule.
The latest ceasefire agreement in Syria reached by Russia and the United States brought to light the large discrepancies between the two parties. This was especially clear in the criticisms Russia lobbed at the United States after the Washington-led international coalition’s attacks on Syrian army bases in Der Al Zour. These discrepancies were still not enough to allay Iran’s fears of Russia’s true aims in Syria, which became clear after the announcement of the deployment of Russian fighters and jets at the Nouja airbase in Hamadan. It was very clear after the announcement that Iran was displeased with Russia’s intentional disclosure of reaching an understanding with Iran on that Issue, which Tehran saw as an attempt by Moscow to show off its abilities and confirm its position as the main player in the Syrian conflict, able to shape the direction of the conflict in the future.
In addition to the above, Iran is facing increasing regional rejection of its constant meddling in the internal affairs of neighboring countries. This is especially true in light of the negative role it has played in the various regional conflicts. Iran is also facing accusations of supporting terrorism, abusing the nuclear deal, and involvement in money laundering.
What is interesting here is that the fundamental conservatives are now using these external pressures to lob strong attacks at the policies of President Hassan Rouhani. Rouhani’s policies revolve around the importance of reaching “understandings” with the United Sates, and not just on the nuclear issue, which was settled by the agreement reached in July, 2015, but also on a number of other regional portfolios such as the Syrian conflict.
In other words, Iran’s fundamental conservatives aim to lay the responsibility of the various regional and international crises - which they believe have carried negative consequences to Iran’s interests - on the Rouhani regime. This is all with the aim of limiting the freedom of movement and maneuvering margins available to the government by solidifying their allies’ positions in decision-making organizations, all in preparation for the most anticipated decision in Iran, which is who will be Khomeini’s successor as Supreme Guide.
